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Abstract 
 
To increase the opportunities for poor ethnic minorities to benefit from economic 
growth the government of Vietnam implemented one of the biggest poverty 
reduction programs entitled ‘Socio-economic Development for the Communes 
Facing Greatest Hardships in the Ethnic Minority and Mountainous Areas’ during 
2006-2010. This paper provides empirical evidence of this program’s impacts on 
households in the project areas. We find that the program had positive impacts on 
several important outcomes of the ethnic minority households, including 
productive asset ownership, household durables ownership, and rice productivity. 
Among higher-order outcomes, they enjoyed positive impacts in income from 
agriculture, household total income, and household per-capita income. A 
particularly important result is that poverty among minority households in 
treatment communes declined significantly more than it declined in comparison 
communes. Finally, ethnic minority households enjoyed a reduction in travel time 
to health facilities, relative to households in control communes. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Vietnam is one of the most successful countries in the world in terms of poverty 
reduction and economic achievement over the past twenty years. The poverty rate 
fell from 58 percent in 1993 to around 14 percent by 2008. Land and trade 
reforms are the major factors that contributed to high and sustained economic 
growth; these are the main reasons three of every four poor people escaped from 
poverty during this period. However, the rate of poverty reduction has slowed 
down over time.Most of the remaining poor households live in remote rural areas 
which are mainly populated by ethnic minorities.  
To increase the opportunities for poor households to benefit from economic 
growth, the government introduced Program 135-II (P135-II):the largest and most 
important poverty reduction program targeted on the ethnic minorities and 
remote areas. The main objectives of P135-II are: (i) to reduce the poverty rate in 
the target areas to below 30%; (ii) to ensure that more than 70% of the 
households in the target areas have annual income per capita higher than 3.5 
million VND; (iii) to improve agricultural productivity of the main crops; and (iv) 
to increase the net primary and net secondary school enrollment rates to at least 
95% and 75%, respectively. 
To achieve these objectives, P135-II was designed with four major support 
components: (i) agricultural production support through improving skills and 
training the ethnic minorities on new production practices; (ii) support to develop 
local infrastructure and to increase the households’ access to that infrastructure; 
(iii) improvement of the socio-cultural life and access to public services; (iv) 
strengthening the administrative and professional capacity of local officials and 
enhancing their knowledge of investment and operations management. The total 
budget allocated for P135-II was about US$ 1.1billion for 2006- 2010 period. 
Baseline Survey and End-line Survey 
In a substantial effort to evaluate the effectiveness of P135-II and to enhance the 
designs of future programs, the Committee for Ethnic Minorities (CEM), with the 
support of UNDP, conducted a baseline survey in 2007 (BLS 2007) and an end-line 
survey in 2012 (ELS 2012). The large sample size (6000 households in 400 
communes in 42 provinces), sound methodology in survey design, and systematic 
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and professional evaluation procedure, these surveys provide the most 
comprehensive view of the socio-economic circumstances of  ethnic minority 
peopleswho face persistent poverty and other difficulties. In particular, these data 
sets  (i) support measurement of the progress in poverty reduction and advances 
in socio-economic status of ethnic minority communities in remote mountainous 
areas of Vietnam over the past 5 years; (ii)  allow rigorous analysis of progress in 
the socio-economic development of ethnic minority communities participating in 
P135-II; (iii) allow measurement of changes in key outcomes attributable to P135-
II; and (iv) provide reliable quantitative baseline data for designing and measuring 
the progress of future government poverty reduction programs. 
Implementation and Decentralization of P135-II 
The program has succeeded in encouraging households to participate in local 
projects. In 2010 around 85 percent of P135-II projects involved local selection 
meetings.The proportions of households aware of the meetings were 56.1 percent 
and 79.3 percent in 2007 and 2010, respectively. These figures first show an 
improvement in household awareness over the period 2007 – 2010, indicating 
better information dissemination at the village level. Nevertheless, there is still 
scope to improve the level of household awareness. 
While the percentage of households who voice their opinions during project 
selection meeting nearly tripled from 2007 to 2010, the figure remained low at 
36.1 percent in 2010. Most ethnic minority groups use their native language 
during group discussion while written guidance and relevant documents are 
written in the Kinh language. This language barrier prevents the ethnic minorities 
from feeling that they are able to express their opinions in a clear manner.  
The program fell far short of the target of 100 percent of the communes being 
investment owners at the end of the program. However, with rigorous capacity 
building at the commune level, the number of commune-owned projects doubled 
by 2010, which demonstrates a significant improvement in the ability of 
communes to become investment owners. The percentage now stands at 45.9 
percent. The majority of investment-owning communes did not encounter any 
serious problems during the implementation process. The biggest problem 
encountered was slow disbursement of funds.  
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There was a large improvement in households’ involvement in Supervisory 
Boards. The better-off groups and majority ethnics were more likely to be 
Supervisory Board members. Non-poor household members are 50 percent more 
likely to join Supervisory Boards than poor household members, and male-headed 
households were more likely to join than female-headed households. This 
phenomenon indicates the importance of engaging the most disadvantaged groups 
in every community-driven activity.  In addition, the administrative capacity of the 
Supervisory Boards appears to be rather limited. More than 60 percent of 
respondents think that the members of the Supervisory Boards are not qualified 
for their tasks. 
P135-II has done a good job in attracting more local workers. The percentage 
of households having members working for local infrastructure projects was 
around 30 percent in 2007 and in 2010. While the percentage of households 
getting paid doubled over the period 2007– 2010, it remains low (4.4 percent in 
2007 and 9.1 percent in 2010). Most local workers work informally for 
infrastructure projects. This lack of formal responsibility by either the contractor 
or workers might affect the quality as well as the progress of any project. The 
number of households making contributions to infrastructure projects increased 
significantly (by 14.2 percent) over the period 2007 – 2010. The average value of 
household contributions to projects also increased greatly – by ten times. Thus, 
households have demonstrated their responsibility as well as their recognition of 
the importance of these infrastructure projects to their living conditions and 
livelihoods. However, one concern is that contributions could constitute a kind of 
direct taxation on poor households or might reduce the time they have available 
for other income-generating activities. This concern does appear to be valid as the 
contribution rate of the poor is relatively higher than that of the non-poor.  
The potential impact of P135-II depends on the degree to which it enhances 
resource availability to target communes. This issue may be particularly crucial in 
the current study, in light of the possibility that the authorities at the province and 
district levels reallocate non-P135 funds from P135 communes to non-P135 
communes to compensate the latter. While the P135-II communes did receive 
substantially more P135 funds than non-P135 communes, they also received much 
less non-P135 funds. As result, the P135-II communes did not receive more 
funding than other communes. This undermined the goals of P135: to reduce 
the widening gap between P135-II communes and other communes, the gap 
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between poor and non-poor households, and the gap between ethnic minorities 
and Kinh households. 
The level of satisfaction with project quality increased, with respect to both 
households and commune officers. At the project inception in 2007, households 
and commune officers expressed different viewpoints regarding P135-II project 
quality. In 2007, commune officials were more positive about project quality than 
households were. The percentage of commune officials satisfied with project 
quality was 15.6 percent higher than that of households. By 2010, this gap had 
diminished to 4 percent; there occurred a convergence of opinions between 
households and officers with both groups having more than 80 percent expressing 
satisfaction with project quality.  
Poverty and Living Standards of Ethnic Minorities 
The poverty incidence among ethnic minorities decreased but still remains 
high. Nung, H’Mong and Tay were most successful in poverty reduction. However, 
the living conditions of the remaining poor households, especially the poor 
households of Thai and Muong groups, improved less. The majority of poverty 
reduction was achieved by income growth, butthe rate of growth tended to 
decrease overtime. In addition, poverty reduction at the household level appears 
not to be sustainable, as a large proportion of poverty is transient: households 
may graduate from poverty, but then fall back into poverty over time. Kinh 
households are more likely to be transiently poor, while other ethnic households 
are more likely to be persistently poor. 
Households incomes in the target areas increased by around 20 percentage 
points from 2007 to 2010,which is a much lower growth rate than the 
national average (about 50%). Households at low income levels experienced 
lower income growth rates than households at high income levels income. As a 
result, income inequality among households in the Program 135-II communes 
increased. The Gini index increased from 43.0 in 2007 to 47.0 in 2012. Inequality 
among Kinh households as well as among ethnic minority households also 
increased during this period.  
Households in the P135-II communes rely largely on agricultural income. 
Nearly 60 percent of total income of the households is from agricultural activities. 
However, we begin to see a transition from farm to non-farm activities. The share 
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of income from wage tends to increase overtime, albeit at a slow rate. The share of 
non-farm income in total income was very limited, at around 5 percent. The 
proportion of households having wages increased from 47.7 percent in 2007 to 
53.7 percent in 2012. Kinh and non-poor households were more likely to have 
wages than ethnic minority and poor households.  
The typical housing conditions improved for all types of households. The per 
capita living area increased from 13 m2 to 18 m2 during the period 2007-2012. 
The proportion of households living in permanent houses also increased. 
However, access to clean water and hygienic latrines remains very limited, 
which is a serious problem. Only 13 percent of ethnic minority households have 
tap water, while the corresponding figure at the national level was 27 percent in 
2010. Only about 30% of households had access to hygienic latrines.  
There was an improvement in the access to electricity in the Program 135-II 
communes. The proportion of households with electricity increased from 68.6 
percent in 2007 to 83.6 percent in 2012. However, compared with the figure of 98 
percent of households nationwide, the electricity coverage in the Program 135-II 
communes remains low.  Access to electricity varies substantially varies across 
ethnic minority groups. 
The living standards of both Kinh and ethnic minority households have been 
improved by increased ownership of durables: 70.9 percent of households had a 
telephone in 2012 and nearly 70 percent of households had a television. The 
percentage of households having a motorbike increased from 43.8 percent to 66.2 
percent. Both the poor and non-poor, and all the ethnic minority groups are 
experienced increases in motorbike ownership. 
Impact of P135- II on Outcomes 
P135-II has had positive impacts on several important outcomes of the ethnic 
minority households, including productive asset ownership, household durables 
ownership, and rice productivity. Among higher-order outcomes, they enjoyed 
positive impacts in income from agriculture, household total income, and 
household per-capita income. A particularly important result is that poverty 
among minority households in treatment communes declined significantly more 
than it declined in comparison communes. Finally, minority households enjoyed a 
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reduction in travel time to health facilities, relative to households in control 
communes. 
Statistically significant positive impacts were recorded for non-minority 
households for their household durables index and for their corn, cassava, and 
industrial crops productivities.  While industrial crop productivity increased, the 
share of land allocated to industrial crops decreased. Perhaps both results were 
driven by taking the least-productive land out of industrial crops production. 
Non-minority households are better off than minority households in several 
very important respects.  In particular, non-minority households have higher 
incomes and higher school enrollments. For both of these, there is evidence of 
improvement for minorities. Minorities’ incomes increased, but not as much as 
non-minorities. Minorities school enrollments also increased, and by larger 
percentages than for non-minorities. 
School enrollment is critically important to households and their communities.  
Enrollment rates of minority children are lower than those of non-minorities, 
especially for upper-secondary school.  However, enrollments improved among 
households in treatment and in comparison communes. In all cases but one, 
enrollments in treatment communes increased more than in comparison 
communes, but the impacts were not statistically significant. 
Conclusion and recommendation 
The budget allocations of P135-II communes and other communes were not 
statistically significantly different. While P135-IIcommunes did receive 
substantially more P135 funds than the other communes received, they also 
received substantially less non-P135 support. The reallocation non-P135 funds 
created a major difficulty for identifying P135 impacts and very likely resulted in 
underestimating the program impacts. These issues should be addressed and 
monitored in future programs to ensure that the funds will be allocated to 
target groups and that future programs do not affect the decisions of local 
authorities on other resource allocations. 
P135-II achieved significant success in fostering a participatory approach to 
implementation, with remarkable corresponding progress in decentralization. 
These changes represent large improvements compared to the first phase of P135 
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and other programs. Beneficiary households participated in every stage of the 
project including selection, implementation, supervision, and contributions to the 
operation and maintenance funds. Financial transparency also improved to a 
certain extent.  
The target of 100 percent of communes becoming investment owners has not 
been achieved and this is still considered a highly challenging task. In addition, 
commune-owned projects still face problems such as slow funds disbursement 
and weak capacity. Participation in project supervision and operations and 
maintenance activities received the least attention. Thus, the need remains for 
local communities to be equipped with sufficient information, knowledge, 
and understanding to execute each activity. These issues should be considered 
and addressed in designing future programs.  
The living standards of households in P135-II improved in every measured 
respect for all ethnic groups. Housing and sanitation conditions also improved for 
most ethnic groups. However, poverty remains high, and the living standard of the 
households in these communes is still very low compared to the national average. 
The poorer households experienced lower income growth rates than the better-off 
households, thus the gap between poor and non-poor households in these 
communes continues to widen. Therefore, further support for poverty 
reduction in these communes is still needed in the coming years. 
P135-II significantly improved the living standards of certain beneficiary 
households in the targeted communes. While the program impact on income and 
poverty of the Kinh & Hoa ethnic groups is neither large nor statistically 
significant, it has large and statistically significant impacts on the income and 
poverty rates of ethnic minority groups. Thus, the program successfully 
targeted the most disadvantaged groups in the P135-II communes. The P135-
II communes were generally worse off than non-P135-II communes in 2007, 
indicating that the program targeting was accurate.  
P135-II only partly achieved its targets. It reduced the poverty rate from 57.5% 
to 49.2%, though the target rate was 30%. Only 41% of households have annual 
income per capita of over 3.5 million VND, while the target is 70%. Net primary 
enrollment and lower secondary enrollment in the targeted communes did 
improve but are still far behind the goals (85.4% compared to 95% and 70.9% 
compared to 75%, respectively). In addition, progress toward achievement of the 
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targets varies among different ethnic groups. While sustained improvements in 
income and poverty were found in Tay, Nung, Dao, and H’mong groups, less 
improvement was seen among other ethnic groups, especially the Thai. The fact 
that program benefits were not equally distributed among different ethnic groups 
suggests that future support to these communes should be better designed to 
account for the specific conditions, needs, and culture of each ethnic group. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Vietnam is one of the most successful countries in the world in terms of poverty 
reduction and economic achievement over the past twenty years. The poverty rate 
fell from 58 percent in 1993 to around 14 percent by 20081. Land and trade 
reforms are the major factors that contributed to high and sustained economic 
growth; these are the main reasons three of every four poor people escaped from 
poverty in this period.  
However, the rate of poverty reduction has slowed down overtime and the gap 
between the rich and poor is continuing to rise. Poor households in some regions 
gain much less from economic growth than the better off households. Most of the 
remaining poor households live in the remote rural areas which are mainly 
populated by ethnic minorities. The share of ethnic minorities in the poorest 10 
percent of the population has risen to 65 percent.2 
To increase the opportunities for poor households to benefit from economic 
growth, the government has introduced many poverty reduction programs for 
specific targeted poor household groups and regions. These programs include P-
135 and P30a (improving the living conditions of ethnic minorities), P-132 and P-
134 (targeted mainly at the Central Highlands to increase access to land and 
improve housing conditions), the Hunger and Poverty Eradication Program 
(HEPR), and later NTP-PR (health insurance for the poor). These programs and 
policies have increased the opportunities for poor households to secure the 
benefits of economic growth, resulting in improve living standards and increased 
chances to escape to poverty. 
However, the most important question “What are the impacts of these programs 
on the expected outcomes” has not yet been answered in detail. The main reason 
                                                        
1 2008 Vietnam Household Living Standards Survey (VHLSS) 
2“Well Begun, Not Yet Done: Vietnam's Remarkable Progress on Poverty Reduction and the 
Emerging Challenges”, The Work Bank, 2012. 
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is that we have limited data. Plans for impact evaluations were not incorporated 
into the program designs. Thus, we do not have the Baseline and Endline surveys 
that would have collected required information for impact evaluation. A few 
impact evaluations have been conducted using qualitative methods, but these are 
unable to provide concrete answers to the questions “what percentage of the 
poverty reduction is contributed by the program and how much household income 
growth is contributed by the program?”3 
With the lessons learnt from P135-I and other poverty reduction programs, and 
with the technical support of UNDP, P135-II is the first large and ambitious 
program has been targeted on the ethnic minorities and remote areas. Moreover, 
the design of P135-II incorporated sound methodology for impact evaluation. The 
main objectives of P135-II at the end of the program in targeted areas are: (i) to 
reduce the poverty rate to less than 30%; (ii) to ensure that more than 70% of 
households have annual income per capita higher than 3.5 million VND; (iii) to 
improve agricultural productivity of main crops;(iv) increase the net primary 
enrollment rate to at least 95%; (v) to increase the net lower secondary 
enrollment rateto at least 75%. 
In order to achieve these ambitious objectives, P135- II was designed with four 
major components: (i) agricultural production support through improving skills 
and training the ethnic minorities on new production practices; (ii) support to 
develop the infrastructure and then increase the accessibility to basic 
infrastructure of the households in the targeted area; (iii) improvement of the 
socio-cultural life and increase the accessibility to public services; (iv) capacity 
strengthening by providing local officers with skills and knowledge on 
professional and administrative management as well as enhancing their 
knowledge on investment management and skills of operation management. Led 
by CEMA, P135-II was implemented in about 1,600 of the poorest communes; 
thetotal budget from 2006 to 2010 was about US$  1.1billion. 
The major aim of this “Impact of Program 135-phase II through the Lens of Baseline 
and Endline Surveys” report is to measure the impact of the program on the 
expected economic outcomes of the households, mainly the poverty, income, 
agriculture production, housing conditions, and access to the basic public services. 
                                                        
3Design, Monitoring, and Evaluation System for Program 135 Phase II, Design of Baseline Survey, 
Tung Phung Duc, 2007. 
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In addition, the report analyses the current situation of all aspects of living 
conditions of the ethnic minority households living in the remote and poorest 
communes. The findings and lesson drawn from this report could help the 
government and donors to design and implement better programs in the future. 
While this chapter gives readers an overview of the trend of poverty, poverty 
reduction programs, the necessity of impact evaluation work, the brief content of 
P135-II, Chapter II provides details of the impact evaluation design, focusing on 
the two most important surveys: the baseline and endline surveys (BLS 2007 and 
ELS 2012). It first gives the concrete description of the sampling design for both 
surveys, including the method to select the control and treatment groups, data 
used for the sampling frame, and the method used to select the survey villages and 
households. Second, it discusses the questionnaire design for both household and 
commune questionnaires in comparison with the questionnaires administered by 
the Vietnam Living Standard Surveys. The survey implementation for both BLS 
2007 and ELS 2012 is then discussed in detail, including the survey organization, 
quality control, and data entry and cleaning, as well as the comparison between 
BLS 2007 and ELS 2012. The lessons learned and quality evaluation of these 
surveys is then discussed in the Conclusion. 
Chapter III reviews the implementation process of P135-II and describes the 
methodology used to measure the impacts of the program. It analyses the 
implementation process, the issues that arise during the implementation time that 
could affect the methodology used for measuring the impacts of the program on 
the expected outcomes. Fund allocation and administrative decisions that changed 
communes’ control or treatment status during the study period are discussed. The 
views of the beneficiary households on the impact of P135-II are also analysed in 
order to have a better view on which outcomes we should focus on. The last 
section of this chapter presents the Difference in Difference (DID) method that 
was proposed to measure the impact of the program at the design stage and its 
limitations. The actual methodology used to measure the impacts is then discussed 
in detail, and the limitations of the methodology are addressed. 
Chapter IV analyses the current poverty and living conditions of the ethnic 
minorities in the P135-II communes. It first analyses the overall poverty trends 
among the ethnic minorities in comparison with BLS 2007 and the national 
average and then it disaggregates the inequality in income between Kinh and 
other ethnic groups to determine the main factors that affect this inequality. The 
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characteristics of the ethnic minorities are also presented in this chapter, 
including living conditions, endowments of productive assets, education, and 
access to basic public services and infrastructure. Poverty dynamics of ethnic 
minorities also addressed in this chapter; this allows us to have a clear view on the 
degree to which poverty in these communities is transient and on the 
sustainability of poverty reduction in these communes. 
Chapter V includes two major parts. The first part provides a comprehensive 
analysis of the extent to which capacity strengthening has been enforced at the 
local level. This goal is assessed through the perspective of both local authorities 
and the beneficiaries. It describes in-depth capacity building at the local level 
through assessment of local training activities and then provides an insight into 
project management capacity and decentralization at the local level. In addition, it 
analyses the outcomes of commune investment ownership and measures 
household participation in planning and implementation stages. The second part 
concentrates on measuring the impacts of the Program on the key outcomes, 
including agricultural production, household income, household poverty status, 
and access to education and health services, which are important elements of 
P135-II targets. 
The key findings, conclusions, policy recommendations, and challenges for poverty 
reduction are addressed in Chapter VI. 
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CHAPTER 2 
BASELINE SURVEY 2007 AND ENDLINE SURVEY 2012 
 
2.1  Objectives of the Surveys 
Vietnam hasmade impressive achievements in economic growth and poverty 
reduction over the past 20 years. Part of this achievement is due to the big efforts 
of the Government through introducing many poverty reduction programs. 
However, recent studies show that it is impossible to measure the impacts of 
certain programs, such as the National Target Program and Program 135 Phase I. 
The reason is that there was no plan for impact evaluation prior to the 
implementation of these programs and therefore no baseline survey was 
conducted to collect information needed for impact evaluation.  
Program 135 Phase II (P135-II) is a major poverty alleviation program that was 
implemented during the period of 2006- 2010 for the poorest areas where the 
main inhabitants are ethnic minorities. Ina substantial effort to evaluate the 
effectiveness of P135-II and to enhance the designs of future programs, the 
Committee for Ethnic Minorities (CEM), with the support of UNDP, conducted a 
baseline survey in 2007 (BLS 2007) and endline survey 2012 (ELS 2012). The 
objectives of these surveys were to provide the most comprehensive data sets 
focusing on ethnic minorities that face the deepest poverty and other difficulties. 
In fact, the baseline data set is widely cited in the most recent government and 
donor documents and publications related to poverty and ethnic minorities.  
The availability of current and comprehensive data about these groups is essential 
for the government and donors to develop evidence-based policies for continuing 
poverty reduction. In particular, these data sets (i) measure the progress in  
poverty reduction and advances in socio-economic status of ethnic minority 
communities in mountainous, remote areas of Vietnam over the past 5 years; (ii)  
allow rigorous analysis of progress in the socio-economic development of ethnic 
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minority communities participating in P135-II; (iii)allow measurement of changes 
in key indicators (poverty rate, income, agricultural productivity, access to basic 
infrastructure, etc.)attributable to P135-II; and (iv) provide reliable quantitative 
baseline data for designing and measuring the progress of future government 
poverty reduction programs. 
This is the first large government program that has adopted a systematic and 
professional evaluation procedure. It meets the highest professional standards, 
not only for the sake of the P135-II, but also as an illustration of the value added 
that good evaluations can provide and can draw the good lessons for upcoming 
government programs. 
2.2  Survey Design 
2.2.1  Sampling Design 
Selection of treatment and control communes 
The most difficult part of impact evaluation design is to develop the appropriate 
sampling design for selection of control and treatment groups. The main reason is 
that the treatment groups are often not randomly selected because most 
development projects and programs deliberately target the most disadvantaged 
groups. The target communes in P135-II are the poorest and most remote 
communes and their selection was based on their poverty rates and lack of key 
necessary infrastructure for agricultural production. The quantifiable criteria for 
identifying P135- II communes were based on the following indicators. First, lack 
of atleast 4 of 7 key items:  roads suitable for cars to travel to central communes; 
at least 50% of agricultural land irrigated; presence of a health center; presence of 
a school presence of a market; availability of electricity; at least 50% of villages in 
the commune have access to clean water. Second, the poverty rate of the commune 
is higher than 30% using the poverty line for 2000 or the poverty rate of the 
commune is higher than 55% using the new poverty line of 2006. Based on these 
criteria (in practice, mainly on the poverty rate), 1,632 communes were selected 
from among the 2,359 communes of P135-I for P135-II.  
Based on the availability of resources and the data requirements for testing for 
changes of the key indicators (poverty and income), we determined that a sample 
of 6,000 households would be adequate. Sample households were selected from 
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400 communes, of which 266 were defined as treatment communes and 134 as 
control communes. From the list of 1,632 communes in P135-II provided by 
CEMA, 266 treatment communes were randomly drawn. This selection process 
ensured that the sample treatment communes were selected from all over the 
provinces included in P135-II. In fact, 42 out of 45 P135-II provinces were 
included in the sample. The selection of control communes was rather more 
complicated and it was the most challenging task. We need to find communes 
which are as similar as possible to the sampled treatment communes. Thus, we 
used the 727 communes that had ‘graduated’ from the P135as the population of 
control communes from which the sample would be drawn.4 A probit regression 
model was used to estimate the probability of being selected for P135-II using 
data for 727 graduated communes and 266 selected treatment, based on key 
characteristics of each commune (poverty, key infrastructure, and population). 
The graduated communes with estimated selection probabilities higher than the 
average were identified as potential communes for the control group.  From 
among these, 134 communes for the control group were selected randomly. 
A simple t-test was used to examine the quality of sample selection. The results 
show that the control and treatment communes displayed no significant 
differences in key indicators of that had been used as the criteria for selection into 
P135-II. This provides evidence that the sampling design is good for measuring the 
impact of the Program. 
Selection of survey households 
The Agriculture Census of 2006 was used as the sampling frame for selecting the 
survey households. Using this data set ensures that we have the most updated list 
of households in the 400 selected communes. There are two steps in the selection 
process of the survey households. The first step is to select the villages. Based on 
the list of villages in 400 selected communes, one village was randomly selected 
from each commune using the probability proportional to population sampling 
method (PPS). This selection method was applied for both control and treatment 
groups. 
                                                        
4‘Graduated’ communes were the P135-I communes that advanced sufficiently that 
they were not eligible for P135-II. 
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The second step is to select households to interview. To ensure that the survey 
covers 6000 households, we first selected randomly 20 households from the list of 
all households in each selected village and then we selected randomly 15 
households out of 20 households for official interview. The remaining households 
(5) are used as the reserve for replacement in cases that the initially selected 
households were not available for the official interview for any reason.  
2.2.2  Questionnaire Design 
Two questionnaires were used in these surveys: one for the household and the 
other for the commune. Both the household and commune questionnaires were 
developed based on the questionnaires of VHLSS 2006 with some substantial 
modifications to reflect the content and implementation process of P135- II(see 
Nguyen and Phung, 2007 for details of the VHLSS). 
The household questionnaire collects information about various aspects of each 
household’s socio-economic conditions.. It includes demographic attributes, 
migration, education, health, agriculture, off-farm and non-farm employment, 
borrowing and saving, remittances, insurance and assets. Questions relevant to 
P135-II were included. A special module was designed to collect information that 
mainly reflects the implementation of the Program at the grass-root level, 
including awareness, participation of the households in the selection, supervision 
and implementation of the projects, and the household’s assessment of the quality, 
transparency, and benefit of the projects supported by the P135-II 
The VHLSS' sections on general information, infrastructure conditions, and access 
to public services (i.e., schools and healthcare services) are simplified in the 
commune questionnaire. New sections to collect information about the 
administrative capacity of the commune management board and commune 
officers, and the training for capacity building, as well as details about the 
commune-level projects carried out over the past 12 months were added to collect 
all needed information for evaluating the implementation of P135-II. 
Using the same questionnaires produces consistency across the two data sets 
(2007 and 2012) that is essential for comparison over time. Therefore, the 
questionnaires used for BLS 2007were used in the ELS 2012 with only a few 
modifications based on lessons learned from BLS 2007and for capturing other 
impact factors.For example, some questions about shocks households experienced 
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since the survey time in 2007were added to the household questionnaire. This 
information is very important for modeling the impact process, especially when 
the shocks are not randomly distributed among surveyed households in the 
control and treatment groups. Shocks could affect estimated program impacts if 
they are not included in the model. The questionsthat appeared inBLS 2007 whose 
information remains unchanged overtime are excluded. For instance, questions on 
educational background of people who were no longer enrolled in school at the 
time of the 2007 interview, age, date of birth, gender, and race for the household 
members who were interviewed in the BLS 2007 were excluded. These questions 
were only used for new household members. The same approach was used to 
revise the commune questionnaire: information that was unchanged overtime was 
eliminated.  Questions related to projects implemented in the commune were 
revised to reflect appropriate recall periods.  
Consultation workshops were organized with policy makers, donors, and 
researchers to get comments on the draft questionnaires of both surveys. The final 
draft questionnaires were then pilot tested in the field before the completed and 
final versionswere released for the data collection stage. 
2.3   Survey implementation 
2.3.1  Baseline 2007 
BLS 2007 was implemented by General Statistics Office (GSO). The Social and 
Environmental Statistics Department, which is the implementing agency of VHLSS, 
was assigned to conduct BLS 2007.The interviewers were recruited from 
Provincial Statistics Offices and they are experienced in conducting VHLSS 
interviews. Two training courses for interviewers and supervisors were held in 
Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh cities. The participants were trained about the purposes of 
the survey, the content of the questionnaires, the interview methods, and the 
solutions to problems that might occur in the field. 
Lessons learned from Vietnam Living Standard Survey 1998 and VHLSS indicated 
that the best way to conduct this survey is to organize the interviewers by teams. 
BLS 2007 had 21 survey teams. Each team included 1 team leader and 4 
interviewers to collect information from about 300 households in 2 or 3 provinces. 
The data collection started on 4th September 2007 and finished on 25th November 
2007. To ensure the quality of the data, 10 supervision teams were organized and 
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each supervision team supervised 2 or 3 interview teams. A supervisor attended 
each interview, re-checked the data in the completed questionnaires, and 
discussed with the team any problems or issues that occurred in the field; these 
discussions produced solutions for improved data collection. The sample included 
5,965 households which completed the interviews. A very small number of 
households (35) could not be interviewed because they had moved to other places 
or refused to cooperate with the team.   
Data entry was implemented by the Statistics Information Center (SIC) in Hanoi. In 
order to reduce non-sampling errors at the data entry stage, double data entry 
was applied for this survey. The raw data was then converted to STATA format 
and data cleaning was implemented by the Social and Environment Statistics 
Department. The first data set was delivered to CEMA on the 6th of March 2008 
(about 4 months after completion of the fieldwork). The final data was ready for 
analysis by August 2008 (one year later). 
During the fieldwork implementation, some issues emerged that might have 
affected the quality of the data5. First, the long delay between training and 
fieldwork  resulted in loss of10 interviewers, and GSO had to recruit and train 10 
replacement interviewers. This delay might also have resulted in interviewers 
forgetting what they had learned from the training, which might have affected the 
quality of the data. Second, most of the survey locations were in remote areas, and 
were very difficult to travel to (some of the survey communes were only 
accessible by foot); this made communication between teams and supervisors 
difficult.  Third, the time for conducting the survey was not suitable, as it extended 
into the rainy season.  That delayed data collection and disrupted the workplan of 
the teams. Fourth, respondents were mainly ethnic minorities with limited 
knowledge about the content of the survey; moreover, many of them can not speak 
Vietnamese fluently. Many interviews were conducted with the help of local 
interpreters.  If interpretation was poor, that might also have affected the quality 
of the interviews.  
                                                        
5
 Survey Report of Baseline Survey 2007- General Statistics Office- Survey Steering Committee of P135- 
II 
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2.3.2  Endline 2012 
This project represents the first time an independent agency has been assigned to 
conduct anendline survey and evaluate the impact of a large government program. 
The endline survey 2012 (ELS 2012) was implemented by Indochina Research and 
Consulting, an independent consulting firm, which was charged with conducting 
an absolutely objective impact evaluation. Implementation of the ELS 2012 was 
quite similar to implementation of BLS 2007, but benefitted from the lessons 
learned from the BLS 2007. Certain modifications and improvements were 
adopted to avoid any problems that had occurred in the BLS 2007. Details of 
interview team selection and training, and interview implementation are provided 
in the next paragraphs. 
First, 30% of the BLS 2007 interviews were implemented with the support of 
interpreters. Therefore, interviewers for ELS 2012were recruited from among 
Kinh and ethnic minorities represented in the sample communes. The ethnic 
minority interviewers received the same training as the other team members.  
Thus, when they interviewed the non-Vietnamese-speaking respondents, the time 
taken for the interviews and the possibility of non- sampling errors were both 
reduced. 
Second, the training method emphasized developing the skills of the interviewers 
and gaining trust from the sample households. At the end of training, an exam was 
given and only interviewers who passed the exam were selected to conduct data 
collection.  
Third, the basic information from BLS 2007was extracted, including the household 
member list, key information of household members such as age, sex, education, 
occupation, etc. The interviewers reviewed this information before doing the 
interview. Having this information on hand in advance was very helpful for 
interviewers to identify and check doubtful answers and thereby improve the 
quality of the data. 
Fourth, a detailed work plan with assigned tasks for each team memberwere well-
developed in advance and sent to each team as well as the CEMA officers at all 
levels two weeks before the teams went to the field. Logistical preparationswere 
supportedby CEMA at all levels to ensure the survey was conducted according 
tothe workplan and interviewers were able to reach the right respondents. 
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Fifth, strict supervision was carried out throughout the data collection process. 
Apart from attending the interviews, supervisors conducted random checks on 
households to make sure that all interviewers followed the interview procedures 
and recorded accurate information. Supervision work was circulated from one 
team to another. A “hotline” was set up and available at all times for interviewers 
to contact when they had questions relating to technical or logistical issues. 
Sixth, ELS 2012 used tablet PCs for data entry during the interviews.  This was the 
first time the new survey technique was applied on such a large and complicated 
survey in Vietnam. Each survey team had two tablets for conducting the surveys; 
they rotated among the team members during each survey. With high-technology 
design, the application of tablets ensured high-quality data and minimized non-
sampling errors normally associated with data entry. The tablet technology 
incorporated survey software applications, GPS, and internet capabilities to 
ensure that the data were collected in the most accurate possible fashion, in the 
shortest time under the best quality control. The data were entered directly during 
the interview instead of using a paper questionnaire. With 3G-internet capability, 
the entered data was transmitted directly back to an online server for immediate 
data checking. This procedure eliminated the data entry stage and increased the 
efficiency of data cleaning. As the survey software was programmed to implement 
logical checking, data cleaning could be done simultaneously during the fieldtrip 
period. The survey managers could provide feedback to enumerators for data 
correction in a timely manner. With this feature, non-sampling errorswere greatly 
reduced. Application of tablet technology with GPS and internet capabilities 
ensured quality control throughout the process. This technology also enabled us to 
monitor the enumerators’ work as the application automatically recorded the 
interview’s starting and ending times, so we were informed of whether the survey 
was properly done in terms of timing. The application also recorded the 
coordinates of the location where the interview took place. This technology helped 
survey managers and supervisors to monitor each team and to ensure that the 
teams arrived in the field according to plan. The map below shows the locations at 
which teams completed interviews from the beginning to the mid-point of the 
survey time. 
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Figure 2. 1: Locations at of P135-II Endline survey interviewers 
 
 
Last, the ELS 2012 was conducted from early April to the end of May 2012 so as to  
avoid the rainy season. The timing reduced problems related to logistical 
arrangements and travel time for the survey teams. 
Applying the new survey techniques and solutions for improvement of the survey 
implementation, ELS 2012 field work took about two months to interview 5,668 
households. The attrition rate from BLS 2007 was about 5.2% after 5 years, which 
was much lower than the attrition rate experienced by VHLSS, partly reflecting of 
the careful logistical arrangements and lower rates of migration in the remote 
areas. While data entry and cleaning for BLS 2007 took more than 5 months, for 
ELS 2012 it took only one month to complete the data cleaning and disseminates 
initial findings. 
Despite careful planning, several issues still arose during the fieldwork for ELS 
2012. In particular, travel to several communes was quite difficult: teams 
sometimes had to walk or go by boat to the survey communes. Also, in some 
communes, the knowledge of respondents was so limited that it might have 
affected the quality of the interview.  
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2.4   Conclusion 
This is the first time that an important poverty reduction program in Vietnam has 
been exposed to a sound and professional impact evaluation.The value added of 
this impact evaluation consists largely of the lessons that can be drawn for future 
government and donor programs. 
BLS 2007 and ELS 2012 were well-designed and implemented, and they provide 
rich and high quality data that support impact evaluation of P135-II and analysis 
the program implementation. These data sets are the most complete and 
comprehensive data sets on ethnic minorities and on the poorest communes in 
Vietnam. As such, they provide a thorough understanding of ethnic minorities’ 
socioeconomic situations. The data sets are large enough to disaggregate ethnic 
minorities into at least 10 different groups. Therefore, they help us to understand 
the differences in many aspects of living conditions and livelihood among these 
ethnic groups. 
The BLS 2007 showed that treated communes (i.e., those chosen for P135-II) are a 
bit poorer and less likely to have car roads, electricity, and cultural houses than 
the control communes. This constitutes evidence that P135_II targeted the right 
communes; however, it also indicates the need to control the impact of other 
factors in estimating the program impact.  In other words, the simple Difference in 
Difference method must be augmented by appropriate econometric control 
methodology.  
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CHAPTER 3 
REVIEW THE IMPLEMENTATION OF P135-II AND 
METHODOLOGY TO MEASURE THE IMPACT 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter analyses the implementation process of P135- II, focusing on the 
budget allocation from Program and from other projects or programs between 
P135- II communes and non- P135- II communes. In addition,  evaluation of 
beneficiary households about the impact of the Program on expected outcomes 
and the important of different projects provided by different components of the 
Program is analysed. We develop the hypothesis about the impact of different 
components of the Program for the whole process from output, outcome, to 
impact. The results of these analysis helps to identify the outcomes that Program 
might have impacts and to consider and re- evaluate the impact evaluation 
methodology proposed at the design stage of the Program and Baseline Survey. 
Thus, we could develop the appropriate impact evaluation method and identify the 
indicators that could measure the impact of the Program in the econometric 
models. This chapter mainly focusses on the description of impact evaluation 
methodology. Therefore, there are several statistical and econometrical terms as 
well as econometric models that require the readers have a basic econometric to 
fully understand the measurement method. We try to present in the most simple 
way about methodology. However, it might be still hard for readers who do not 
have basic statistic knowledge. For those readers, they could skip the methodology 
section and it does not affected the major contents of the report. 
3.1.1 Control and Treatment Communes 
Table 3.1 show that the authorities switched a comparison commune into 
treatment commune status and vice-versa from 2006 to the end of the Program. 
Thus, some communes transitioned from comparison to treatment status or 
graduated from treatment status between the two surveys.   
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Table 3. 1: Transition Matrix between Control and Treatment Communes 
Status in Each Year 
n Code T1 T2 TP 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
C C C C C C C 98 1 0 0 0 
C T T T T T T 1 2 0 1 ⋯ 
C C T T T T T 30 3 0 1 ⋯ 
C C C T T T T 1 4 0 1 ⋯ 
T T T T T T T 247 5 1 1 1 
T T C C C C C 17 6 1 0 ⋯ 
T T T T C C C 2 7 1 0 ⋯ 
T T T T T C C 2 8 1 0 ⋯ 
Source: Analysis Team calculations based on 2007 and 2012 household surveys. 
The fact that some communes switched status complicated the assignment of 
treatment indicators for the impact evaluation.  Three possibilities were explored 
in preliminary analysis: an indicator for treatment status in 2006 (T1); an 
indicator for treatment status in 2012 (T2); and a conventional treatment 
indicator for the subset of communes that never switched status (TP). From 2006 
to the end of the Program, there are about 21 graduated communes and 30 control 
communes at the beginning of the P135- II became to Treatment communes. Therefore, 
we have only 98 purely control communes and 247 purely treatment communes. 
Therefore, These communes are cleanest definition of control / treatment status 
and they are most appropriate communes used for impact measurement. 
3.1.2 Comparison of Funds Allocation Across Treatment and Control 
Communes 
The potential impact of P135-II depends on the degree to which it enhances 
resource availability to target communes.  This issue may be particularly crucial in 
the current study, in light of the possibility that the authorities reallocate non-
P135 funds from P135 communes to non-P135 communes to compensate the 
latter because they were not included in P135. 
Section 5 of the commune questionnaire records data on commune economic 
development projects and their funding. Comparison and treatment communes all 
receive P135 funding.  The data do not distinguish between P135-I and P135-II, 
but projects undertaken in more recent years are likely to have been funded by 
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P135-II, thus we focus on projects undertaken during 2006 – 2012.  We calculated 
cumulative net funding for 2006 – 2012; funds for projects ending after 2012 were 
pro-rated to estimate the expenditures up to 2012.6 Average funding is displayed 
in the following table 3.2. 
Table 3. 2: Budget allocation between control and treatment communes 
Fund Source 
Comparison Communes Average Treatment Communes Average 
000 VND n 000 VND n 
P135 2,047,862 98 3,322,755 245 
Other 5,845,986 98 4,586,976 245 
All Sources 7,983,848 98 7,909,731 245 
Source: Analysis Team calculations based on 2007 and 2012 household surveys. 
While the treatment communes did receive substantially more P135 funds than 
comparison communes, they also received less non-P135 funds.  The averages of 
funds received by comparison and treatment communes from all sources are 
statistically indistinguishable. This pattern is consistent with the hypothesis of 
compensatory reallocation of non-P135 funds by the authorities. The vast majority 
of projects recorded for section 5 of the commune questionnaire are 
infrastructure projects.  Under the assumption that the impact of infrastructure 
funding is independent of funding source, statistically identifying the impact of 
P135-II on household response variables may be difficult. 
Figure 3.1 presents the budget allocation per capita and it shows that P135- II 
received not considerable higher fund per capita than non- P135- II communes. 
Figure 3.1 also shows the unequal budget allocation among the communes and the 
average fund per capita in 5 years of Program is small (about VND 1 million). 
Figure 3. 1: Distribution of Fund allocation per capita 
                                                        
6
 Amounts were net of local contributions; ten outliers were omitted. 
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Source: Analysis Team calculations based on 2007 and 2012 household surveys. 
The vast majority of projects recorded for section 5 of the commune questionnaire 
are infrastructure projects.  Under the assumption that the impact of 
infrastructure funding is independent of funding source, statistically identifying 
the impact of P135-II on household response variables may be difficult. 
3.2 Methodologies to Measure Impacts 
Some elements of the impact evaluation framework are illustrated by the simple 
causal chain hypothesis on the next page. Clearly, outcomes like household income 
and the educations of household members are determined by much more complex 
mechanisms than indicated here.  Nonetheless, the simple causal chain helps 
organize our work. 
Commune leader and household member perceptions are readily available from 
the commune and household surveys.  Four elements of P135-II are given in the 
third row of the figure:  commune infrastructure, agricultural production, capacity 
building, and social capital. Accounting for those inputs is straightforward.  Many 
variables might affect outcomes like production, income, and education.  It is for 
this type of outcome that the econometric impact evaluation is deployed. 
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Figure 3. 2:  Causal Chain Hypothesis 
 
Source: Analysis Team. 
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3.2.1 Views of the Beneficiaries 
Assessing the degree to which survey respondents are aware of P135-II and the 
activities it supports, and the degree to which survey respondents perceive P135-
II is beneficial to them is straightforward. 
Commune Leaders were asked, both in 2007 and in 2012 to indicate changes in 
quality of life of people in their communes compared to 5 years previous.  
Virtually all communes experienced improvements in their residents’ quality of 
life according to their leaders. 
Table 3. 3:Evaluation of commune leaders on living standard of people in 
their commune 
 
Response 
Percentage 
Control Treatment 
2007 
Better 95.52 94.33 
Worse 1.02 1.62 
No Change 3.06 4.05 
Total 100.00 100.00 
    
2012 
Better 97.94 99.19 
Worse 1.03 0.40 
No Change 1.03 0.40 
Total 100.00 100.00 
Source: Analysis Team calculations based on 2007 and 2012 household surveys. 
The changes were attributed to the following reasons. The Commune 
Questionnaires provided twelve potential responses. 
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Table 3. 4: Main reasons of improvement 
 2007 2012 
 Control Treatment Control Treatment 
Main Reason     
Better Agricultural Income 65.26 80.08 68.09 69.67 
Better Commune Infrastructure 22.11 14.41 21.28 19.67 
     
Second Most Important Reason     
Better Agricultural Income 12.63 8.47 18.60 15.52 
Better Business Opportunities 14.74 4.66 18.60 9.05 
Better Employment Opportunities 10.53 7.63 8.14 8.19 
Better Commune Infrastructure 38.95 42.37 41.86 46.55 
     
Third Most Important Reason     
Better Commune Infrastructure 14.29 9.09 19.05 19.19 
Better Educational Opportunities 13.19 16.75 17.46 21.51 
More Favorable Prices 7.69 10.53 9.52 4.65 
Better Social Services 3.30 4.31 11.11 9.88 
Better Training Opportunities 8.79 6.70 11.11 13.37 
Source: Analysis Team calculations based on 2007 and 2012 household surveys. 
Better commune infrastructure is frequently cited as a reason for improvement.  If 
the improvements in commune infrastructure can be tied to P135-II, that provides 
some evidence of the program’s impact.    
Commune leaders were asked to enumerate the types of programs conducted in 
their communes in order of their importance. Commune leaders frequently 
mentioned P135.  Among most important and second most important programs 
P135 is always more prominent in treatment communes than in comparison 
communes.  In fact, P135 was mentioned as most important by 60% of treatment 
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communes in 2012; at that date, it is clear they must have been referring to P135-
II.   
Table 3. 5: Most important programs conducted in commune 
 2007 2012 
 Control Treatment Control Treatment 
Most Important Programs     
Poverty Reduction 34.83 28.94 26.88 18.75 
Economic Development 10.11 6.81 15.05 6.67 
P135 12.36 42.98 35.48 60.42 
Culture and Education 13.48 5.96   
     
Second Most Important 
Programs 
    
Poverty Reduction 14.77 15.02 17.28 31.53 
Economic Development 15.91 12.02 17.28 13.06 
P135 3.41 22.75 13.58 19.82 
Culture and Education 15.91 15.02 11.11 12.61 
Environmental 10.23 7.73 2.15 1.67 
Health 6.82 3.00 13.58 2.70 
     
Third Most Important Programs     
Poverty Reduction 2.94 7.77 11.48 13.71 
Economic Development 5.88 3.88 16.39 13.71 
P135   18.03 8.57 
Culture and Education 10.29 13.59 24.59 20.57 
Environmental 17.65 15.53 8.20 16.57 
Health 17.65 15.53 2.94 7.77 
Source: Analysis Team calculations based on 2007 and 2012 household surveys. 
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Turning attention to household heads’ perceptions, and classifying households by 
poor /non-poor status, we find 35% of the poor and 46% of the non-poor were 
aware of P135 in 2012. When asked to identify the specific activities P135 
supported, most of those who were aware of P135 were aware that it provides 
infrastructure investment.  On the other hand, over all, very few respondents are 
aware of the activities P135 supported in 2012. 
Table 3. 6: Awareness of the households on P135- II components 
 
Percent of Those 
Aware of P135 
Percent of All 
Respondents 
Infrastructure Investment 63% 25% 
Support for Production 31% 12% 
Agricultural Extension Services 25% 10% 
Capacity Building 5% 2% 
Improving Cultural Life 14% 6% 
Source: Analysis Team calculations based on 2007 and 2012 household surveys. 
Finally, individual household heads were asked to list any benefits their 
households directly experienced. The results for 2012 are given in the following 
table. The differences between comparison and treatment households are very 
small so we do not sohow them separately. 
Table 3. 7: Major benefits of P135-II 
Benefit Experienced by Household 
Percent of Those 
Aware of P135 
Percent of All 
Respondents 
Improved Income 38% 15% 
Employment Creation 8% 3% 
Improved Market Access 27% 11% 
Improved Agricultural Productivity 33% 13% 
Improved Access to Education / Health Care 41% 16% 
Vocational Training 1% 0.5% 
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Material / Machines for Agricultural 
Production 
10% 4% 
Other Benefit 6% 2% 
No Benefit 18% 7% 
Source: Analysis Team calculations based on 2007 and 2012 household surveys. 
It seems fair to say that a program which 15% of all respondents credit for 
increased income has had a positive impact; similarly for the 11% that perceive 
improved market access, 13% that perceive improved agricultural productivity, 
and 16% that link improved access to education and health care to the program. 
We close this section with a summary of the working-age adults directly employed 
in commune-level infrastructure projects. Table 3.8 shows that about 12% of 
working age adults work on infrastructure projects in comparison communes and 
11% of working age adults work on infrastructure projects in treatment 
communes. This similarity is not surprising given the fact that average 
infrastructure spending is the same among comparison and treatment communes.  
The proportions of those working on infrastructure projects who belong to poor 
households reflect the proportions of poor households in comparison and 
treatment communes. 
Table 3. 8: Working on Infrastructure Projects 
Group ControlCommunes 
Treatment 
Communes 
P-value for 
Difference 
Sample 
Size 
% of Working-age Adults  
Who work on Infrastructure 
Projects 
12.05 11.46 0.06 49,354 
% of Working-age Adults of Poor 
HH  
Who Work on Infrastructure 
Projects 
11.52 11.11 0.36 28,006 
% of Working-age Adults Who 
Belong to Poor HH 
46.32 61.96 0.00 52,865 
% of Working on Infrastructure 
Projects Who Belong to Poor HH 
43.50 59.27 0.00 5,737 
Source: Analysis Team calculations based on 2007 and 2012 household surveys. 
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3.2.2 Econometric Impact Evaluation for Higher-Level Outcomes 
Econometric impact evaluation requires a model to link each outcome with a set of 
explanatory variables and an estimation strategy that exploits the panel data 
feature of the data set.  We begin with the model. 
Model 
The model is summarized by the equation given below.  The subscripts have the 
following designations:  c = commune, i = household, t = time period.  Notice that 
the treatment is at the commune level, not at the household level.  The question of 
self-selection at the household level does not arise in this case. Self-selection might 
occur at the commune level if communes lobby for inclusion or embrace P135-II 
with varying degrees of enthusiasm.  Certainly, we have non-random assignment 
of treatment at the commune level: if assignment is on exogenous regressors (but 
not on unobservables), then that is easily controlled by including those exogenous 
regressors. 
 =   + 
 +   +   +   +   +   +     
 (1) 
Where as: 
 Outcome variable 
 Treatment indicator 
 Vector of time-varying observable household characteristics 
 Vector of time-varying observable commune characteristics 
 Time-invariant commune characteristics (may include unobservables) 
 Time-invariant household characteristics (may include unobservables) 
 Time-specific effect 
 Idiosyncratic household deviations from expectation 

 Impact of Treatment on households with  = 0  
Difference in Differences 
The conventional Difference in Differences (DID) estimator to estimate the impact 
of  = 1 is given by 
 = ( −  ) − (  −   )  
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or    = ( −   ) − ( −   ) . 
The DID estimator of the program impact is valid if the time-varying 
characteristics  and  are uncorrelated with treatment  = 1.  This would 
be the case if assignment to P135-II had been random.  However, the treatment 
communes were not randomly selected, so that assumption is highly questionable. 
We may control for characteristics  and  by running the regression specified 
by equation (1), using the panel data nature of our data to control for the 
unobservables in and. 
Fixed Effects Transformation 
The fixed-effects (FE) transformation sweeps out all time-invariant characteristics 
listed in equation (1), including those that are unobservable.  Re-write the 
equation as: 
" =  
 +  
 +  " +  " +  +  ",   (2) 
where 
" =    −
1
2 % 

&
 
illustrates the transformation that is applied to each variable.  Pooled OLS on the 
transformed model yields consistent estimators of the coefficients.  Notice that the 
transformation does not sweep out the time-specific effects, so fixed-effects 
estimation must include a time-dummy.   
The impact estimate, is the estimated partial regression coefficient on the dummy 
variable that represents treatment: 
'
'  =   
. 
Estimation 
A set of plausible control variables is selected for each response variable under 
consideration. The set of control variables is narrowed-down by stepwise 
deletion: the least significant variable is deleted and the model re-estimated until 
all remaining controls are significant at the 40% level.  The high significance level 
is used to guard against Type II error, which would lead to omitted variables bias.   
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Limitations 
The primary limitation of fixed-effects panel data estimation is the fact that the 
differenced regressors often have much less variation than the regressors in level 
form.  As a result, the estimated coefficients may be estimated with poor precision 
and may therefore be statistically insignificant. 
3.3 Conclusion 
During the implementation process, there are some communes graduated and 
moved out of the Program, while some control communes become treatment 
communes. This switched status created the difficulty and complication for 
developing the appropriate impact measurement methodology and accuracy of 
estimations. It reduces the sample size of both control and treatment groups thus 
reduces power of testing and affects measurement of impacts considerably.  
Budget allocation between P135- II commune and non- P135- II commune are 
insignificant difference. While the P135- II commune tends to receive more fund 
from Program compared to non- P135- II, it receives much less fund from other 
programs, projects and government budget than non- P135- II. Local authority 
(district and provincial levels) often reallocate other funds from P135- II to non- 
P135- II for compensation is the major reason. Potential impact of P135- II 
depends on the budget enhancement for these communes so the reallocation of 
budget for non- P135-II communes could create the constraint for measuring the 
impact of the Program and might under estimate of Program’s impact.  
Perception of local authority and beneficiary household shows that the Program 
improved clearly accessibility to basic infrastructure, market and then increased 
agriculture productivity, non- farm job opportunity. Thus, it increased the income 
and improved the livelihood of the beneficiary households living in P135- II 
communes. 
The implementation of the Program is inconsistence overtime so the Difference in 
Difference Method (double differences) is not suitable to measure the impact of 
the Program. Results from analysis of the implementation of the Program, 
perception of the local authority and beneficiary households in this chapter helps 
us to develop the most appropriate impact measurement method and identify the 
impact outcomes.    
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CHAPTER 4 
POVERTY PROFILE OF ETHNIC MINORITIES 
 
With a high economic growth rate during the past two decades, Vietnam has 
become a middle-income country. Poverty incidence and poverty severity index 
have been decreasing. In middle 1990s, half of the population were below the 
consumption poverty line. In 2008, the poverty rate is around 14 percent 
(according to the 2008 Vietnam Household Living Standard Survey - VHLSS). 
Although there is a high economic growth and fast poverty reduction, not all 
households can benefit from the economic growth. Poverty remains high in the 
mountain and highland, where there are a large population of ethnic minorities. 
Ethnic minorities account for around 14 percent of the Vietnam’s population, but 
account for 50 percent of the poor population (according to the 2010 VHLSS). 
Economic growth and poverty reduction is not very successful in ethnic 
minorities. Many studies show that chronic poverty is now a phenomenon of 
ethnic minorities (Pham et al., 2012; World Bank, 2012). 
To reduce poverty in difficulty areas, the Government has launched Program 135 
which was targeted at the poor and ethnic minorities in the most difficult and 
poorest communes of Vietnam since 2000. This chapter examines poverty pattern 
and characteristics of households in the poorest areas of Vietnam – communes 
benefitted from Program 135 phase II (2006-2010). This chapter also investigates 
poverty dynamics of these households, and examines the relation between income 
growth, inequality and poverty of the households. This analysis relies on panel 
data from the Baseline Survey of P135-II conducted in 2007 and the Endline 
Survey of P135-II conducted in 2012.  
This chapter is structured into five parts. The second part examines poverty status 
and inequality pattern of households in P135-II communes through 
decomposition of change in poverty into change due to growth and change in 
inequality. The third part examines characteristics of the poor including living 
conditions, livelihood and assets of households. The forth part analyses poverty 
dynamics of ethnic minorities and estimates the determinants of persistent and 
transient poverty. The fifth part concludes.    
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4.1 Poverty and inequality of ethnic minorities 
4.1.1 Poverty trend 
The most widely used poverty measures are three Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) 
poverty indexes. In this study, we examine poverty of households in the poorest 
communes using the three FGT indexes7. Table 4.1 presents poverty indexes of 
households in P135-II communes. Per capita income of households in these 
poorest communes increased by 20 percent from 6,039 to 7,295 thousand 
VND/year/person during 2007-2012. This ratio is lower than the income growth 
rate of the national level. According to VHLSS 2006 and 2010, real per capita 
income of households increased by around 50 percent during the period 2006-
2010 and per capita income of household in 2010 is 16,644 thousand VND. 
Among the households in P135-II areas, Kinh households have substantially 
higher income than those of the ethnic minorities. Huge income gap between the 
Kinh and ethnic minorities is found in most studies on poverty in Vietnam (e.g., 
World Bank, 2012). Except Thai and Muong, the other ethnic minorities in P135-II 
experienced an increase in per capita income. In 2010, H’Mong and Thai are ethnic 
minority groups who had the lowest per capita income.  
Table 4. 1: Per capita income and the poverty rate of households in P135-II 
communes 
Groups 
Per capita income (thousand VND) Poverty rate (%) 
2007 2012 Change 2007 2012 Change 
All households 6,039.2*** 7,294.6*** 1,255.4*** 57.5*** 49.2*** -8.2*** 
 
180.3 193.5 264.5 1.3 1.3 1.8 
Ethnicity  
      
Kinh  9,273.6*** 11,377.7*** 2,104.2** 34.3*** 32.0*** -2.3 
 
659.4 716.2 973.1 3.7 4.0 5.4 
Ethnic minorities 5,210.4*** 6,293.7*** 1,083.3*** 63.4*** 53.5*** -10.0*** 
 
140.3 169.7 220.2 1.3 1.3 1.8 
Ethnic minority groups 
      
Tày 5,915.5*** 7,353.4*** 1,437.9*** 57.9*** 43.7*** -14.3*** 
 
270.9 373.7 461.2 2.8 2.9 4.0 
Thái 5,180.7*** 5,101.5*** -79.2 59.6*** 62.9*** 3.3 
 
267.0 288.8 393.0 3.3 3.3 4.6 
Mường 6,787.1*** 7,455.8*** 668.6 48.3*** 48.3*** 0.0 
 
431.2 529.4 682.1 3.9 3.9 5.5 
Nùng 5,800.8*** 7,722.7*** 1,921.9** 59.8*** 41.5*** -18.3*** 
 
510.9 611.9 796.1 4.4 4.3 6.2 
                                                        
7
 Refer to Appendix for detailed explanation of FGT indexes 
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Groups 
Per capita income (thousand VND) Poverty rate (%) 
2007 2012 Change 2007 2012 Change 
H'Mông 3,305.5*** 5,001.3*** 1,695.9*** 83.5*** 59.2*** -24.3*** 
 
96.2 191.9 214.6 2.1 3.0 3.6 
Dao 5,021.8*** 5,775.7*** 753.9** 63.0*** 55.9*** -7.1* 
 
195.1 261.8 326.3 2.9 3.1 4.2 
Other ethnic 
minorities 
5,863.0*** 7,110.9*** 1,247.9** 58.1*** 50.7*** -7.3* 
 
406.4 487.3 634.3 3.0 2.8 4.1 
Gender of household 
head       
Male 5,762.8*** 7,024.2*** 1,261.4*** 58.8*** 50.5*** -8.4*** 
 
141.7 175.3 225.4 1.3 1.3 1.9 
Female 9,101.2*** 10,118.7*** 1,017.6 42.8*** 36.6*** -6.1 
 
1,362.8 1,112.9 1,758.2 4.5 4.3 6.2 
Age of household head 
      
Below 25 5,890.5*** 6,666.7*** 776.1 71.7*** 56.9*** -14.7** 
 
1,659.4 1,066.8 1,971.1 5.0 4.8 6.9 
26-35 5,035.0*** 6,283.7*** 1,248.7*** 65.1*** 57.4*** -7.7*** 
 
171.1 272.4 321.6 2.1 2.1 3.0 
35-45 5,684.3*** 7,307.7*** 1,623.4*** 56.2*** 45.3*** -10.9*** 
 
206.9 271.1 341.0 2.2 2.2 3.2 
46-60 7,445.3*** 8,740.7*** 1,295.4** 48.5*** 40.2*** -8.4** 
 
421.2 479.7 638.2 2.8 2.6 3.8 
Above 60 6,323.1*** 7,005.4*** 682.3 55.4*** 57.1*** 1.7 
 
489.7 745.9 891.4 5.4 5.2 7.5 
Regions 
      
North 5,083.7*** 6,551.1*** 1,467.3*** 65.2*** 50.7*** -14.6*** 
 
118.4 152.3 192.9 1.3 1.4 1.9 
Central 6,131.5*** 7,283.9*** 1,152.5*** 56.1*** 54.3*** -1.8 
 
233.9 331.4 405.5 2.0 2.0 2.9 
South 8,712.6*** 9,608.3*** 895.7 36.7*** 38.2*** 1.5 
 
776.2 824.6 1,131.2 4.7 4.7 6.6 
Note:* significantly different from zero at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Income per capita is measured in the price of January 2012. 
Standard errors in the second line below the estates. 
Source: Analysis Team calculations based on 2007 and 2012 household surveys. 
In this study, poverty is defined based on per capita income and income poverty 
line. The income poverty line is 2,400 thousand VND/person/year in the price of 
2006. This is the national poverty line set up by the government for the period 
2006-2010. We adjust this poverty line to the price of 2007 and 2012. Table 4.1 
shows that poverty rate decreased from 57.5 percent to 49.2 percent during the 
period 2007-2012. Poverty mainly decreased among ethnic minorities. The Kinh 
has much lower poverty incidence, but its poverty rate does not increase 
substantially over the years. This finding is different from the national trends, 
which shows Kinh households experiencing a faster rate of poverty reduction 
during the last decade than ethnic minorities; and as a result the ethnic minorities 
account a larger proportion of the poor (Figure 4.1). Possibly, most of poverty 
 reduction programs are mainly targeted at the ethnic minorities in difficult 
communes; therefore the e
than the Kinh. Nung, H’Mong and Tay groups experience the highest poverty 
reduction rates during the past five years. 
Mountain are poorer than those in the Central and
ethnic minorities such as Nung, Tay and H’Mong in Northern Mountain. However, 
poverty was reduced faster in the Northern region than the Southern region.
Figure 4. 1: Poverty rate and the share of
Poverty rate (%)
Note: The poor in this figure are those who have per capita expenditure below the expenditure 
poverty rate. The nominal expen
1790, 2077 and 7836 thousand VND/person/year. 
Source: Analysis Team calculations based on
While poverty incidence simply demonstrates rate of people who live
poverty line in a given population, poverty gap index measures the intensity of 
poverty. Poverty gap and severity indexes
depth poverty picture of the targeted population. Table 
changes in these poverty indexes during the period 2007
significant increases in poverty gap and poverty severity indexes of Thai and 
Muong households while H’Mong experienced significant reduction in all poverty 
indexes. This phenomenon indicates 
                                                       
8
 Poverty gap index measures the extent to which individuals fall below the poverty line (the poverty 
gap) as a proportion of the poverty line. Poverty severity index is the squared poverty gap index, which 
averages the squares of the poverty gaps relative 
2005).  
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becomes more severe and poor households live even lower than the poverty line. 
The income gap between poor H’Mong households and the poverty line is 
narrowed by 2012. By ethnicity, there is a large variation in the poverty gap and 
poverty severity among ethnic minorities.  By regions, poverty gap and severity 
decreased for Northern region, but increased for Central region. These indexes 
imply that poverty is more severe for Central households while becomes less 
severe for Northern households. 
Table 4. 2: Poverty gap and severity indexes by demographics and regions 
Groups 
Poverty gap index (%) Poverty severity index (%) 
2007 2012 Change 2007 2012 Change 
All households 23.5*** 22.4*** -1.1 12.5*** 13.4*** 0.9 
 
0.7 0.8 1.0 0.4 0.6 0.8 
Ethnicity  
      
Kinh  11.7*** 13.3*** 1.5 6.0*** 8.0*** 2.1 
 
1.5 2.3 2.7 0.8 2.0 2.2 
Ethnic minorities 26.5*** 24.6*** -1.9* 14.2*** 14.7*** 0.5 
 
0.7 0.8 1.1 0.5 0.6 0.8 
Ethnic minority groups 
      
Tày 22.3*** 18.1*** -4.3* 11.5*** 10.2*** -1.3 
 
1.5 1.6 2.2 1.1 1.2 1.6 
Thái 26.0*** 32.1*** 6.1** 14.2*** 20.9*** 6.7*** 
 
1.9 2.2 2.9 1.4 1.7 2.2 
Mường 16.8*** 23.5*** 6.7** 7.4*** 15.2*** 7.9*** 
 
1.6 2.4 2.8 0.8 1.9 2.1 
Nùng 22.2*** 17.8*** -4.4 10.9*** 9.9*** -1.0 
 
2.1 2.0 2.9 1.4 1.3 1.9 
H'Mông 37.8*** 26.0*** -11.8*** 20.4*** 14.5*** -5.9*** 
 
1.4 1.7 2.2 1.1 1.2 1.6 
Dao 22.7*** 24.0*** 1.2 11.4*** 13.5*** 2.1 
 
1.5 1.7 2.2 1.0 1.2 1.6 
Other ethnic minorities 24.9*** 23.8*** -1.1 14.0*** 14.4*** 0.4 
 
1.6 1.8 2.4 1.1 1.6 1.9 
Gender of household head 
      
Male 23.9*** 23.0*** -0.9 12.7*** 13.8*** 1.2 
 
0.7 0.8 1.1 0.5 0.7 0.8 
Female 18.5*** 15.3*** -3.3 10.5*** 8.7*** -1.8 
 
2.4 1.9 3.1 1.6 1.2 2.0 
Age of household head 
      
Below 25 30.0*** 26.4*** -3.5 15.8*** 15.1*** -0.8 
 
2.6 2.6 3.7 1.7 1.7 2.4 
26-35 27.2*** 25.5*** -1.7 14.5*** 15.4*** 0.9 
 
1.2 1.4 1.9 0.8 1.3 1.5 
35-45 23.8*** 21.0*** -2.7 12.8*** 12.3*** -0.5 
 
1.2 1.2 1.7 0.8 0.8 1.1 
46-60 18.5*** 17.8*** -0.8 9.6*** 10.7*** 1.1 
 
1.3 1.3 1.8 0.8 1.0 1.3 
Above 60 21.0*** 27.6*** 6.5 11.5*** 17.8*** 6.3 
 
2.6 4.7 5.4 2.1 4.8 5.2 
Regions 
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Groups 
Poverty gap index (%) Poverty severity index (%) 
2007 2012 Change 2007 2012 Change 
North 27.1*** 22.0*** -5.1*** 14.4*** 12.5*** -1.9** 
 
0.8 0.8 1.1 0.5 0.6 0.8 
Central 23.5*** 27.3*** 3.8** 12.7*** 17.5*** 4.7*** 
 
1.1 1.3 1.7 0.8 1.0 1.3 
South 12.9*** 17.0*** 4.0 6.8*** 10.8*** 4.0 
 
1.9 3.0 3.6 1.2 2.7 2.9 
Note: * significantly different from zero at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Standard errors in the second line below the estimates. 
Source: Analysis Team calculations based on 2007 and 2012 household surveys. 
There is a small change in distribution of the poor by different ethnic minority 
groups. The share of Thai households in the total poor increased, while the share 
of H’Mong households decreased during the period 2007-2012.   
Table 4. 3: Share of the poor 
Groups 
Share of the poor (%) Share of the population (%) 
2007 2012 Change 2007 2012 Change 
Kinh 12.2 12.8 0.6 20.4 19.7 -0.7 
 
1.54 1.85 2.41 1.30 1.27 1.82 
Ethnic minorities 87.8 87.2 -0.6 79.6 80.3 0.7 
 
1.54 1.85 2.41 1.30 1.27 1.82 
Ethnic minority groups 
      
Tày 10.1 9.0 -1.1 10.0 10.2 0.2 
 
0.78 0.79 1.11 0.58 0.59 0.82 
Thái 13.3 16.3 3.0* 12.8 12.7 -0.1 
 
1.13 1.35 1.76 0.82 0.83 1.17 
Mường 5.7 6.6 0.9 6.8 6.8 0.0 
 
0.62 0.71 0.94 0.52 0.52 0.74 
Nùng 3.7 3.1 -0.6 3.5 3.6 0.1 
 
0.41 0.41 0.58 0.32 0.32 0.45 
H'Mông 24.8 21.2 -3.6* 17.1 17.6 0.6 
 
1.41 1.45 2.02 0.93 0.96 1.33 
Dao 8.0 8.3 0.3 7.3 7.4 0.0 
 
0.64 0.71 0.95 0.46 0.46 0.65 
Other ethnic minorities 22.3 22.7 0.4 22.1 22.0 -0.1 
 
1.43 1.50 2.07 1.14 1.08 1.57 
Regions 
      
North 63.9 58.8 -5.1* 56.3 57.1 0.8 
 
1.76 1.93 2.61 1.35 1.33 1.90 
Central 23.8 26.9 3.1* 24.4 24.4 0.0 
 
1.22 1.44 1.88 0.95 0.95 1.34 
South 12.3 14.3 2.0 19.3 18.5 -0.8 
 
1.83 2.08 2.77 1.50 1.43 2.08 
Total 100.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 
 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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Groups 
Share of the poor (%) Share of the population (%) 
2007 2012 Change 2007 2012 Change 
Note: * significantly different from zero at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Standard errors in the second line below the estimates. 
Source: Analysis Team calculations based on 2007 and 2012 household surveys. 
4.1.2 Inequality analysis 
Gini coefficient 
Poverty gap index and poverty severity index overlook inequality factor among 
the poor. These indexes do not capture differences in the severity of poverty 
amongst the poor. Therefore, Gini coefficient9 and generalized entropy index are 
used in this part to measure level of inequality among targeted households. Table 
4.4 presents the estimates of Gini index and ratios of different percentiles of per 
capita income distribution. Gini index (measured in 100) increases from 43 in 
2007 to 47 in 2012. Accordingly, the 2012 Lorenz curve moves further from the 
diagonal line as compared to 2007 Lorenz curve (Figure 4.2). The ratio of the 
90th/10th income percentile increased from 7.2 to 10.3. This situation implies that 
income inequality among targeted households intensifies in 2012. As Gini index 
increases from 2007 to 2012 for every ethnic group, inequality within Kinh 
households as well as within ethnic minority households also increases over the 
period 207 – 2012.  
Table 4. 4: Inequality in per-capita income distribution 
  
  
Bottom half of the 
Distribution 
Upper half of the 
Distribution 
Interquartil
e Range 
Tails   
p25/p10 p50/p25 p75/p50 p90/p75 p75/p25 p90/p10 Gini 
Total 
       2007 1.51 1.64 1.64 1.78 2.68 7.22 43.00 
 
0.04 0.03 0.04 0.08 0.09 0.43 1.45 
2012 1.76 1.88 1.81 1.73 3.40 10.34 47.03 
 
0.07 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.12 0.59 1.21 
Kinh 
       2007 1.79 1.37 1.93 1.78 2.64 8.38 42.77 
 
0.11 0.10 0.14 0.14 0.28 1.04 3.07 
2012 1.89 1.82 1.90 1.73 3.45 11.25 45.43 
 
0.24 0.20 0.15 0.14 0.35 2.11 2.93 
Ethnic minorities 
2007 1.46 1.60 1.62 1.55 2.58 5.84 40.30 
                                                        
9
 Refer to Appendix for detailed explanation of Gini coefficient 
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Bottom half of the 
Distribution 
Upper half of the 
Distribution 
Interquartil
e Range 
Tails   
p25/p10 p50/p25 p75/p50 p90/p75 p75/p25 p90/p10 Gini 
 
0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.08 0.23 1.38 
2012 1.72 1.83 1.72 1.68 3.16 9.14 44.91 
 
0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.11 0.46 1.30 
Note: Standard errors in the second line below the estimates. 
Source: Analysis Team calculations based on 2007 and 2012 household surveys. 
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Figure 4. 2: Lorenz Curve 
 
Source: Analysis Team calculations based on 2007 and 2012 household surveys. 
Figure 4.3 presents income growth of all the households with annual growth rate 
of households at different percentiles of per capita income. Households at lower 
levels of income experienced lower growth rate of income than households at 
higher levels of income. As a result, income inequality among households in P135-
II increased overtime.    
Figure 4. 3: Income growth-incidence curve of all households 
 
 
Note: the horizontal axis is the percentiles of per capita income 
Source: Analysis Team calculations based on 2007 and 2012 household surveys. 
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Generalized entropy measures 
Apart from Gini index, three generalized entropy indexes are employed in this study 
to measure income inequality. An advantage of the generalized entropy measures is 
that the total inequality can be decomposed into within-group inequality and 
between-group inequality components. Similar to Gini index, the generalized 
entropy indexes increased over the period 2007-2012 for the whole sample, and for 
all ethnic groups. Table 4.5 shows decomposition of the total inequality into 
inequality within Kinh group and within ethnic minority households as well as 
inequality between Kinh households and ethnic minority households. Within-group 
inequality component accounts for a larger proportion of the total inequality. 
Between-group inequality component accounts for less than 10 percent of the total 
inequality. This phenomenon indicates that there is high level of inequality within Kinh 
group and within ethnic minority groups while inequality between the Kinh and the 
ethnic minorities in difficult communes of P135-II is rather low.  
Table 4. 5: Decomposition of inequality by Kinh and ethnic minorities 
 
 
2007 2012 
GE(0) GE(1) GE(2) GE(0) GE(1) GE(2) 
Total 31.1 32.8 46.6 40.0 38.6 53.8 
       
Ethnic minorities 27.2 28.9 41.2 36.5 35.2 48.7 
Kinh 31.4 30.7 38.4 37.8 34.7 42.8 
       
Within-group inequality 28.1 29.5 42.9 36.7 35.0 49.8 
Between-group 
inequality 
3.0 3.3 3.7 3.3 3.6 4.1 
Between as a share of 
total 
9.7 10.1 7.9 8.1 9.3 7.5 
Source: Analysis Team calculations based on 2007 and 2012 household surveys. 
Table 4.6 decomposes the total inequality into within-region inequality and 
between-region inequality. Within-region inequality accounts for a larger 
proportion of the total inequality, while between-region inequality component 
accounts for a small fraction of the total inequality.   
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Table 4. 6: Decomposition of inequality by regions 
 
 
2007 2012 
GE(0) GE(1) GE(2) GE(0) GE(1) GE(2) 
Total 31.1 32.8 46.6 40.0 38.6 53.8 
       
North 26.8 29.0 41.8 33.8 33.2 45.8 
Central 31.1 32.1 45.7 50.6 47.7 69.5 
South 31.6 31.1 39.3 38.2 35.6 44.3 
       
Within-group inequality 28.8 30.4 44.0 38.7 37.3 52.4 
Between-group 
inequality 
2.3 2.4 2.6 1.3 1.3 1.4 
Between as a share of 
total 
7.3 7.4 5.6 3.2 3.5 2.7 
Source: Analysis Team calculations based on 2007 and 2012 household surveys. 
Decomposition of change in poverty 
Since inequality increased over the period 2007-2012, the effect of income growth 
on poverty reduction will be mitigated. The decomposition of poverty changes into 
“growth”, and “redistribution” components can shed light on the relation between 
poverty and important factors that contribute significantly to poverty reduction 
such as growth and redistribution. Table 4.7 presents the decomposition of change 
in poverty into three components10: growth, redistribution, and residual. The 
growth component of change in poverty measured from 2007 to 2012 is defined 
as the change in poverty due to change in mean income between 2007 and 2012, 
holding income distribution (the Lorenz curve) constant. The redistribution 
component is the change in poverty due to change in income distribution from 
2007 to 2012, while keeping the mean income fixed at the base year. The 
difference between the total change in poverty and the changes in poverty due to 
the income growth and income redistribution is called residual.  
Table 4. 7: Growth and redistribution decomposition of poverty changes 
 
Incidence of poverty (%) Change in incidence of poverty 
2007 2012 
Actual 
change 
Growth Redistribution Residual 
Total 57.50 49.25 -8.25 -10.56 0.49 1.83 
Ethnic 
minorities 
63.45 53.48 -9.96 -10.38 -1.02 1.44 
                                                        
10
 Decomposition method comes from Datt and Ravallion (1991) 
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Kinh 34.29 31.98 -2.31 -12.04 5.77 3.96 
Source: Analysis Team calculations based on 2007 and 2012 household surveys. 
Table 4.7 shows that poverty reduction in P135-II areas results from income 
growth. Within ethnic minority households and within Kinh households, income 
growth contributed mainly to poverty reduction, but income distribution had 
opposite effects on poverty. As total inequality within ethnic minority households 
increased (see Table 4.4, 4.5, 4.6), income redistribution did have a negative effect 
on poverty incidence despite its being a small effect. For Kinh group, the increase 
in unequal redistribution of income results into an increase in poverty rate.   
Elasticity of poverty rate 
Tables 4.8 and 4.9 present the elasticity of the poverty rate with respect to mean 
income and inequality (measured by the Gini coefficient), respectively. The 
elasticity to income is computed by shifting per capita income of all the 
households by a fixed amount and estimating the new poverty indexes. The 
elasticity is estimated using the percentage change in poverty indexes and the 
percentage change in mean income. The elasticity to Gini is estimated by 
increasing per capita incomes of all the households by the same fixed transferred 
income level, then normalizing incomes to bring the new mean level of income to 
the old mean level (tax on incomes). 
Table 4. 8: Elasticity of poverty with respect to income 
  
  
Poverty Headcount Rate 
(P0) 
Poverty Gap (P1) 
Squared Poverty Gap 
(P2) 
2007 2012 
chang
e 
2007 2012 
chang
e 
2007 2012 
chang
e 
Ethnic 
minorities 
-0.79 -0.89 -0.10 -1.30 -1.08 0.22 -1.58 -1.22 0.36 
Kinh -2.56 -0.81 1.74 -1.62 -1.28 0.35 -1.69 -1.16 0.53 
Total -1.00 -0.88 0.12 -1.33 -1.10 0.23 -1.59 -1.22 0.37 
Source: Analysis Team calculations based on 2007 and 2012 household surveys. 
Table 4.8 shows that poverty is relatively elastic to income growth. However, 
elasticity tends to decrease overtime, which means that to reduce the same 
percentage of poverty index, income needs to be increased more strongly than 
before. For 2012, elasticity of poverty gap and severity is larger than elasticity of 
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poverty rate, which indicates that reducing poverty gap and poverty severity 
requires higher income growth than reducing poverty rate.  
Table 4. 9: Elasticity of poverty with respect to the inequality 
 
Poverty Headcount Rate 
(P0) 
Poverty Gap (P1) 
Squared Poverty Gap 
(P2) 
2007 2012 
chang
e 
2007 2012 
chang
e 
2007 2012 
chang
e 
Ethnic 
minorities 
0.05 0.31 0.27 1.18 1.64 0.46 2.14 2.76 0.62 
Kinh 2.65 2.80 0.15 3.32 3.80 0.49 4.65 5.21 0.56 
Total 0.27 0.61 0.33 1.59 2.08 0.49 2.70 3.32 0.62 
Source: Analysis Team calculations based on 2007 and 2012 household surveys. 
Elasticity of poverty incidence with respect to inequality is relatively small, but 
increased quickly from 0.27 in 2007 to 0.61 in 2012. Elasticity of poverty gap and 
poverty severity with respect to inequality is rather high. For 2012, a one-percent 
decrease in Gini would lead to 2.1 percent reduction in poverty gap index and 3.3 
percent reduction in poverty severity index. This finding suggests that income 
redistribution plays an extremely important role in decreasing poverty gap and 
poverty severity. 
4.2 Characteristics of ethnic minorities 
4.2.1 Living conditions 
Housing condition 
The living conditions are assessed through the study of housing condition, latrine, 
and source of water. Per capita living area increased from 13 m2 to 18 m2 during 
the period 2007-2012 for beneficiary groups, indicating improvement in living 
areas across ethnic groups and across regions. The proportion of households 
living in solid houses also increased. Except H’Mong group, other ethnic minority 
groups experience an increase in proportion of households living in solid houses.   
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Table 4. 10: Housing condition of households 
Groups 
Per capita living area 
(m2) 
% households living in a 
solid house 
% households living in a 
semi-solid house 
2007 2012 
Chang
e 
2007 2012 
Chang
e 
2007 2012 Change 
          
Total 13.0*** 18.0*** 5.0*** 6.7*** 15.7*** 8.9*** 53.4*** 60.0*** 6.6*** 
 
0.2 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.9 1.1 1.3 1.3 1.8 
Poor/Non-poor 
Poor 10.7*** 15.2*** 4.5*** 4.4*** 10.4*** 6.0*** 50.4*** 62.5*** 12.2*** 
 
0.2 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.9 1.1 1.6 1.6 2.3 
Non-poor 15.6*** 21.2*** 5.6*** 9.4*** 21.6*** 12.2*** 56.8*** 57.1*** 0.3 
 
0.4 0.9 1.0 1.2 1.6 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.9 
Ethnicity 
         
Kinh 15.1*** 20.6*** 5.5*** 10.1*** 25.5*** 15.3*** 45.4*** 47.9*** 2.5 
 
0.8 1.0 1.3 1.8 2.5 3.1 3.2 3.3 4.6 
Ethnic 
minorities 
12.3*** 17.2*** 4.9*** 5.7*** 12.6*** 6.9*** 55.9*** 63.7*** 7.9*** 
 
0.2 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.9 1.1 1.3 1.3 1.9 
Ethnic minority groups 
Tày 14.8*** 21.2*** 6.4*** 6.4*** 9.3*** 2.9 55.4*** 80.7*** 25.2*** 
 
0.5 0.9 1.1 1.5 1.7 2.3 2.8 2.2 3.6 
Thái 12.2*** 15.6*** 3.4*** 8.9*** 13.9*** 5.0* 67.2*** 71.1*** 3.9 
 
0.4 0.6 0.7 1.9 2.2 2.9 3.0 2.9 4.2 
Mường 13.5*** 19.8*** 6.4*** 9.2*** 23.4*** 14.3*** 52.8*** 61.3*** 8.5 
 
0.6 1.2 1.4 2.3 3.2 4.0 3.7 3.6 5.2 
Nùng 14.6*** 21.8*** 7.2*** 5.8** 16.2*** 10.3** 71.5*** 73.0*** 1.4 
 
0.6 1.1 1.2 2.4 4.0 4.6 4.5 4.5 6.4 
H'Mông 10.1*** 14.2*** 4.2*** 2.8** 0.4** -2.4** 62.8*** 57.7*** -5.0 
 
0.3 0.5 0.6 1.1 0.2 1.1 2.8 2.7 3.9 
Dao 13.7*** 18.0*** 4.3*** 4.7*** 5.2*** 0.6 64.1*** 84.6*** 20.5*** 
 
0.5 0.7 0.8 1.2 1.3 1.8 2.8 1.9 3.4 
Others 11.5*** 16.1*** 4.6*** 4.5*** 19.1*** 14.6*** 41.7*** 48.5*** 6.8 
 
0.5 1.6 1.7 1.5 2.3 2.7 2.8 3.0 4.1 
Regions 
         
North 12.4*** 17.9*** 5.6*** 7.5*** 8.3*** 0.7 58.4*** 72.6*** 14.2*** 
 
0.2 0.4 0.4 0.8 0.8 1.1 1.3 1.2 1.8 
Central 12.5*** 16.1*** 3.6*** 7.7*** 29.4*** 21.6*** 62.9*** 52.4*** -10.5*** 
 
0.4 0.6 0.7 1.2 1.7 2.1 1.9 1.9 2.7 
South 15.2*** 20.5*** 5.4*** 3.7** 18.1*** 14.4*** 30.2*** 37.7*** 7.5 
 
0.9 1.8 2.0 1.9 3.0 3.5 3.4 4.0 5.3 
Note: * significantly different from zero at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Standard errors in the second line below the estimates. 
Source: Analysis Team calculations based on 2007 and 2012 household surveys. 
Water and sanitation 
Although a large number of programs have been designed to improve water access 
and sanitation for the ethnic minorities, improvement in the access and the 
current access to clean water and sanitary latrines remain limited in P135-II areas. 
Only 9.1 percent, 7.4 percent and 15.5 percent of households had access to flush 
toilet, suilabh toilet, and double septic tank toilet, respectively. Nearly 70 percent 
 51 
of households do not have access to sanitary latrines. For ethnic minority groups 
such as H’Mong, the proportion of households with access to sanitary latrines is 
extremely small, lower than 10 percent.  
Table 4. 11: Latrine types 
Groups 
% households having 
flush toilet 
% households having 
suilabh toilet 
% households having 
double septic tank toilet 
2007 2012 
Chang
e 
2007 2012 
Chang
e 
2007 2012 
Chang
e 
          
Total 3.7*** 9.1*** 5.4*** 2.0*** 7.4*** 5.3*** 5.4*** 15.5*** 10.2*** 
 
0.6 0.7 0.9 0.4 0.8 0.9 0.5 0.9 1.0 
Poor/Non-poor 
Poor 0.8** 4.9*** 4.2*** 1.3*** 5.6*** 4.3*** 3.0*** 14.5*** 11.5*** 
 
0.4 0.6 0.7 0.4 0.9 1.0 0.6 1.2 1.3 
Non-poor 7.0*** 13.8*** 6.8*** 2.9*** 9.3*** 6.5*** 8.0*** 16.7*** 8.7*** 
 
1.3 1.2 1.8 0.6 1.4 1.5 0.9 1.4 1.7 
Ethnicity 
         
Kinh 7.6*** 16.4*** 8.8*** 4.9*** 10.1*** 5.2** 15.5*** 22.2*** 6.7** 
 
1.9 1.9 2.7 1.2 2.1 2.4 1.9 2.3 3.0 
Ethnic 
minorities 
2.5*** 6.9*** 4.4*** 1.1*** 6.5*** 5.4*** 2.2*** 13.5*** 11.2*** 
 
0.6 0.7 0.9 0.3 0.8 0.9 0.4 1.0 1.0 
Ethnic minority groups 
Tày 3.7*** 10.0*** 6.3*** 0.3 6.9*** 6.6*** 2.6** 19.5*** 16.8*** 
 
1.2 1.7 2.1 0.3 1.4 1.4 1.1 2.3 2.5 
Thái 0.3 8.8*** 8.5*** 0.8* 6.0*** 5.2*** 4.7*** 12.1*** 7.4*** 
 
0.3 1.6 1.6 0.5 1.6 1.7 1.5 2.3 2.7 
Mường 0.8 9.0*** 8.1*** 1.8* 5.5*** 3.7 7.0*** 28.1*** 21.1*** 
 
0.7 1.9 2.0 1.0 2.1 2.3 2.0 3.4 3.9 
Nùng 0.8 7.2** 6.4** 1.2 5.3*** 4.1** 1.8 14.2*** 12.3*** 
 
0.8 2.9 3.0 1.0 1.6 1.8 1.5 3.4 3.7 
H'Mông 0.0*** 0.7* 0.7* 1.8* 0.9*** -0.9 0.0*** 0.9*** 0.9*** 
 
0.0 0.4 0.4 1.1 0.3 1.1 0.0 0.3 0.3 
Dao 2.7** 8.5*** 5.8*** 1.8** 4.4*** 2.6 2.4** 5.3*** 2.9* 
 
1.1 1.8 2.1 0.9 1.3 1.6 1.0 1.1 1.5 
Others 5.5*** 6.9*** 1.5 0.8 11.3*** 10.5*** 0.4** 16.4*** 16.0*** 
 
1.9 1.6 2.5 0.5 2.4 2.4 0.2 2.4 2.4 
Regions 
         
North 1.5*** 7.0*** 5.5*** 1.4*** 3.2*** 1.8*** 4.4*** 15.9*** 11.4*** 
 
0.3 0.7 0.7 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.6 1.0 1.2 
Central 2.4*** 11.9*** 9.5*** 1.4*** 7.1*** 5.7*** 10.5*** 18.9*** 8.4*** 
 
0.6 1.2 1.4 0.4 1.0 1.1 1.5 1.7 2.2 
South 10.6*** 11.2*** 0.6 4.4*** 17.7*** 13.4*** 1.8** 10.9*** 9.1*** 
 
2.7 2.2 3.5 1.3 3.2 3.5 0.7 2.7 2.8 
Note: * significantly different from zero at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Standard errors in the second line below the estimates. 
Source: Analysis Team calculations based on 2007 and 2012 household surveys. 
Clean water is also a serious problem with households in the poorest communes. 
Clean water is a crucial factor for health, especially child health. Unclean water can 
cause many problems to health. WHO (2004) mentions the adverse affects of 
 52 
drinking contaminated water which resulted in thousands of deaths every day, 
mostly in under-5 children in developing countries. UNDP (2006) claims that 
unsafe water and shortage of basic sanitation caused 80 percent of diseases. Yet, 
only 13 percent of ethnic minority households in P135-II communes have tap 
water, while this corresponding figure for the national level is 27 percent for 2010 
(according to the 2012 VHLSS). The proportion of households having tap water 
even slightly decreased over the period 2007 – 2012. The proportion of 
households with solid well increased but with a small growth rate.  
Table 4. 12: Drinking water sources 
Groups 
% households having 
tap water 
% households having 
water from solid well 
% households having 
water from temporary 
well 
2007 2012 
Chang
e 
2007 2012 
Chang
e 
2007 2012 
Chang
e 
          
Total 15.0*** 13.3*** -1.7 47.9*** 52.2*** 4.2** 26.4*** 28.4*** 2.0 
 
1.2 1.1 1.6 1.3 1.3 1.8 1.0 1.0 1.4 
Poor/Non-poor 
Poor 14.7*** 12.8*** -1.9 41.0*** 44.1*** 3.0 31.6*** 35.4*** 3.8* 
 
1.4 1.4 2.0 1.6 1.6 2.2 1.4 1.4 2.0 
Non-poor 15.3*** 13.8*** -1.5 55.7*** 61.2*** 5.6** 20.5*** 20.5*** 0.0 
 
1.9 1.7 2.5 2.0 1.9 2.8 1.3 1.3 1.8 
Ethnicity 
         
Kinh 23.1*** 21.7*** -1.4 63.9*** 68.6*** 4.7 10.4*** 9.1*** -1.3 
 
3.4 3.1 4.6 3.4 3.2 4.7 1.4 1.3 1.9 
Ethnic 
minorities 
12.4*** 10.6*** -1.8 42.9*** 47.0*** 4.1** 31.4*** 34.4*** 3.1* 
 
1.1 1.0 1.5 1.3 1.3 1.8 1.1 1.2 1.6 
Ethnic minority groups 
Tày 3.2*** 3.1*** -0.1 52.3*** 64.6*** 12.2*** 39.4*** 27.3*** 
-
12.1*** 
 
1.2 1.1 1.6 2.8 2.6 3.8 2.7 2.4 3.6 
Thái 9.0*** 1.1* -7.9*** 37.2*** 54.2*** 17.0*** 29.0*** 37.2*** 8.2* 
 
1.8 0.7 1.9 3.0 3.2 4.4 3.0 3.1 4.3 
Mường 2.2** 10.5*** 8.3** 67.4*** 47.4*** 
-
20.0*** 
18.5*** 34.8*** 16.3*** 
 
1.0 3.2 3.3 3.5 3.7 5.1 2.7 3.5 4.4 
Nùng 7.7*** 8.9*** 1.2 47.4*** 54.9*** 7.5 36.3*** 29.6*** -6.7 
 
2.1 2.8 3.5 4.6 4.5 6.4 4.3 3.8 5.7 
H'Mông 21.9*** 16.2*** -5.7** 25.4*** 24.0*** -1.3 47.3*** 53.3*** 6.0 
 
2.0 1.6 2.6 2.1 2.2 3.1 2.8 2.7 3.9 
Dao 5.0*** 3.2*** -1.8 40.6*** 33.5*** -7.1* 46.4*** 57.2*** 10.8*** 
 
1.2 0.8 1.5 2.9 2.9 4.1 3.0 2.9 4.2 
Others 19.2*** 18.4*** -0.9 43.9*** 51.9*** 8.0* 17.8*** 18.3*** 0.5 
 
3.1 2.9 4.2 3.1 3.1 4.3 1.7 1.7 2.4 
Regions 
         
North 11.5*** 8.6*** -2.9*** 43.2*** 46.0*** 2.7 36.8*** 39.8*** 3.0 
 
0.8 0.8 1.1 1.3 1.3 1.9 1.3 1.3 1.9 
Central 0.9*** 2.6*** 1.7** 52.3*** 57.3*** 5.1* 25.0*** 28.4*** 3.5 
 
0.3 0.6 0.7 1.9 1.9 2.7 1.7 1.8 2.5 
South 39.4*** 36.8*** -2.6 54.4*** 61.3*** 6.9 2.7*** 0.6 -2.1** 
 
4.3 4.1 6.0 4.3 4.2 6.0 0.9 0.5 1.0 
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Groups 
% households having 
tap water 
% households having 
water from solid well 
% households having 
water from temporary 
well 
2007 2012 
Chang
e 
2007 2012 
Chang
e 
2007 2012 
Chang
e 
Note: * significantly different from zero at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Standard errors in the second line below the estimates. 
Source: Analysis Team calculations based on 2007 and 2012 household surveys. 
There is improvement in the access to electricity in P135-II communes. The 
proportion of households with electricity increased from 68.6 percent in 2007 to 
83.6 percent in 2012. However, compared with the national figure of 98 percent 
households having access to electricity, electricity coverage in P135-II communes 
remains low.  Access to electricity varies substantially across ethnic minority 
groups. Tay, Muong and Nung have relatively high proportions of households 
having electricity, while M’Mong and Dao experience much lower rates.   
Table 4. 13: Boiling water and access to electricity 
Groups 
% households boiling water before 
drinking 
% households having access to 
electricity 
2007 2012 Change 2007 2012 Change 
       
Total 82.2*** 79.0*** -3.2* 68.6*** 83.6*** 15.0*** 
 
1.2 1.2 1.8 1.1 0.7 1.4 
Poor/Non-poor 
      
Poor 80.5*** 75.7*** -4.8** 59.8*** 78.6*** 18.8*** 
 
1.5 1.6 2.2 1.6 1.1 1.9 
Non-poor 84.2*** 82.7*** -1.5 78.4*** 89.2*** 10.8*** 
 
2.1 1.9 2.8 1.6 0.9 1.9 
Ethnicity 
      
Kinh 81.1*** 79.8*** -1.2 87.7*** 97.7*** 10.0*** 
 
3.3 3.2 4.6 2.9 0.7 2.9 
Ethnic minorities 82.6*** 78.8*** -3.8** 62.6*** 79.2*** 16.6*** 
 
1.2 1.3 1.8 1.2 0.9 1.5 
Ethnic minority groups 
      
Tày 96.8*** 98.6*** 1.9* 76.4*** 89.6*** 13.2*** 
 
0.9 0.6 1.1 2.1 1.5 2.6 
Thái 98.7*** 95.1*** -3.6** 57.8*** 77.0*** 19.2*** 
 
0.9 1.4 1.7 3.1 2.5 4.0 
Mường 99.2*** 99.2*** 0.0 89.1*** 99.7*** 10.6*** 
 
0.6 0.6 0.8 2.2 0.2 2.2 
Nùng 94.3*** 88.2*** -6.0** 76.4*** 96.8*** 20.5*** 
 
1.7 2.5 3.0 3.1 1.2 3.3 
H'Mông 67.5*** 50.8*** -16.7*** 35.1*** 60.0*** 24.8*** 
 
2.6 2.8 3.8 2.7 2.6 3.7 
Dao 94.3*** 96.6*** 2.3 40.7*** 62.4*** 21.7*** 
 
1.2 1.0 1.6 3.0 2.8 4.1 
Others 65.5*** 64.1*** -1.4 70.8*** 82.4*** 11.6*** 
 
3.3 3.2 4.6 2.6 2.0 3.3 
Regions 
      
North 89.0*** 83.5*** -5.5*** 57.1*** 77.3*** 20.1*** 
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Groups 
% households boiling water before 
drinking 
% households having access to 
electricity 
2007 2012 Change 2007 2012 Change 
 
0.8 1.1 1.4 1.3 1.0 1.7 
Central 90.3*** 88.6*** -1.7 81.7*** 87.6*** 5.9*** 
 
1.0 1.1 1.4 1.3 1.1 1.7 
South 56.5*** 57.2*** 0.7 81.6*** 94.4*** 12.9*** 
 
4.3 4.3 6.1 3.6 1.7 4.0 
Note: * significantly different from zero at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Standard errors in the second line below the estimates. 
Source: Analysis Team calculations based on 2007 and 2012 household surveys. 
 
Durable assets 
Living standards of households in P135-II communes, for both Kinh and ethnic 
minorities have improved, demonstrated through the increase in durable assets 
(Tables 4.14 and 4.16). Around 70.9 percent of households had either landline or 
mobile phone in 2012. For poorest ethnic minority groups such as H’Mong and 
Dao, more than 50 percent of households had mobile phone. The number of 
households with television also increased, with nearly 70 percent of households 
having television by 2012.   
Table 4. 14: Telephone and television 
Groups 
% households having a telephone % households having a television 
2007 2012 Change 2007 2012 Change 
       
Total 14.0*** 70.9*** 56.9*** 52.1*** 72.7*** 20.7*** 
 
1.1 1.1 1.5 1.3 1.1 1.7 
Poor/Non-poor 
      
Poor 4.3*** 65.1*** 60.8*** 36.9*** 65.8*** 28.9*** 
 
1.0 1.5 1.8 1.5 1.5 2.1 
Non-poor 25.0*** 77.4*** 52.4*** 69.2*** 80.6*** 11.4*** 
 
1.9 1.6 2.4 1.8 1.5 2.4 
Ethnicity 
      
Kinh 35.1*** 84.0*** 48.9*** 77.6*** 89.1*** 11.5*** 
 
3.3 2.3 4.0 2.7 1.7 3.2 
Ethnic minorities 7.5*** 66.9*** 59.3*** 44.2*** 67.8*** 23.5*** 
 
0.9 1.2 1.5 1.3 1.2 1.8 
Ethnic minority groups 
      
Tày 12.1*** 77.4*** 65.3*** 62.6*** 81.1*** 18.4*** 
 
1.8 2.3 2.9 2.6 2.1 3.4 
Thái 4.3*** 61.5*** 57.1*** 47.7*** 77.7*** 30.0*** 
 
1.2 3.1 3.4 3.2 2.4 4.0 
Mường 10.5*** 76.9*** 66.3*** 68.3*** 89.4*** 21.0*** 
 
2.2 3.2 3.8 3.4 2.2 4.0 
Nùng 13.9*** 83.9*** 69.9*** 54.5*** 81.4*** 26.9*** 
 
4.0 3.1 5.0 4.5 3.0 5.4 
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Groups 
% households having a telephone % households having a television 
2007 2012 Change 2007 2012 Change 
H'Mông 1.3*** 55.5*** 54.2*** 13.2*** 39.0*** 25.7*** 
 
0.5 2.7 2.8 1.7 2.7 3.2 
Dao 6.0*** 81.6*** 75.6*** 46.1*** 62.2*** 16.1*** 
 
1.4 2.2 2.6 3.0 2.8 4.1 
Others 9.3*** 61.0*** 51.7*** 42.5*** 66.2*** 23.7*** 
 
2.5 2.8 3.8 3.0 2.9 4.2 
Regions 
      
North 8.2*** 70.2*** 62.1*** 45.7*** 67.4*** 21.8*** 
 
0.7 1.2 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.8 
Central 13.7*** 66.9*** 53.2*** 56.5*** 77.1*** 20.7*** 
 
1.4 1.8 2.3 1.9 1.5 2.4 
South 28.8*** 77.1*** 48.3*** 62.8*** 80.9*** 18.1*** 
 
4.0 3.4 5.2 4.3 3.3 5.4 
Note: * significantly different from zero at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Standard errors in the second line below the estimates. 
Source: Analysis Team calculations based on 2007 and 2012 household surveys. 
Ownership of motorbike also increased significantly during the past five years. 
Specifically, the percentage of households having a motorbike increased from 43.8 
percent to 66.2 percent (Table 4.15). Motorbike ownership increases across ethnic 
groups and across different types of households. However, the proportion of 
households having an electric fan just increased slightly from 44.2 percent to 48.6 
percent during this period. Despite the improvement in asset ownership, H’Mong 
group still has the lowest percentage of households owning motorbikes and 
electric fans. 
Table 4. 15: Motorbike and electric fan 
Groups 
% households having motorbike % households having electric fan 
2007 2012 Change 2007 2012 Change 
       
Total 43.8*** 66.2*** 22.4*** 44.2*** 48.6*** 4.4** 
 
1.3 1.3 1.8 1.3 1.3 1.8 
Poor/Non-poor 
      
Poor 32.4*** 60.4*** 28.0*** 31.5*** 38.9*** 7.3*** 
 
1.5 1.6 2.2 1.5 1.6 2.2 
Non-poor 56.1*** 72.7*** 16.6*** 57.8*** 59.5*** 1.7 
 
2.1 1.9 2.8 2.0 1.9 2.8 
Ethnicity 
      
Kinh 54.8*** 71.0*** 16.2*** 71.5*** 77.1*** 5.5 
 
3.4 3.4 4.8 3.3 2.9 4.4 
Ethnic minorities 40.3*** 64.7*** 24.4*** 35.4*** 39.6*** 4.2** 
 
1.3 1.3 1.8 1.3 1.3 1.8 
Ethnic minority groups 
      
Tày 49.1*** 76.0*** 27.0*** 66.8*** 53.0*** -13.8*** 
 
2.8 2.4 3.7 2.5 2.8 3.7 
Thái 42.5*** 73.2*** 30.7*** 30.3*** 41.8*** 11.5*** 
 
3.2 2.7 4.2 3.0 3.2 4.4 
Mường 46.5*** 70.4*** 23.9*** 62.7*** 66.8*** 4.1 
 
3.8 3.5 5.2 3.7 3.4 5.1 
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Groups 
% households having motorbike % households having electric fan 
2007 2012 Change 2007 2012 Change 
Nùng 45.4*** 76.7*** 31.3*** 61.8*** 58.4*** -3.4 
 
4.6 3.6 5.8 4.1 4.2 5.9 
H'Mông 21.9*** 51.1*** 29.2*** 2.8*** 7.2*** 4.4*** 
 
2.2 2.8 3.5 0.6 1.4 1.5 
Dao 44.6*** 70.0*** 25.4*** 32.8*** 44.0*** 11.2*** 
 
3.0 2.7 4.0 2.9 3.0 4.2 
Others 42.2*** 57.4*** 15.2*** 29.8*** 38.3*** 8.5* 
 
3.2 3.1 4.5 3.3 3.2 4.6 
Regions 
      
North 42.3*** 67.9*** 25.6*** 39.4*** 38.0*** -1.3 
 
1.3 1.3 1.8 1.3 1.3 1.8 
Central 46.5*** 65.6*** 19.1*** 45.3*** 57.2*** 11.9*** 
 
2.0 1.8 2.7 2.0 1.9 2.8 
South 44.4*** 62.6*** 18.1*** 54.7*** 64.5*** 9.8 
 
4.2 4.4 6.0 4.3 4.1 6.0 
Note: * significantly different from zero at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Standard errors in the second line below the estimates. 
Source: Analysis Team calculations based on 2007 and 2012 household surveys. 
 
Social allowance 
One of important programs that support the disadvantaged groups is cash 
transfers. Targeted transfers can help reduce vulnerability and protect people 
from falling into poverty (Alderman and Haque, 2006). Cash transfers may have 
persistent effects on chronic poverty if they ease liquidity constraints that inhibit 
the poor from investing in productive activities, generating multipliers on the cash 
received (Sadoulet et al. 2001; Farrington and Slater 2006; Lloyd-Sherlock 2006).  
In other countries, there are increasing evidences on the impact of cash transfers 
on poverty (Sadoulet et al. 2001; Farrington and Slater 2006; Lloyd-Sherlock 
2006; Lagarde et al., 2009).  
Currently, there are a number of cash transfer programs targeted at the poor, 
ethnic minorities and vulnerable people in Vietnam, for example Degree 67-
13/2010/NÐ-CP, Decree 49/2010/NÐ-CP, Decision 82/2006/QĐ-TTg. Table 4.16 
shows that the proportion of households receiving social allowances increased 
from 19.3 percent to 37 percent during the past five years. A larger proportion of 
the poor and ethnic minorities receives social allowances than the non-poor and 
Kinh. Although more households receive transfers, the real amount of transfers 
(after adjusted to inflation) did not increase substantially. In 2012, the average 
 57 
amount of transfers per household is 785 thousand VND/year11. By ethnicgroups, 
the coverage of allowance varies significantly. Nung and Dao households have 
rather low proportion of receiving transfers, even lower that of Kinh households. 
Meanwhile, Thai and H’Mong households enjoy substantial increase in access to 
social allowance. 
Table 4. 16: Social allowances 
Groups 
% households receiving social 
allowances 
Social allowances 
(thousand VND) 
2007 2012 Change 2007 2012 Change 
       
Total 19.3*** 37.0*** 17.7*** 662.6*** 785.8*** 123.2 
 
0.8 1.2 1.4 87.2 83.8 120.9 
Poor/Non-poor 
      
Poor 20.8*** 41.8*** 21.0*** 418.7*** 668.3*** 249.6*** 
 
1.1 1.5 1.9 50.3 59.1 77.6 
Non-poor 17.6*** 31.5*** 13.9*** 938.0*** 917.5*** -20.5 
 
1.2 1.7 2.1 176.5 164.7 241.4 
Ethnicity 
      
Kinh 19.1*** 31.0*** 11.9*** 675.2** 1,075.7*** 400.6 
 
2.1 2.8 3.5 307.3 276.3 413.1 
Ethnic minorities 19.4*** 38.8*** 19.5*** 658.7*** 695.1*** 36.4 
 
0.8 1.2 1.5 64.3 68.2 93.7 
Ethnic minority 
groups       
Tày 6.6*** 24.9*** 18.3*** 520.7*** 776.1*** 255.3 
 
1.3 2.4 2.7 130.2 142.5 192.9 
Thái 20.4*** 53.0*** 32.6*** 561.3*** 730.4*** 169.0 
 
2.3 3.2 3.9 134.3 158.5 207.6 
Mường 12.0*** 20.1*** 8.1** 760.6*** 458.2*** -302.4 
 
2.3 2.8 3.7 215.9 100.6 237.9 
Nùng 1.4* 17.7*** 16.3*** 178.4 271.7*** 93.2 
 
0.9 3.5 3.6 112.7 82.0 139.2 
H'Mông 10.4*** 50.7*** 40.3*** 221.1*** 545.9*** 324.8*** 
 
1.3 2.8 3.1 61.4 60.1 85.9 
Dao 7.1*** 19.5*** 12.3*** 151.1** 255.9*** 104.8 
 
1.5 2.3 2.7 71.3 64.9 96.4 
Others 39.9*** 46.6*** 6.6* 1,252.9*** 1,019.5*** -233.3 
 
2.6 3.0 4.0 184.5 203.5 274.6 
Regions 
      
North 8.5*** 37.1*** 28.6*** 305.3*** 629.2*** 323.9*** 
 
0.7 1.3 1.5 44.4 50.7 67.4 
Central 53.9*** 49.4*** -4.6* 1,285.0*** 988.4*** -296.7 
 
1.9 1.9 2.7 122.4 146.6 190.9 
South 5.8*** 22.4*** 16.6*** 825.3** 935.6*** 110.3 
 
1.4 3.2 3.5 363.0 323.2 485.5 
Note: * significantly different from zero at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Standard errors in the second line below the estimates. 
Source: Analysis Team calculations based on 2007 and 2012 household surveys. 
                                                        
11
 This amount is averaged for all households including those who do not receive any cash transfer 
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4.2.2 Income structure 
Productive assets and income diversification plays an important role in 
sustainable poverty reduction. Table 4.17 shows that households in P135-II areas 
rely largely on agricultural income. Nearly 60 percent of total household income 
comes from from agricultural activities. Among farm income, crop and livestock 
are the main income contribution sources (Table 4.18).  There is a transition from 
farm to non-farm activities. The share of income from wage tends to increase 
overtime, albeit at a low rate. 
Table 4. 17: Household income structure 
 
Household income (thousand VND/year) Income share (%) 
2007 2012 Change 2007 2012 Change 
Total household 
income 
29,442.66*** 34,095.74*** 4,653.08*** 100.00 100.00 0.00 
 
884.10 919.25 1,275.31    
Salary 6,402.72*** 10,000.03*** 3,597.31*** 19.54*** 23.92*** 4.38*** 
 
368.93 453.90 584.88 0.91 1.07 1.40 
Agriculture, 
forestry and 
aquaculture 
16,688.06*** 17,464.36*** 776.30 63.50*** 57.47*** -6.03*** 
544.95 618.14 824.00 1.04 1.15 1.55 
Non-farm 2,706.65*** 2,521.03*** -185.61 5.32*** 4.73*** -0.59 
 
537.01 457.36 705.33 0.54 0.65 0.85 
Others 3,645.23*** 4,110.32*** 465.09 11.64*** 13.88*** 2.24*** 
 
260.65 232.86 349.49 0.51 0.67 0.84 
Note: * significantly different from zero at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Standard errors in the second line below the estimates. 
Source: Analysis Team calculations based on 2007 and 2012 household surveys. 
Table 4. 18: Structure of income from agriculture, forestry and aquaculture 
(%) 
 
2007 2012 Change 
Agriculture, forestry and 
aquaculture 
100.00 100.00 100.00 
   
Cultivation development 
63.85*** 68.01*** 4.16** 
0.78 1.65 1.82 
Livestock raising 
16.42*** 16.27*** -0.15 
0.52 0.93 1.06 
Agriculture services 
0.13*** 0.21*** 0.08 
0.09 0.05 0.10 
Forestry 
15.43*** 11.73*** -3.70*** 
0.46 0.78 0.91 
Aquaculture 
4.17*** 3.77** -0.39 
0.67 1.50 1.64 
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Note: * significantly different from zero at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Standard errors in the second line below the estimates. 
Source: Analysis Team calculations based on 2007 and 2012 household surveys. 
Table 4.19 examines the wage income in more detail. The proportion of 
households having wages (either long-term or short-term works) increased from 
47.7 percent in 2007 to 53,7 percent in 2012. Kinh and non-poor households are 
more likely to have wages than ethnic minority and poor households. However, 
this gap is relatively small. Although the proportion of households having wage 
was rather high for most ethnic minority groups, the share of wages in total 
income remained low for some ethnic groups such as Tay, H’Mong, and Dao. 
Wages for the poor mainly come from short-term or seasonal works.   
Table 4. 19: Wage income 
Groups 
% households having wage 
income 
Share of wage income in total income 
(%) 
2007 2012 Change 2007 2012 Change 
       
Total 47.7*** 53.7*** 6.0*** 19.5*** 23.9*** 4.4*** 
 
1.3 1.2 1.8 0.9 1.0 1.4 
Poor/Non-poor 
      
Poor 41.0*** 51.4*** 10.4*** 14.9*** 22.4*** 7.5*** 
 
1.7 1.6 2.3 1.1 1.4 1.8 
Non-poor 55.2*** 56.2*** 1.0 24.9*** 26.5*** 1.6 
 
2.0 2.0 2.8 1.5 1.6 2.1 
Ethnicity 
      
Kinh 56.5*** 63.8*** 7.3 27.7*** 35.7*** 8.0** 
 
3.3 3.2 4.6 2.2 2.9 3.7 
Ethnic minorities 44.9*** 50.5*** 5.5*** 17.1*** 20.9*** 3.7*** 
 
1.3 1.3 1.9 1.0 1.0 1.4 
Ethnic minority 
groups       
Tày 47.7*** 46.8*** -0.9 14.4*** 16.3*** 1.9 
 
2.8 2.8 3.9 1.2 1.4 1.8 
Thái 35.8*** 50.4*** 14.7*** 11.4*** 20.2*** 8.8*** 
 
3.0 3.2 4.4 1.2 1.9 2.3 
Mường 59.2*** 55.3*** -3.9 23.2*** 25.2*** 2.0 
 
3.6 3.7 5.1 2.1 2.3 3.1 
Nùng 48.6*** 47.6*** -1.0 14.2*** 17.8*** 3.6 
 
4.6 4.6 6.5 2.0 2.3 3.1 
H'Mông 26.3*** 44.1*** 17.8*** 5.4*** 8.3*** 2.9*** 
 
2.7 2.8 3.9 0.7 0.7 1.0 
Dao 36.9*** 40.4*** 3.4 8.1*** 14.6*** 6.5*** 
 
2.8 2.9 4.1 0.9 1.4 1.7 
Others 57.0*** 58.2*** 1.2 30.1*** 32.4*** 2.3 
 
2.9 2.9 4.1 2.7 2.7 3.8 
Regions 
      
North 38.5*** 46.1*** 7.6*** 11.2*** 15.7*** 4.5*** 
 
1.3 1.3 1.9 0.5 0.7 0.9 
Central 48.1*** 55.8*** 7.7*** 19.2*** 24.2*** 5.0*** 
 
1.9 1.9 2.7 1.0 1.2 1.6 
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Groups 
% households having wage 
income 
Share of wage income in total income 
(%) 
2007 2012 Change 2007 2012 Change 
South 69.6*** 69.5*** -0.1 41.1*** 46.4*** 5.3 
 
3.9 3.9 5.6 3.3 3.9 5.1 
Note: * significantly different from zero at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Standard errors in the second line below the estimates. 
Source: Analysis Team calculations based on 2007 and 2012 household surveys. 
Since opportunities for long-term wage employment is limited in the poor areas, 
non-farm activities can be an important way to increase in productivity, income 
and reduce poverty. Non-farm production has been found to be an effective way to 
promote income and reduce poverty for rural households in developing countries 
(e.g. Lanjouw and Lanjouw 1995; Lanjouw 1998, Ruben and Van den Berg 2001). 
In Vietnam, 35 percent of households had income from non-farm activities 
(excluding wages) in 2010 (according the 2010 VHLSS). Yet, in P135-II communes, 
the proportion of households having non-farm income decreased from 23.6 
percent in 2007 to 13.6 percent in 2012. The poor and ethnic minorities display an 
extremely low rate of non-farm production. The share of non-farm income in total 
income was stands at only 5 percent. 
Table 4. 20: Nonfarm income (excluding wage) 
Groups 
% households having nonfarm 
income 
Share of nonfarm income in total 
income (%) 
2007 2012 Change 2007 2012 Change 
       
Total 23.6*** 13.6*** -10.1*** 5.3*** 4.7*** -0.6 
 
1.2 1.1 1.6 0.5 0.7 0.8 
Poor/Non-poor 
      
Poor 15.6*** 6.7*** -8.9*** 2.2*** 1.6*** -0.6 
 
1.3 1.0 1.6 0.4 0.4 0.5 
Non-poor 32.6*** 21.2*** -11.4*** 8.9*** 8.4*** -0.5 
 
1.9 2.0 2.8 1.0 1.3 1.6 
Ethnicity 
      
Kinh 31.4*** 28.0*** -3.4 11.3*** 12.7*** 1.3 
 
3.2 3.2 4.5 1.7 2.2 2.8 
Ethnic minorities 21.2*** 9.0*** -12.2*** 3.5*** 2.5*** -1.1* 
 
1.1 1.0 1.5 0.4 0.5 0.6 
Ethnic minority 
groups       
Tày 24.2*** 6.2*** -18.0*** 3.8*** 1.7*** -2.1** 
 
2.4 1.4 2.8 0.6 0.6 0.8 
Thái 19.6*** 9.5*** -10.1*** 3.3*** 1.6*** -1.7* 
 
2.5 1.9 3.2 0.7 0.5 0.9 
Mường 19.3*** 12.2*** -7.1* 3.9*** 3.8*** -0.1 
 
3.0 2.5 4.0 0.9 1.1 1.5 
Nùng 21.5*** 4.1* -17.4*** 3.8*** 1.5 -2.3 
 
3.9 2.1 4.5 1.2 1.2 1.7 
H'Mông 24.7*** 4.2*** -20.6*** 2.1*** 0.4** -1.6*** 
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Groups 
% households having nonfarm 
income 
Share of nonfarm income in total 
income (%) 
2007 2012 Change 2007 2012 Change 
 
2.6 1.2 2.9 0.3 0.2 0.3 
Dao 33.6*** 3.6*** -30.0*** 2.4*** 0.8** -1.6** 
 
2.9 1.3 3.2 0.7 0.3 0.8 
Others 15.3*** 14.6*** -0.7 4.6*** 4.7*** 0.1 
 
2.7 2.8 3.9 1.3 1.5 2.0 
Regions 
      
North 25.9*** 7.2*** -18.7*** 3.5*** 1.7*** -1.8*** 
 
1.2 0.7 1.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 
Central 13.0*** 11.0*** -2.0 3.7*** 2.9*** -0.7 
 
1.3 1.3 1.9 0.5 0.5 0.7 
South 30.4*** 31.9*** 1.4 11.9*** 15.0*** 3.1 
 
4.1 4.1 5.8 2.2 2.7 3.5 
Note: * significantly different from zero at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Standard errors in the second line below the estimates. 
Source: Analysis Team calculations based on 2007 and 2012 household surveys. 
Table 4.21 present number of income sources for P135-II households, which is an 
indicator of income diversification. Poor households who rely mainly on farm 
incomes can be more vulnerable to natural and economic shocks. Having more 
income sources can be a strategy to reduce semi-unemployment and mitigate 
negative shocks. However, as the economy develops, households will move into 
formal sectors, and income will mainly come from wages. This phenomenon is 
demonstrated through a decrease in number of income sources among P135-II 
households from 4.3 in 2007 to 3.5 in 2012.    
Table 4. 21: No. of household income sources 
 
2007 2012 Change 
Total 4.34 3.53 -0.80 
 
0.03*** 0.03*** 0.05*** 
Poor/Non-Poor 
   
Poor 4.31 3.63 -0.68 
 
0.03*** 0.04*** 0.05*** 
Non-poor 4.37 3.43 -0.95 
 
0.06*** 0.05*** 0.08*** 
Ethnic minority 
   
Kinh & Hoa 4.00 3.19 -0.82 
 
0.09*** 0.07*** 0.11*** 
Tày 4.73 3.97 -0.75 
 
0.06*** 0.07*** 0.09*** 
Thái 4.82 3.73 -1.09 
 
0.06*** 0.10*** 0.12*** 
Mường 4.74 3.15 -1.58 
 
0.07*** 0.09*** 0.12*** 
Nùng 4.69 4.05 -0.64 
 
0.09*** 0.09*** 0.13*** 
H'Mông 4.53 3.99 -0.54 
 
0.04*** 0.06*** 0.07*** 
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2007 2012 Change 
Dao 4.81 3.84 -0.97 
 
0.06*** 0.07*** 0.09*** 
Other ethnic minorities 3.78 3.25 -0.53 
 
0.07*** 0.07*** 0.10*** 
Regions 
   
North 4.67 3.89 -0.78 
 
0.03*** 0.03*** 0.04*** 
Central 4.35 3.53 -0.83 
 
0.04*** 0.05*** 0.07*** 
South 3.49 2.65 -0.83 
 
0.11*** 0.08*** 0.14*** 
Note: * significantly different from zero at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Standard errors in the second line below the estimates. 
Source: Analysis Team calculations based on 2007 and 2012 household surveys. 
Arable lands are important for income generation and productivity promotion for 
rural households (Lipton, 1985; Finan et al., 2005). Land areas were almost 
unchanged during 2007-2012. However, the average size of annual crops of the 
poor and Kinh households decreased. The decrease in land area for annual crops 
might result from the situation that Kinh households tended to move to non-farm 
production and business. They can also switch to perennial crops, which bring 
higher income than annual crops.   
Compared with the Kinh, the ethnic minorities have much larger size of annual 
crop lands, especially for H’Mong, Dao and Thai groups since ethnic minorities 
remain to rely heavily on agricultural production. In addition, there are a number 
of programs and policies that allocate lands for ethnic minorities, e.g., Program 
135 and 5-million Hectare Aforestation Programme (for a review on programs for 
ethnic minorities, see Pham et al., 2011). However, the perennial crop lands 
managed by the ethnic minorities and the poor are smaller than the Kinh and non-
poor households. 
Table 4.23 shows an increase in land irrigation. For all ethnic minorities as well as 
the poor and non-poor, the share of irrigated lands increased remarkably during 
the past five years.  
Table 4. 22: Crop land 
Groups 
Annual crop land (m2) Perennial crop land (m2) 
2007 2012 Change 2007 2012 Change 
       
Total 7,237.6*** 6,878.6*** -359.0 1,569.4*** 1,577.6*** 8.2 
 
436.5 328.9 546.5 178.6 241.3 300.2 
Poor/Non-poor 
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Groups 
Annual crop land (m2) Perennial crop land (m2) 
2007 2012 Change 2007 2012 Change 
Poor 6,324.4*** 6,943.7*** 619.2 1,078.0*** 867.3*** -210.7 
 
219.9 488.6 535.7 153.0 110.3 188.5 
Non-poor 8,261.2*** 6,805.5*** -1,455.7 2,120.3*** 2,375.4*** 255.2 
 
891.8 432.1 990.8 337.6 496.8 600.5 
Ethnicity 
      
Kinh 5,471.9*** 3,235.3*** -2,236.6 2,519.8*** 2,727.9*** 208.1 
 
1,640.9 373.0 1,682.0 600.2 912.7 1,091.8 
Ethnic minorities 7,790.7*** 8,019.0*** 228.3 1,271.8*** 1,217.6*** -54.2 
 
253.7 411.1 483.0 141.9 138.1 198.0 
Ethnic minority groups 
Tày 4,238.8*** 4,054.4*** -184.4 980.0*** 2,463.0*** 1,483.1** 
 
200.0 273.0 338.1 196.6 660.6 688.8 
Thái 7,421.4*** 8,608.5*** 1,187.2 925.7*** 544.9** -380.8 
 
652.5 1,891.0 1,998.9 333.5 245.9 414.0 
Mường 4,898.7*** 4,715.6*** -183.1 2,572.8*** 403.7*** -2,169.0*** 
 
493.2 543.4 733.1 770.3 114.0 777.8 
Nùng 4,899.5*** 6,652.9*** 1,753.4 2,099.9*** 1,561.5*** -538.4 
 
333.1 1,216.7 1,259.8 651.1 563.8 860.2 
H'Mông 12,012.7*** 10,034.5*** -1,978.2*** 612.5** 300.7*** -311.7 
 
451.2 506.4 678.0 253.3 104.8 274.0 
Dao 9,775.8*** 8,906.5*** -869.3 2,003.4*** 1,767.1*** -236.3 
 
1,019.5 742.1 1,260.3 363.7 306.3 475.2 
Others 7,926.8*** 9,474.2*** 1,547.5 1,194.5*** 1,611.6*** 417.1 
 
635.5 886.1 1,090.1 280.7 294.4 406.6 
Regions 
      
North 8,330.6*** 7,838.9*** -491.7 1,042.0*** 1,030.9*** -11.0 
 
255.9 302.6 396.3 137.0 167.7 216.5 
Central 5,381.6*** 6,553.3*** 1,171.6 2,638.7*** 2,644.9*** 6.1 
 
260.8 893.1 930.2 364.5 347.3 503.4 
South 6,700.6*** 4,914.1*** -1,786.5 1,629.9*** 1,687.6* 57.7 
 
1,872.7 801.5 2,034.8 619.3 946.6 1,129.9 
Note: * significantly different from zero at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Standard errors in the second line below the estimates. 
Source: Analysis Team calculations based on 2007 and 2012 household surveys. 
Table 4. 23: Proportion of lands that are irrigated (%) 
Groups 
Annual crop land (%) Perennial crop land (%) 
2007 2012 Change 2007 2012 Change 
       
Total 50.2*** 82.1*** 31.9*** 29.8*** 61.7*** 31.9*** 
 
1.1 0.7 1.3 2.3 2.5 3.4 
Poor/Non-poor 
      
Poor 46.7*** 80.8*** 34.2*** 20.4*** 57.2*** 36.8*** 
 
1.4 1.0 1.7 2.9 3.7 4.7 
Non-poor 54.8*** 83.7*** 28.9*** 37.2*** 65.1*** 27.8*** 
 
1.8 1.1 2.1 3.3 3.3 4.7 
Ethnicity 
      
Kinh 63.7*** 93.1*** 29.3*** 44.5*** 69.8*** 25.3*** 
 
3.4 1.2 3.6 4.9 4.8 6.8 
Ethnic minorities 47.3*** 79.7*** 32.4*** 23.6*** 58.3*** 34.7*** 
 
1.1 0.8 1.4 2.5 2.8 3.8 
Ethnic minority groups 
      
Tày 67.7*** 90.4*** 22.8*** 21.1*** 39.8*** 18.7** 
 
1.9 1.2 2.2 4.6 6.0 7.5 
Thái 52.8*** 74.1*** 21.3*** 30.4** 53.6*** 23.2 
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Groups 
Annual crop land (%) Perennial crop land (%) 
2007 2012 Change 2007 2012 Change 
 
2.8 2.6 3.8 13.3 10.1 16.5 
Mường 64.5*** 81.3*** 16.8*** 65.8*** 95.9*** 30.1*** 
 
3.1 2.5 4.0 7.8 3.1 8.3 
Nùng 49.8*** 84.8*** 34.9*** 21.1*** 43.1*** 22.0* 
 
3.9 3.2 5.0 7.6 11.1 13.3 
H'Mông 22.2*** 77.1*** 54.9*** 17.5*** 63.6*** 46.1*** 
 
1.5 1.9 2.4 6.6 8.7 10.9 
Dao 44.7*** 73.2*** 28.5*** 4.1 67.5*** 63.5*** 
 
2.0 2.2 3.0 2.5 6.7 7.2 
Others 44.8*** 79.8*** 35.0*** 18.1*** 60.7*** 42.7*** 
 
3.0 1.9 3.5 4.6 4.8 6.6 
Regions 
      
North 44.7*** 77.6*** 32.9*** 27.8*** 47.9*** 20.1*** 
 
1.1 1.0 1.5 2.8 3.5 4.5 
Central 47.5*** 85.6*** 38.1*** 31.6*** 70.7*** 39.1*** 
 
1.8 1.2 2.2 4.0 3.4 5.3 
South 80.8*** 95.8*** 15.0*** 34.2*** 87.2*** 53.0*** 
 
4.2 1.3 4.4 8.4 5.4 9.9 
Note: * significantly different from zero at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Standard errors in the second line below the estimates. 
Source: Analysis Team calculations based on 2007 and 2012 household surveys. 
Access to credit 
In addition to programs that provide land supports for the poor, the government 
has launched micro-finance programs to provide preferential credit for the poor 
and ethnic minorities. Main micro-finance support from the government is 
provided through Vietnam Bank for Social Policies. The role of credit in increasing 
household welfare in the developing countries has been found in many empirical 
studies (e.g., Morduch, 1995, Pitt and Khandker, 1998, Coleman, 2002). In 
Vietnam, several studies found positive effect of credit, both micro finance and 
formal sources, on household welfare and poverty reduction (e.g., Quach and 
Mullineux, 2007; Pham and Lensink, 2008; Nguyen, 2008). 
Nearly one third of households in P135-II communes borrowed credit from 
Vietnam Bank for Social Policies (VBSP). The poor and ethnic minorities are more 
likely to borrow from VBSP than the non-poor and Kinh, because the VBSP’s credit 
is targeted at the poor. The proportion of households who borrow from VBSP did 
not increase over 2007-2012. Real average level of loans (in the 2012 price) 
decreased from 2.8 to 2.4 million VND per households who borrow. To promote 
production, provision of credit might not be enough. Households should be 
provided with vocational training and production skills to make use of the capital.   
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Table 4. 24: Credit from Vietnam Bank for Social Policies (VBSP) 
Groups 
% households borrowing  Loan size (thousand VND) 
2007 2012 Change 2007 2012 Change 
       
Total 26.8*** 26.1*** -0.7 2,829.0*** 2,407.8*** -421.1*** 
 
1.1 1.1 1.5 118.5 104.3 157.9 
Poor/Non-poor 
      
Poor 28.3*** 30.9*** 2.6 2,772.3*** 2,883.7*** 111.3 
 
1.4 1.4 1.9 143.0 146.7 204.8 
Non-poor 25.1*** 20.7*** -4.4* 2,892.9*** 1,874.6*** -1,018.4*** 
 
1.7 1.7 2.4 194.0 147.8 243.8 
Ethnicity 
      
Kinh 24.1*** 20.3*** -3.8 2,922.9*** 1,884.8*** -1,038.1*** 
 
2.7 2.6 3.7 321.7 238.7 400.4 
Ethnic minorities 27.6*** 27.9*** 0.3 2,800.2*** 2,571.7*** -228.6 
 
1.2 1.1 1.6 119.7 113.5 164.9 
Ethnic minority 
groups       
Tày 33.2*** 27.5*** -5.7 3,735.8*** 2,544.8*** -1,191.0*** 
 
2.6 2.5 3.6 332.2 261.2 422.3 
Thái 26.2*** 33.4*** 7.2* 2,894.9*** 3,324.8*** 430.0 
 
2.8 3.0 4.1 340.3 361.6 496.1 
Mường 27.1*** 23.7*** -3.4 2,669.7*** 2,005.7*** -664.0 
 
3.3 3.0 4.5 354.6 254.5 436.0 
Nùng 21.6*** 29.7*** 8.2 2,455.3*** 2,905.0*** 449.7 
 
3.2 4.0 5.1 405.0 449.6 604.3 
H'Mông 35.6*** 21.1*** -14.6*** 2,867.7*** 1,976.7*** -891.0*** 
 
2.7 2.1 3.4 238.1 210.3 317.5 
Dao 26.0*** 23.7*** -2.3 2,731.0*** 2,155.3*** -575.8 
 
2.6 2.5 3.6 290.4 245.9 380.3 
Others 22.2*** 31.8*** 9.6** 2,383.4*** 2,834.8*** 451.3 
 
2.7 2.8 3.9 248.9 251.7 353.9 
Regions 
      
North 28.7*** 23.8*** -4.9*** 2,837.8*** 2,251.1*** -586.7*** 
 
1.2 1.1 1.6 130.4 115.3 174.1 
Central 27.4*** 33.2*** 5.8** 3,235.1*** 3,018.5*** -216.6 
 
1.7 1.8 2.5 213.7 188.6 285.0 
South 21.3*** 23.4*** 2.1 2,335.0*** 2,090.5*** -244.6 
 
3.6 3.6 5.0 364.1 316.0 481.6 
Note: * significantly different from zero at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Standard errors in the second line below the estimates. 
Source: Analysis Team calculations based on 2007 and 2012 household surveys. 
The non-poor and Kinh have higher borrowing rate from formal credit. Borrowing 
from formal credit often requires collateral but households can receive larger 
amount of loan. In 2012, 34 percent of households borrowed from formal credit 
sources. This figure for the poor and non-poor households is 27.1 and 43.2 
percent, respectively. The Kinh and non-poor households have higher amount of 
loan than the ethnic minorities and poor groups, respectively.  
Table 4. 25: Formal credit 
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Groups 
% households borrowing  Loan size (thousand VND) 
2007 2012 Change 2007 2012 Change 
       
Total 22.5*** 34.3*** 11.8*** 13,662.4* 
10,038.7**
* 
-3,623.7 
 
1.2 1.2 1.7 7,200.1 1,095.8 7,282.5 
Poor/Non-poor 
      
Poor 17.8*** 27.1*** 9.3*** 3,220.7*** 5,798.6*** 2,577.8*** 
 
1.4 1.5 2.1 479.3 729.0 872.3 
Non-poor 27.7*** 42.3*** 14.6*** 25,452.8* 
14,791.1**
* 
-10,661.7 
 
1.9 2.0 2.8 15,313.4 2,140.8 15,459.5 
Ethnicity 
      
Kinh 40.5*** 54.0*** 13.5*** 47,821.9 
23,814.2**
* 
-24,007.8 
 
3.4 3.3 4.7 30,694.1 4,214.7 30,966.4 
Ethnic minorities 16.8*** 28.1*** 11.3*** 3,214.8*** 5,723.8*** 2,509.0*** 
 
1.0 1.2 1.5 286.8 307.8 420.7 
Ethnic minority 
groups       
Tày 26.2*** 38.1*** 12.0*** 5,177.1*** 9,279.7*** 4,102.6*** 
 
2.5 2.7 3.7 859.3 873.0 1,224.2 
Thái 12.1*** 34.5*** 22.4*** 2,379.1*** 6,067.6*** 3,688.6*** 
 
2.1 3.1 3.7 492.5 658.1 821.4 
Mường 40.2*** 41.1*** 0.9 8,429.2*** 
10,783.8**
* 
2,354.6 
 
3.7 3.7 5.2 1,443.1 1,918.5 2,398.1 
Nùng 29.6*** 37.7*** 8.1 4,475.1*** 8,594.2*** 4,119.1*** 
 
4.0 4.5 6.0 733.1 1,304.9 1,494.8 
H'Mông 5.0*** 16.2*** 11.2*** 669.8*** 2,543.3*** 1,873.5*** 
 
0.9 2.0 2.2 174.8 319.0 363.6 
Dao 8.4*** 22.4*** 14.0*** 1,342.4*** 4,276.9*** 2,934.5*** 
 
1.7 2.4 2.9 303.7 499.2 584.0 
Others 14.4*** 22.9*** 8.5** 2,849.4*** 4,017.5*** 1,168.1 
 
2.3 2.7 3.5 646.0 456.2 790.6 
Regions 
      
North 17.6*** 29.9*** 12.3*** 16,882.9 6,672.3*** -10,210.6 
 
1.0 1.2 1.6 13,380.0 404.5 13,384.6 
Central 22.2*** 36.4*** 14.2*** 5,491.5*** 
10,336.6**
* 
4,845.1*** 
 
1.7 1.9 2.5 673.0 952.8 1,166.3 
South 34.6*** 42.5*** 7.9 
15,170.6**
* 
17,897.2**
* 
2,726.6 
 
4.2 4.3 6.0 3,917.0 4,683.5 6,098.9 
Note: * significantly different from zero at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Standard errors in the second line below the estimates. 
Source: Analysis Team calculations based on 2007 and 2012 household surveys. 
Table 4.26 presents access to informal credit. When households do not have access 
to formal credit and micro-finance, informal credit presents as the alternative 
source for households to cope with negative shocks, and other needs. 12 percent 
of households borrow from informal sources in 2007 as well as 2012. The Kinh 
have a higher borrowing rate from informal credit as well as larger credit size than 
those of their ethnic minority counterparts.   
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Table 4. 26: Informal credit 
Groups 
% households borrowing  Loan size (thousand VND) 
2007 2012 Change 2007 2012 Change 
       
Total 13.0*** 12.6*** -0.4 1,522.9*** 1,881.7*** 358.8 
 
0.9 0.9 1.3 223.6 233.8 323.5 
Poor/Non-poor 
      
Poor 13.1*** 13.1*** -0.1 759.0*** 1,642.8*** 883.8*** 
 
1.3 1.2 1.8 92.3 270.0 285.3 
Non-poor 12.9*** 12.1*** -0.7 2,385.4*** 2,149.3*** -236.1 
 
1.3 1.2 1.8 463.6 393.8 608.2 
Ethnicity 
      
Kinh 15.1*** 16.9*** 1.9 3,193.2*** 3,728.7*** 535.5 
 
2.3 2.7 3.6 848.5 754.1 1,134.6 
Ethnic minorities 12.4*** 11.3*** -1.1 1,012.0*** 1,303.1*** 291.1 
 
0.9 0.7 1.2 136.2 194.1 237.1 
Ethnic minority 
groups       
Tày 13.5*** 15.4*** 1.9 1,095.1*** 1,709.5*** 614.4 
 
1.9 2.1 2.8 213.6 367.2 424.5 
Thái 9.7*** 9.1*** -0.6 672.5*** 736.9*** 64.3 
 
1.8 1.7 2.5 167.1 180.7 246.0 
Mường 19.7*** 16.7*** -3.1 1,080.1*** 1,502.8*** 422.7 
 
3.1 2.8 4.2 226.2 375.1 437.5 
Nùng 20.4*** 17.2*** -3.2 1,194.1*** 5,612.6* 4,418.5 
 
3.4 3.9 5.2 266.6 2,958.9 2,967.0 
H'Mông 3.8*** 2.9*** -0.9 467.0* 199.4** -267.5 
 
1.3 0.7 1.5 276.5 79.6 287.6 
Dao 7.5*** 16.9*** 9.4*** 529.3*** 1,947.5*** 1,418.2*** 
 
1.4 2.3 2.7 126.1 521.7 536.4 
Others 16.2*** 11.1*** -5.1* 1,588.0*** 1,111.7*** -476.3 
 
2.5 1.5 2.9 402.2 315.2 510.8 
Regions 
      
North 12.8*** 12.1*** -0.6 1,042.5*** 1,710.5*** 668.0** 
 
0.9 0.9 1.3 122.5 276.6 302.5 
Central 11.1*** 12.9*** 1.8 2,331.8*** 2,314.8*** -17.0 
 
1.2 1.3 1.8 700.6 570.3 903.1 
South 15.8*** 13.6*** -2.3 1,774.4*** 1,802.6*** 28.2 
 
3.2 3.1 4.4 567.2 517.7 767.1 
Note: * significantly different from zero at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Standard errors in the second line below the estimates. 
Source: Analysis Team calculations based on 2007 and 2012 household surveys. 
4.3 Poverty dynamics of ethnic minorities 
Dynamics of poverty 
Analysis of poverty dynamics often requires long panel data. Basically, the 
chronically poor are households whose living standard is below a defined poverty 
line for a number of years, while the transiently poor experience some non-
poverty years during that period (Hulme and Shepherd, 2003). Jalan and Ravallion 
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(2000) decompose poverty into two components: transient poverty due to the 
inter-temporal variability in consumption, and chronic poverty determined by 
mean consumption overtime. However this method requires longitudinal data 
with at least three repeated observations. In this study, we use a simple approach 
to examine the dynamics of poverty in P135-II communes. We use panel data to 
classify households into four groups: persistently poor – households that were 
poor in both 2007 and 2012; those escaping poverty – households that were poor 
in 2007 but non-poor in 2012; those falling into poverty – households that were 
non-poor in 2007 but became poor in 2012; and persistently non-poor – 
households that were non-poor in both 2007 and 2012. Households who escaped 
from poverty and those who fell into poverty can be regarded as the transiently 
poor. 
Table 4. 27: Poverty transition during 2007-2012 
Groups 
Persistently 
poor: 
Poor in both 
2007 and 
2012 
Escaped 
poverty: 
Poor in 2007, 
and non-poor 
in 2012 
Fell into 
poverty: 
Non-poor in 
2007, and 
poor in 2012 
Persistently 
non-poor: 
Non-poor in 
both 2007 
and 2012 
Total 
All households 35.0 22.1 14.3 28.6 100.0 
 
(1.2) (1.0) (1.0) (1.2) 
 
Ethnic minorities 
     
Kinh & Hoa 16.7 18.1 15.3 49.9 100.0 
 
(3.2) (2.9) (3.3) (3.8) 
 
Ethnic minorities 39.5 23.1 14.0 23.4 100.0 
 
(1.3) (1.1) (0.9) (1.1) 
 
Ethnic minority groups 
Tay 32.4 24.2 11.3 32.2 100.0 
 
(2.7) (2.5) (1.8) (2.7) 
 
Thai 41.0 15.6 21.9 21.5 100.0 
 
(3.4) (2.4) (3.0) (2.7) 
 
Mường 32.8 13.4 15.6 38.3 100.0 
 
(3.6) (2.6) (2.8) (3.8) 
 
Nùng 33.3 26.3 8.2 32.1 100.0 
 
(4.1) (3.7) (2.0) (4.4) 
 
H'Mông 51.5 31.5 7.8 9.2 100.0 
 
(3.0) (2.9) (1.6) (1.7) 
 
Dao 38.2 23.1 17.7 21.0 100.0 
 
(3.0) (2.6) (2.5) (2.4) 
 
Other ethnic 
minorities 
35.7 22.6 15.0 26.7 100.0 
 
(2.6) (2.3) (2.1) (2.7) 
 
Regions 
     
North 39.2 24.7 11.5 24.6 100.0 
 
(1.4) (1.3) (0.9) (1.2) 
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Groups 
Persistently 
poor: 
Poor in both 
2007 and 
2012 
Escaped 
poverty: 
Poor in 2007, 
and non-poor 
in 2012 
Fell into 
poverty: 
Non-poor in 
2007, and 
poor in 2012 
Persistently 
non-poor: 
Non-poor in 
both 2007 
and 2012 
Total 
Central 37.7 18.7 16.5 27.0 100.0 
 
(2.0) (1.6) (1.6) (1.8) 
 
South 18.3 18.4 19.9 43.3 100.0 
 
(4.0) (3.5) (3.9) (4.5) 
 
Note: Standard errors in the second line below the estimates. 
Source: Analysis Team calculations based on 2007 and 2012 household surveys. 
Table 4.27 presents the proportion of households falling into four poverty 
categories. 35 percent of households were poor in both years. There were a large 
proportion of households in transient poverty. 22.1 percent of households escaped 
from poverty, but 14.3 percent of household fell into poverty. Kinh households are 
more likely to be transiently poor, while ethnic minority households are more 
likely to be persistently poor. Although Kinh poor households were more likely to 
escape poverty, there is also a large proportion of non-poor households from the 
Kinh group falling into poverty in 2012. By ethnicity, there is a high proportion of 
chronic poverty among Thai, H’Mong and Dao groups. H’Mong, Nung, Tay and Dao 
are those who were more likely to escape from poverty than other ethnic 
minorities. Thai and Dao groups were more vulnerable to poverty: 21 percent of 
Thai households and 18 percent of Dao households fell into poverty in 2012.  
Determinants of poverty  
To examine determinants of poverty status, we use a standard multinomial logit 
model.12 In our study, households can fall into one of the four mutually exclusive 
poverty statuses: persistently poor; escaped poverty; fell into poverty; and 
persistently poor. The methodology is presented in appendix. 
 
Table 4.28 presents marginal effects of explanatory variables on the probability of 
households being in the four poverty statuses. Age of household head has expected 
effect on chronic poverty: households with a young or an old household head are 
more likely to fall in persistent poverty. Households with middle-age heads have 
lower probability of being persistently poor. Households with female heads tend 
to have lower probability of being persistently poor. High education of household 
heads is positively correlated with the probability of being persistently non-poor 
                                                        
12Multinomial logit models are presented in most econometrics textbooks such as Wooldridge (2001). 
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and negatively correlated with the probability of being persistently 
poor.Households with large size and high proportion of children and elderly are 
more likely to be persistently poor. On the contrary, persistently non-poor 
households tend to have a smaller household size and smaller proportion of 
children and elderly. 
Ethnic minorities also matter to poverty dynamics. Compared with Kinh 
households (base group), Tay and Muong households are more likely to be 
chronically poor. Thai households tend to fall into poverty, while H’Mong 
households tend to escape from poverty.  
Asset ownership is an important for households not to fall into persistent poverty 
Households with large living areas, crop lands, and receiving remittances are less 
likely to be persistently poor. However, asset is not the most significant factor 
making households escape or fall into poverty. 
Table 4. 28: Marginal effect in multinomial logit regression 
 
Explanatory variables 
Dependent variable 
Persistently 
poor: 
Poor in both 
2007 and 
2012 
Escaped poverty: 
Poor in 2007, 
and non-poor in 
2012 
Fell into poverty: 
Non-poor in 
2007, and poor 
in 2012 
Persistently non-
poor: 
Non-poor in 
both 2007 and 
2012 
Age head -0.0196*** -0.0035 0.0019 0.0212*** 
 
(0.0063) (0.0065) (0.0051) (0.0076) 
Age head squared 0.0002** 0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0002*** 
 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Head is male 0.1032** 0.0059 -0.0218 -0.0873 
 
(0.0421) (0.0523) (0.0331) (0.0660) 
Schooling years of 
head 
-0.0305*** -0.0041 -0.0011 0.0357*** 
 
(0.0043) (0.0040) (0.0033) (0.0047) 
Kinh Omitted 
   
Tày 0.1313** -0.0107 0.0402 -0.1609*** 
 
(0.0663) (0.0537) (0.0478) (0.0526) 
Thái 0.0707 -0.0633 0.1441** -0.1515*** 
 
(0.0617) (0.0491) (0.0628) (0.0504) 
Mường 0.1544** -0.1048** 0.0710 -0.1206** 
 
(0.0642) (0.0411) (0.0535) (0.0546) 
Nùng 0.0705 0.0401 -0.0125 -0.0981 
 
(0.0658) (0.0582) (0.0514) (0.0646) 
H'Mông 0.0571 0.1524** 0.0172 -0.2266*** 
 
(0.0693) (0.0738) (0.0467) (0.0539) 
Dao 0.0167 -0.0057 0.1369* -0.1479*** 
 
(0.0612) (0.0626) (0.0785) (0.0554) 
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Explanatory variables 
Dependent variable 
Persistently 
poor: 
Poor in both 
2007 and 
2012 
Escaped poverty: 
Poor in 2007, 
and non-poor in 
2012 
Fell into poverty: 
Non-poor in 
2007, and poor 
in 2012 
Persistently non-
poor: 
Non-poor in 
both 2007 and 
2012 
Other ethnic minorities 0.0273 0.0895** -0.0110 -0.1059 
 
(0.0734) (0.0440) (0.0296) (0.0749) 
North Omitted 
   
Central -0.0620 -0.0660 0.1257*** 0.0023 
 
(0.0414) (0.0465) (0.0453) (0.0548) 
South -0.0505 -0.0963* 0.1412*** 0.0056 
 
(0.0713) (0.0496) (0.0543) (0.0825) 
Household size 0.0393*** 0.0084 -0.0198*** -0.0278** 
 
(0.0076) (0.0092) (0.0070) (0.0116) 
Proportion of children 0.2942** -0.0068 -0.1072* -0.1802** 
 
(0.1179) (0.0627) (0.0630) (0.0740) 
Proportion of elderly 0.2422*** -0.1986* -0.0167 -0.0270 
 
(0.0921) (0.1094) (0.0795) (0.1059) 
Proportion of female 
members 
0.0714 0.0148 -0.0754 -0.0108 
(0.0757) (0.0701) (0.0495) (0.0938) 
Per capita living area 
(m2) 
-0.0077*** -0.0049* 0.0033** 0.0092*** 
(0.0029) (0.0027) (0.0016) (0.0023) 
Per capita annual crop 
land (ha) 
-0.1065*** -0.0904*** 0.0587*** 0.1382*** 
(0.0268) (0.0223) (0.0162) (0.0235) 
Per capita perennial 
crop land (ha) 
-0.0106 0.0005 -0.0077 0.0178* 
(0.0116) (0.0095) (0.0090) (0.0108) 
Poverty rate of 
commune 
0.0034*** 0.0009 -0.0012* -0.0032** 
(0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0006) (0.0013) 
Receiving remittances -0.1179*** -0.0316 0.0359 0.1136*** 
 
(0.0422) (0.0458) (0.0252) (0.0397) 
Receiving allowances 0.0606 -0.0700** -0.0100 0.0194 
 
(0.0384) (0.0312) (0.0248) (0.0481) 
Borrowing from VBSP 
bank 
0.0064 0.0037 0.0411* -0.0512 
(0.0294) (0.0264) (0.0227) (0.0408) 
Observations 3,515 3,515 3,515 3,515 
Note: * significantly different from zero at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Standard errors in the second line below the estimates. 
Source: Analysis Team calculations based on 2007 and 2012 household surveys. 
4.4 Conclusions 
Poverty, especially chronic poverty, in Vietnam is common among the ethnic 
minorities. Although ethnic minorities accounts for only 14 percent of the national 
population, they accounts approximately for 50 percent of the poor throughout 
the country. While poverty incidence decreased from 57.5 percent to 49.2 percent 
during the period 2007-2012, the reduction mainly come from the ethnic minority 
groups. There was almost no decrease in the poverty rate of Kinh households.  
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Although poverty incidence decreased, the poverty gap and severity indexes of 
households in P135-II areas did not decrease during 2007-2012. There is an 
increase in the poverty gap and severity among Thai and Muong households. 
Poverty situation is still severe among the poor. H’Mong is the only ethnic 
minority group who experienced reduction in all the three poverty indexes.  
Average income of household increased by 20 percent during the period 2007-
2012. Households with low levels of income experienced lower growth rate than 
households at the high levels of income. As a result, income inequality among 
households in P135-II communes increased overtime. The Gini index (measured in 
100) increased from 43.0 in 2007 to 47.0 in 2012. Inequality within Kinh 
households as well as within ethnic minority households also increased during 
this period. A large proportion of the total inequality is due to within-group 
inequality. The between-group inequality component accounts for less than 10 
percent of the total inequality.   
The decomposition analysis shows that poverty reduction of the households in 
P135-II communes resulted from income growth. Poverty is sensitive to economic 
growth. However, the elasticity of poverty with respect to income growth tends to 
decrease overtime, which means that income redistribution plays a very 
important role in decreasing poverty gap and poverty severity. 
Households in Program 135-II communes remain heavily reliant on agricultural 
income whereby agricultural activities generate nearly 60 percent of total 
households’ income. Nevertheless, there has been a shift from farm to non-farm 
activities leading to an increasing share of income from wage. However, this 
transition is taking place at a slow rate, which is reflected by a limited share of 
non-farm income of around 5 percent.   
There were a large proportion of households in transient poverty. 22.1 percent of 
households escaped from poverty, but 14.3 percent of household fell into poverty. 
Kinh households are more likely to be transiently poor, while ethnic minority 
households are more likely to be persistently poor. Although Kinh poor 
households were more likely to escape poverty, a large proportion of non-poor fell 
into poverty in 2012.      
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CHAPTER 5 
CAPACITY, DECENTRALIZATION, PARTICIPATION AND 
IMPACTS OF P135-II ON OUTCOMES 
 
5.1 Introduction 
One core development of Program 135 Phase II (P135-II) is the strong emphasis 
on capacity-building through decentralization, and participation. Rural 
development and rural poverty alleviation experience has shown that 
decentralization and participation are powerful tools for sustainable community 
and economic development. Decentralization is the democratic process of 
engaging communities over the decisions that shape their future. Decentralization 
is said to be accompanied by participation, empowerment, transparency and 
accountability. In particular, decentralization facilitates participation, which is 
seen as a process through which stakeholders influence and share control over 
development initiatives and the decisions and resources which affect them (World 
Bank, 1994). Through participation, people become actors in their own 
development rather than just passive beneficiaries. These advantages of 
decentralization and participation are conditional on the local authorities’ as well 
as the community’s capacity to take charge of the whole process from engaging the 
targeted population in planning stage, implementation and financial management 
to project operation and maintenance. Recognizing the importance of 
participatory approach, Program 135 Phase II has integrated capacity building as 
one of the Program’s four components. Likewise, “decentralization, empowerment 
and participation” is designed as Policy Area II in four key Policy Areas of the 
Policy Matrix.  
This chapter provides a comprehensive analysis of the extent to which capacity 
strengthening has been enforced at local level. This goal is assessed through the 
perspective of both local authorities and the beneficiaries. The first part describes 
in-depth capacity building at local authorities through assessment of local training 
activities and then provides an insight into project management capacity and 
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decentralization at local authorities. The outcomes of commune investment 
ownership and measurement of household participation in planning and 
implementation stages are presented before the detail results of impact 
measurement on the expected outcomes for beneficiary households of both ethnic 
minority and majority. The conclusion is presented in the last section of this 
chapter.  
5.2 Capacity strengthening and Project Management 
5.2.1 Capacity strengthening through training activities at commune level 
P135-II is the only National Targeted Program that has strongly enforced 
decentralization to commune level with the introduction of commune investment 
ownership. In order to facilitate the decentralization process, capacity building at 
the local level is essential. Phase II has shown the importance of local-level 
institutional capacity-building with more than 7 percent of the Program’s total 
funding allocated for this activity, a 6 percent increase from Phase I. Throughout 
the Program, a number of decentralization policies have been presented to 
enhance autonomy and accountability of local government in targeted areas. 
Shifting investment ownership responsibilities from provincial and district levels 
to communes require the communes’ strong capacity in administrative and 
financial planning as well as project management. Local staff training is one of the 
key capacity strengthening activities at commune level. Local authorities have 
organized training on administration, financial and project management skills for 
178,000 commune staffs and village staffs. Training is delivered in the form of 
short-term courses, which last approximately 5 – 6 days per course.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 5. 1: Training activities 
Source: Analysis Team calculations based on 2007 and 2012 household surveys.
Figure 5.1 provides information on training activities for Commune Supervisory 
Board (CSB) and Project Management Unite (PMU) staff. 95.4 percent of the 
respondents13 attended training courses organized under P135
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unadjusted year after year and does not meet specific requirements of each 
commune. Secondly, high turnover rate and rotation of commune staff leads to 
extra resources and time spent on training the new in-charge personnel. These 
facts partially explain the reason why a substantial proportion of commune staff 
did not give positive comments about the training programs.   
Promoting female participation in every project activity and project committee is 
an important goal of P135-II. Our research shows that 16.2 percent of officials in 
CSB and PMU are female officials. This number sends a positive signal on female 
representativeness in public operation and services, although their participation is 
only at a modest level. While P135-II has included certain regulations to promote 
women’s participation, extra effort needs to be made to encourage their 
representativeness in both public and government bodies.  
5.2.2 Project Management at commune level 
Management and planning for P135-II projects at commune level 
The transfer of project’s investment ownership from higher administrative level to 
local authorities requires formation of Project Management Unit (PMU) at 
commune level. PMU holds legal authority to carry out administrative activities 
and financial transactions of commune projects. Circular 676/2006 states that 
PMU has to be formed before any project implementation. Following the formation 
of PMU, a set of prerequisite management system for the Program is to be 
implemented before the commune undertakes any project. Table 5.1 provides 
information on the adequacy level of management system at commune level.  
Table 5. 1: Project Management and Planning at commune level (%) 
 
2007 2010 
Differenc
e 
Communes with PMU 70.04 93.93 23.89 
         using participatory planning 93.02 93.94 0.92 
         with training plan for commune officials 80.95 73.71 - 7.24 
         having communication plan 84.52 90.35 5.83 
         using new report format 34.42 38.16 3.74 
         organizing participatory M&E activities 87.50 86.64 - 0.86 
Source: Analysis Team calculations based on 2007 and 2012 household surveys. 
Most of P135-II communes have implemented the prerequisite management 
system for the Program. Prerequisite management system for the Program has 
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also been better established in 2010 as compared to 2007 since an additional 23.9 
percent of communes have formed PMU, making up the proportion of communes 
with PMU to a significant 93.9 percent. The regulation stipulating that every 
investment-owned commune must have a commune PMU leads to the 
requirement that every commune have a PMU by the end of the Program. 
However, 6.1 percent of communes still do not have separate PMUs to manage the 
Program’s activities. 
For communes where PMUs are established, the application of participatory 
planning is extensive. The percentage of communes with participatory planning 
stands at 93 percent in both 2007 and 2010. While the numbers of communes 
having communication plan and organizing participatory M&E activities remain 
relatively high in both years, the application of new reporting format has not been 
well established at commune level. Despite an improvement in the use of new 
reporting format from 2007 to 2010, only less than 40 percent of the communes 
use this one in 2010.  
Public Financial Management & Transparency  
In the period 2011 – 2020, a reform strategy for Public Sector is underway, in 
which Public Financial Management System is the center of the reform. The 
reform, with the emphasis on decentralization, is taking steps towards enhancing 
transparency and accountability arrangements of the system. While development 
partners share concerns about the system through which resources are channeled 
to the poor, P135-II’s objective addresses this concern and matches the 
Government’s interest in promoting a more transparent and effective Public 
Financial Management System. This share of interest is shown in the Program’s 
Policy Matrix with ‘Fiduciary Transparency and Accountability’ being one of the key 
four policy areas. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 5. 2: Fiduciary transparency at commune level 
Source: Analysis Team calculations based on 2007 and 2012 household
A detailed evaluation of the Program’s impact on fiduciary transparency is not 
within the scope of this study. The study measures the impact on local experience 
in financial reporting and the extent to which households are aware of public 
expenditure information. Our empirical analysis shows substantial improvement 
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 activities. Similarly, the percentage of Kinh households aware of project financial 
expenditure is 14 percentage points higher than their ethnic minority 
counterparts in 2010. This phenomenon suggests that ethnic minorities have 
relatively limited access to information, in which language barrier might 
considerably contribute to the outcome. Nevertheless, it is undeniable that there 
has been considerable improvement in
the percentage of households receiving financial information has been recorded 
over the period 2007 –
percent in 2010 think that financial information is re
percentage point decrease from 2007, which implies that households have become 
more cautious in evaluating the reliability of financial information that they 
receive.  
Figure 5. 3: Household receive
infrastructure projects (%)
Source: Analysis Team calculations based on 2007 and 2012 household surveys.
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By the end of the Program, commune office has adopted a fairly comprehensive 
prerequisite management system to facilitate community-driven mechanism in its 
planning and management process. More intensive application of participatory 
approach has been adopted. The Program shows an increase in the number of 
commune PMUs, a rise in planning activities that integrate participatory approach 
such as in planning, reporting, M&E, communication plan. Commune office has 
actively promoted financial transparency and information dissemination to 
grassroots level. As such, public and financial transparency has been improved, 
which is demonstrated by an increase in projects publicizing expenditure 
information as well as the number of households receiving the information. Even 
though progress has made been, there is big room for improvement on 
information dissemination to household level and on public financial management 
system at commune level.  
5.2.3 Ownership of P135-II investment projects 
Decentralization is pushed forward in P135-II with the introduction of commune 
investment ownership whereby commune office is given the responsibility for 
take leading of small and medium infrastructure projects including administrative 
and technical procedures. While all of the projects in Phase I were undertaken at 
district level which was believed to have sufficient capacity to carry out the work, 
this new policy in Phase II is considered a challenging but necessary step towards 
the success of community-driven approach; that is to build up institutional 
capacity at commune level.  
Taking up the responsibilities of an investment owner, the commune has to 
master the process of preparing profile design for construction, budget estimate, 
organizing bidding and selecting the contractor as well as supervising project 
implementation and handing over the completed project to beneficiaries. All of 
these activities require thorough understanding of the procedure as well as 
technical knowledge even for small-scale projects. This requirement leads to the 
low proportion of P135-II commune-owned projects in 2007 (21.5 percent). With 
rigorous capacity building, including provision of technical assistance and training 
courses for commune level, the number of commune-owned projects doubled in 
2010 (45.9 percent). With the target of 100 percent communes being investment 
owners, this figure seems to indicate that the former goal is far from being 
achieved. Despite the modest number of commune-owned projects, the double 
increase in the number of projects over the period 2007 – 2010 demonstrates 
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significant improvement in the ability of communes to become investment 
owners. Together with the increase in number of commune-owned projects, the 
number of households benefiting from each investment-owned project increases 
slightly by 10 households. This improvement indicates that not only more projects 
can be owned by communes but the positive impact of each commune-owned 
project is also more widespread by the end of the Program.  
Table 5. 2:  Ownership of P135-II infrastructure projects 
 
2007 2010 Difference 
Infrastructure projects where communes are investment owners 
(%) 
21.54 45.95 24.41 
Households benefiting from each investment-own projects (no of 
households) 
421.3 432.1  10.8 
Communes think that it is better for communes to be investment 
owners (%) 
97.44 96.11 -1.33 
Projects with CIO encounter slow funding (%) 57.35 45.33 -12.02 
Projects with CIO encounter weak capacity of commune officials (%) 17.65 17 -0.65 
Projects with CIO encounter weak capacity of the contractors (%) 5.88 5.38 -0.5 
Source: Analysis Team calculations based on 2007 and 2012 household surveys. 
Table 5.2 shows problems encountered by investment-owning communes. The 
majority of investment-owning communes do not encounter serious problems 
during implementation process. In both years, more than 96 percent of commune 
staff interviewed expresses their preference to be the investment owners rather 
than having the projects owned by higher authorities. The former option gives 
them more autonomy in planning and implementing the projects; therefore the 
project would best meet the need of community. During implementation process, 
the biggest problem encountered by projects with CIO is slow disbursement. 12 
percent decrease in number of projects experiencing slow funding seems to 
indicate that the problem has alleviated but remains dominant by the end of the 
Program as a significant proportion of 45.3 percent still encounters this issue. 
Slow funding indicates inefficiency in public financial system and poses challenges 
for contractors who have to carry out the construction work without timely 
financial payout. The second most prevailing issue, and equally important, is weak 
capacity building of investment owners. 17.7 percent of projects with CIO has 
problem with weak capacity of commune officials. Worryingly, this weight does 
not seem to significantly decrease in 2010 (17 percent) while the total number of 
investment-owned projects has increased substantially. Capacity at commune 
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level has been the biggest concern in the decentralization process to grassroots 
level because success of commune investment-owned projects highly depends on 
communes’ capacity. This is the reason why the Program has invested 
considerably on capacity building at local level. It is, on the other hand, difficult to 
measure the effectiveness and quality of capacity building through training 
courses. Weak capacity of contractors does not seem to be a notable problem for 
commune-owned projects. Less than 6 percent of projects in P135-II face this 
problem.  
5.2.4 Capacity strengthening at community – HouseholdParticipation 
Rural development and rural poverty reduction experience have shown that 
empowering local governments to engage in a constructive dialogue with civil 
society is one of the most cost-effective and insightful medium for sustainable 
community development. Participation is seen as a process of empowerment, 
which aims to improve democracy, independence and self-reliance of the rural 
population (Ghai, 1990). Recognizing the importance of participatory approach, 
P135-II has strongly promoted informed public participation in program planning 
and management. This section measures the impact of the Program on household 
participation level throughout the selection, planning and implementation stages 
of infrastructure projects. The participation level is assessed through the 
perspectives of commune office (the implementing agency) and households (the 
targeted population).   
Household participation in selection of P135-II infrastructure projects 
Household participation in the selection stage of infrastructure projects is critical 
for project planning at grassroots level. Active and effective household 
participation in project selection determines whether their ideas and needs are 
well reflected in the choice of construction projects at their locality. At village 
level, selection meetings to get direct beneficiaries’ opinion are organized by 
Planning Board. 
According to local participatory scheme, all households are informed about 
selection meetings and each would appoint one representative to attend the 
meeting. After collecting community opinions during the selection meetings, the 
Planning Board and village head would then build an investment project list in 
order of importance. With strong emphasis and close guidance of higher 
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administrative authorities, the Program has succeeded in encouraging household 
to participate in project. In 2010, around 85 percent of P135-II projects have 
organized local selection meetings; while the proportions of households aware of 
the meetings are 56.1 percent and 79.3 percent in 2007 and 2010 respectively. 
These figures first show an improvement in household awareness over the period 
2007 – 2010, indicating better information dissemination at village level. 
Nevertheless, the gap between household awareness rate and the actual rate of 
meetings organized persists. With an increase in awareness about selection 
meeting, attendance rate in selection meeting has climbed accordingly from 49 
percent in 2007 to 73.9 percent in 2010, in which only 51 percent of poor 
households attend selection meeting in 2010. This means that 49 percent of poor 
households have been overlooked in project selection stage.  
By ethnicities, our numerical findings indicate that Kinh&Hoa, Tay and Nung 
groups are more aware of selection meetings, therefore their participation rates in 
selection meetings are the highest among all those of ethnic groups. Another 
notable change is the tremendous increase in household awareness and in 
participation level of Thai group in project selection over the period 2007 – 2010. 
Information about selection meeting has become known to more than 56 percent 
of Thai population in 2010, resulting from an increase in 50.6 percentage point 
from 2007. H’Mong group has the lowest participation rate. Households with male 
head participate more than households with female head in 2010. Figure 5.4 also 
display an interesting trend in household participation by region. At the Program’s 
onset, the Northern region has the highest participation rate and the Southern 
region has the lowest rate. This trend has reversed in 2010: Northern region has 
the lowest participation level while the other two regions demonstrate significant 
improvement. This phenomenon suggests that the Southern and Central commune 
authorities have scored better in terms of implementing participatory approach as 
compared to their Northern counterpart.   
 
 
 
  
 Figure 5. 4: Household participation rate in selection meeting (%)
Source: Analysis Team calculations based on 2007 and 2012 household surveys.
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household heads; therefore, the noted discrepancy reflects gender difference as 
male participants seem to be more confident in sharing their opinions than their 
female counterparts. This phenomenon is particularly true in the rural and remote 
setting where male is given priority in education and in the decision-making 
process.  
Among those who voice out their opinions, 25.8 percent of households have their 
ideas taken, three times higher than the corresponding figure in 2007 (8.2 
percent). Even though only a small number of households having their ideas taken, 
the majority of households interviewed are satisfied with project selection. This 
can be attributed to the fact that the living condition and socio-economic status at 
treated areas are extremely inadequate, so any additional construction project 
would significantly improve their living condition and livelihood.   
Household contribution to implementation stage of P135-II infrastructure 
projects   
Community contribution 
Community contribution for public investment does not only include financial and 
labor support to infrastructure project implementation but also aims to promote 
public accountability in project management and future maintenance of public 
services. Local contribution comes under the form of cash or in-kind labor. The 
number of households making contribution to infrastructure projects increases 
significantly by 14.2 percent over the period 2007 – 2010. One big concern of 
community contribution in poor communes is that this strategy might pose direct 
taxation to households’ limited income or reduce their time availability for other 
income-generating activities. This concern does appear to be a problem according 
to our finding as the contribution rate of the poor is relatively higher than that of 
the non-poor for both 2007 and 2010. Table 5.3 shows consistent improvement 
regarding community contribution in terms of household number as well as 
contribution value in cash and in-kind labor. For instance, the average number of 
labor days contributed by each household increases significantly from 1.1 in 2007 
to 6.27 in 2010. Value of contribution per household for each project also rises 
greatly by 10 times. In general, household contributions still represent a small 
percentage of the total value of the projects, these contributions are, nevertheless, 
important in promoting community responsibility for public services from which 
they are the direct beneficiaries. Households have demonstrated their 
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responsibility as well as recognized the importance of these infrastructure 
projects to their living condition and livelihood. In this respect, the Program has 
succeeded in promoting households’ accountability in construction of public 
projects, albeit to a certain extent.  
Table 5. 3: Community contribution for P135-II infrastructure projects (%) 
  2007 2010 Difference 
Households contributing to construction of the project (2) 21.8 35.9 14.1 
Average amount of contribution in cash (1000 Dong) per 
household (2) 
12.2 135.42 123.2 
Average amount of household contribution in cash per 
project (1000 Dong) (1) 
4,136.2 5,713.5 1,577.3 
Average number of labor day per household (2) 1.07 6.27 5.2 
Average number of labor day contributed by household per 
project (1) 
100.2 122.5 22.3 
Source: Analysis Team calculations based on 2007 and 2012 household surveys. 
Job creation (by all local infrastructure projects) 
Infrastructure development can create job opportunities and generate a 
temporary source of income for local people living in the areas where the 
construction projects are carried out. P135-II and many other poverty reduction 
projects have connected infrastructure development with job creation and income 
generation for local people. This strategy also promotes community “ownership” 
with respect to infrastructure projects.  
Table 5. 4: Job creation opportunities for households in local infrastructure 
projects 
 
2007 2010 Difference 
Households having members working for local infrastructure 
projects (%) 
31.1 27.1 - 4.0 
Participants in infrastructure projects having signed contracts 
with employers (%) 
2.9 1.8 - 1.1 
Average number of working days per project participant in 
the past 12 months 
6.5 7.2 0.7 
Participants get paid from working for infrastructure projects 
(%) 
4.4 9.1 4.7 
Source: Analysis Team calculations based on 2007 and 2012 household surveys. 
The level of local job created from all local infrastructure projects remains low and 
seems to slightly decrease over the period 2007 – 2010. In the setting that 
households’ labor contribution for all local infrastructure projects have tendency 
to decline (by 4 percentage point as shown in Table 5.4), P135-II has done a good 
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job in attracting more local workers (as shown in Table 5.3). The percentage of 
households having members working for local infrastructure projects stays 
around 30 percent, in which only less than 3 percent have signed contract with 
employers. Most local members work informally for infrastructure projects 
without legal obligation. This situation seems to worsen in 2010, demonstrated 
through a 1.1 percentage point (40 percent) drop in contract signing rate. When 
no legal binding agreement is made between the contractor and the workers, both 
parties are not obliged to take responsibility for the other and this might affect the 
quality as well as progress of any project. 
In terms of labor contribution, there is an increase in average number of working 
days per project per participant (6.5 to 7.2) and the percentage of households 
getting paid doubles (4.4 percent to 9.1 percent) despite its remaining low over 
the period 2007 – 2010. This phenomenon implies that infrastructure projects 
have provided more paid work to local workers in the year 2010 but majority of 
households still do unpaid or voluntary work for local construction projects. In 
theory, infrastructure development seems to be a good opportunity to generate 
income for the local, but in reality project contractors encounter considerable 
difficulty in recruiting qualified and available local workers. This phenomenon 
explains the low participation of local workers. Firstly, local workers could only 
take up simple-skill work while certain construction stages require skilled 
workers so the contractors end up hiring outside workers. Secondly, many local 
workers, especially the ethnic minority workers, prefer working on a daily basis 
and they are not willing to work overtime or at weekend when required. These 
constraints adversely affect the effectiveness of job creation from infrastructure 
development projects.  
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 5. 5: Job creation for households in local infrastructure
classification 
Source: Analysis Team calculations based on 2007 and 2012 household surveys.
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Household participation in supervision of P135
In order to promote community involvement and to improve community capacity 
in project management, People Super
members. People Supervisory Board plays a critical role throughout the project 
implementation process. Supervisory Board has the responsibility to monitor the 
project implementation. Our empirical results show an i
households’ involvement in Supervisory Board. Even though the percentage of 
households having member joining Supervisory Board remains below 10 percent 
for both years, there is a major improvement in their participation as the figure 
doubles from 3.5 percent in 2007 to 8 percent in 2010.  
Figure 5. 6: Households’ participation in Supervisory Board (%)
Source: Analysis Team calculations based on 2007 and 2012 household surveys.
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importance of engaging the most disadvantaged groups among the already 
disadvantaged in every community-driven activity.   
Capacity of People Supervisory Board is rather limited; therefore capacity building 
for this committee is extremely important to ensure the quality of implementation 
process. Capacity building for Supervisory Board has not been effectively carried 
out as shown in table 5.5. In 2010, only 17 percent of Supervisory Boards undergo 
technical training even though this level is already an improvement from the 
baseline period. Similarly, only 17.4 percent of Supervisory Boards are provided 
with project design. Following a standard procedure, projects after completion 
have to undergo Supervisory Board’s approval before coming into operation. This 
step has been an administrative procedure rather than being fully exercised by 
relevant parties due to weak capacity of Supervisory Board. The majority of 
commune officers as well as households are not satisfied with qualification of 
Supervisory Board. More than 60 percent think that members of Supervisory 
Board are not qualified for their task. 
Table 5. 5: Participation and quality of Supervisory Board (%) 
  2007 2010 
Differenc
e 
Households having member join People Supervisory Board 
(2) 3.5 8.0 4.5 
Projects having People Supervisory Board (1) 81.1 85.4 4.3 
Projects having People Supervisory Board (2) 47.5 55.1 7.6 
Projects with People Supervisory Board undergoing 
technical training 11.3 17.0 5.7 
Projects with People Supervisory Board provided with 
project design 14.3 17.4 3.1 
People Supervisory Board qualified for the task (1) 38.4 30.0 -8.4 
Households satisfied with qualification of People 
Supervisory Board (2) 28.8 39.8 11.0 
Source: Analysis Team calculations based on 2007 and 2012 household surveys. 
(1) refers to commune staff’s assessment; (2) refers to households’ assessment 
Other households’ contribution to infrastructure projects 
Completion of infrastructure project and O& M 
After each project is completed, the contractor needs to officially hand it over to 
the investment owners, and the investment owners are supposed to formally 
delegate the responsibility/ownership to the direct beneficiaries. Nevertheless, 
this procedure has not been properly executed. Local community is not formally 
 informed of their responsibility or ownership with respect to each new public 
infrastructure. As a result, they are less obliged to take accountability and 
ownership of the service project. This situation results in little
community about O&M. Despite a relatively high percentage of projects with O &M 
plan (48.2 percent in 2007 and 54.4 percent in 2010), the percentage of 
households who know about O & M plans for these projects are around 40 
percentage point lower. Equivalently, percentage of households contributed 
money to maintenance of the projects remains extremely mo
households’ awareness and involvement in O & M remains low in 2010, the 
Program still witnesses a huge improvement in households’ awareness and 
involvement in O & M activities of infrastructure projects. Specifically, the 
awareness rate increases by almost 13 times over the period 2007 
financial contribution rate to O&M fund also rises by 10 times in the same period. 
Figure 5. 7: Households’ involvement in O & M of P135
Source: Analysis Team calculations based on 2007 and 2012 household surveys.
Public bidding 
As regard to the organization of public bidding, commune staff reports more than 
50 percent of projects adopting public bidding for infrastructure projects. The 
figure remains relatively unchanged over the period 2007 
increase by 3 percent during the Program period). Nevertheless, what is reported 
by households presents a different picture. Only 27 percent of households are 
aware of public bidding in 2010, ind
dissemination about public bidding at commune level. Nevertheless, there has 
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 been a big improvement of 9.3 percent increase in household awareness from the 
year 2007 to 2010. As public bidding enhances the fin
figures suggest that P135
transparent even though the result is far from being satisfactory. Public bidding 
can hardly operate effectively and widely if only a small group of commun
aware of its occurrence. Therefore, PMU and Supervisory Board play critical roles 
in information dissemination to grassroots level. Lack of information reveals weak 
capacity and low qualification of PMU and Supervisory Board. More proper and 
relevant trainings should be provided for these in
Assessment of P135-II infrastructure projects
The level of satisfaction with project quality increases, with respect to both 
households and commune officers. At the project onset in 2007, househo
commune officers express different viewpoints regarding 
In 2007, commune officials were more positive about project quality than 
households. The percentage of commune officials satisfied with project quality is 
15.6 percent higher than that of households. By 2010, this gap diminishes to 4 
percent; there occurs a convergence of opinions between households and officers 
with both groups having more than 80 percent expressing satisfaction with 
project quality. We can conclude w
improved in Phase II. 
Figure 5. 8: Households that are satisfied with quality of P135
infrastructure projects (%)
Source: Analysis Team calculations based on 2007 and 2012 hous
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Figure 5.8 provides a closer look into households’ evaluation with classification by 
ethnicity and region. All ethnicities express an increase in the level of satisfaction 
with quality of the project, especially Nung and Dao with 41.0 percent and 37.2 
percent increase respectively. Households from the South show higher satisfaction 
with the project quality, as compared to the North and Central regions.  
Beneficiaries of P135-II infrastructure projects 
Increase in satisfaction level can be related to the increase in beneficiary 
population per each infrastructure project. P135-II Infrastructure projects have 
successfully extended its reach for greater impact. By the end of 2010, there is a 10 
percent increase in number of household benefiting from P135-II infrastructure 
projects, making up 94.6 percent of the total household number benefiting from 
the project. Half of the beneficiary population is poor households. This 
phenomenon indicates that P135-II has fairly succeeded in targeting the poor.        
Table 5. 6: Households benefit from P135-II infrastructure projects 
    2007 2010 Difference 
Total 84.90 94.59 9.70 
Ethnicities 
   
 
Kinh&Hoa 85.92 96.95 11.03 
 
Tay 84.83 92.34 7.51 
 
Thai 71.65 94.70 23.04 
 
Muong 89.60 96.77 7.17 
 
Nung 75.86 99.56 23.71 
 
H'Mong 90.50 89.47 -1.02 
 
Dao 76.01 91.20 15.19 
 
Other ethnicities 92.47 93.31 0.84 
Region 
   
 
North 85.83 92.49 6.66 
 
Central 83.71 96.21 12.50 
 
South 84.04 97.38 13.34 
Source: Analysis Team calculations based on 2007 and 2012 household surveys. 
Benefit from infrastructure projects is distributed relatively equally among ethnic 
groups and across three main geographical regions. For most of the ethnic groups, 
the population benefiting from P135-II infrastructure projects remains above 90 
percent of the whole population, except for H’Mong with 89.5 percent (2010). 
Nung and Thai groups show the highest augmentation in the benefited population 
from P135-II infrastructure projects (23.7 percent and 23.04 percent 
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respectively). Apart from Nung and Thai groups, Kinh&Hoa and Dao are among 
the groups with significant rise in number of households benefitting from P135-II 
infrastructure projects. By region, households from the South benefit the most 
from P135-II infrastructure projects (97.4 percent), followed by Central region 
(96.2 percent), and North region (92.5 percent).  
5.3 Impact of P135- II on outcomes 
5.3.1  P135-II Impacts on Key Response Variables 
Higher level outcomes appear in the lower half of Figure 3.2 (Causal Chain 
Hypothesis). These include measures of agricultural production, household 
income, household poverty status, and so on.  In this section we define several key 
response variables and report the estimated impacts of P135-II on them. We focus 
heavily on measures of agricultural productivity because important elements of 
P135-II target agricultural productivity. The detail definition of the key response 
variables, including the calculation method, is presented in the appendix 
5.3.2 Control Variables 
Control variables for the household income regressions include: education and 
education squared of the best-educated working-age member of the household; 
age, age squared, and gender of the household head; size of the household; total 
land area held by the household; annual remittances received by the household; 
an indicator for the number of negative shocks experienced by the household 
during the past few years; and a dummy variable for the year (2007 or 2012).  
Working age is defined as 15 ≤ age ≤ 65 for both men and women.We ran separate 
regressions for minority and non-minority households that aims to the impact 
level of the Program on the different major beneficiary household groups. 
5.3.3 Estimation 
Fixed-effects estimation was implemented via the xtreg command in STATA; 
estimation accounted for the complex sample design (stratification, clustering, and 
weighting). Outliers, defined as observations with values greater than four 
standard deviations from the mean, were deleted prior to estimation.  The set of 
control variables was narrowed-down by stepwise deletion: the least significant 
variable was deleted and the model re-estimated until all remaining controls were 
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significant at the 40% level.  The high significance level is used to guard against 
Type II error, which would lead to omitted variables bias.  Results are given in 
Table 5.7 below. 
Estimated P135-II impact appears in columns headed by DID FE/X (difference-in-
differences, fixed-effects, with controls).  T-ratios for the hypothesis that the 
impact is no greater than zero are given, as are one-tail p-values for testing the 
hypothesis.  Impacts are given for minority and non-minority households.  The 
panels on the right-hand side of the table show the sample average values of the 
outcome variables, which are helpful for interpreting the estimated impacts.  It is 
essential to keep in mind the role of the counterfactual (comparison communes) 
for interpreting the estimated impacts. 
For example, the estimated impact on asset index for minorities is 0.38.  However, 
the sample means show the following: between 2007 and 2012 the asset index 
among comparison households decreased from 2.43 to 2.09 (in 2007 households 
had 2.43 asset items, on average; this declined to 2.09 by 2012).  Thus, the change 
over time was -0.34.  Over the same time span asset items owned by households in 
treatment communes increased from 2.30 to 2.33, and increase of 0.03.  Were we 
to use these data to calculate the difference-in-differences estimator, the 
calculation would be [(2.33 – 2.30) – (2.09 – 2.43)] = 0.37.  Thus, the significant 
positive impact does not necessarily mean that households in the treatment area 
were much better off in 2012 than they were in 2007.  The estimated impact in 
this case should be interpreted as follows: in the absence of treatment, the asset 
index of treatment households would have decreased by the same amount as for 
the comparison households.  Finally, we see in this case that the controls did not 
play a very important role: the estimated impact is quite close to the ordinary DID 
calculation.   
For further illustration, examine the results for income from businesses for non-
minorities.  The large negative impact (-22,536) appears to indicate that 
households in the treatment communes are much worse off.  Again, the key 
interpretation is relative:  households in the treatment communes saw their 
incomes from businesses rise from 22,988 to 28,703 between 2007 and 2012.  
However, households in the comparison communes enjoyed a much larger 
average increase: from 21,912 to 48,759.  Thus, business incomes of households in 
the treatment communes failed to grow as rapidly as business incomes of 
counterpart households in comparison communes. 
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Minority households recorded statistically significant positive impacts due to 
P135-II for several important variables:  productive asset ownership, household 
durables ownership, and rice productivity.  Among higher-order outcomes, they 
enjoyed positive impacts in income from agriculture, household total income, and 
household per-capita income.  A particularly important result is that poverty 
among minority households in treatment communes declined significantly more 
than it declined in comparison communes. Specifically, for ethnic minority 
households, P135- II increased the rice productivity about 10%, agriculture 
income about 17%, total income of these households about 16%, and then reduce 
the poverty of ethnic minority about 10%. In addition, Program helps to reduce 
the travel time of ethnic minority households to health facilities about 12%.  
In only two instances were estimated impacts for minority households negative.  
First, the value of their corn productivity among households in treatment 
communes increased less than that in comparison communes. but it did increase 
(from 770 VND per square meter to 1,590 VND per square meter compared to an 
increase from 0.94 VND per square meter to 1,940 VND per square meter).  In this 
case we see not only did comparison households enjoy a larger increase in the 
value of their corn productivity, they started off at a higher value as well.  A similar 
description is appropriate for the negative impact recorded for the share of land 
allocated to industrial crops. 
Statistically significant positive impacts were recorded for non-minority 
households for their household durables index and for their corn, cassava, and 
industrial crops productivities.  While the industrial crop productivity increased, 
the share of land allocated to industrial crops decreased.  Perhaps both results 
were driven by taking the least-productive land out of industrial crops production. 
Non-minority households in treatment areas saw their agricultural incomes 
decline while those in comparison areas saw theirs increase: this contrast is 
reflected in the statistically significant impact on income from agriculture.  The 
statistically significant impact on income from businesses was discussed above. 
Finally, the measured travel time to health facilities in treatment communes 
increased.  While it seems unlikely that travel times to specific facilities increased, 
this result could be driven by a shift in the mix of health facilities visited. 
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The right-hand panels of Table 5.7 support two important generalizations.  First, 
in almost all measures the treatment communes were worse off in 2007 than the 
comparison communes.  This is consistent with authorities directing P135-II 
resources to communes most in need. 
Second, non-minority households are better off than minority households in 
several very important respects.  In particular they have lower incomes and lower 
school enrollments.  For both of these, there is evidence of improvement.  Incomes 
increased, but not as much as non-minorities. Enrollments also increased, and by 
larger percentages than for non-minorities. 
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Table 5. 7:  Impact estimation results 
        
Sample Averages 
 
Minorities Non-Minorities 
 
Minorities Non-Minorities 
Response Variable 
DID 
FE/X 
t-
ratio 
p-
value 
DID 
FE/X 
t-
ratio 
p-
value 
 
Treatment Control Treatment Control 
 
2012 2007 2012 2007 2012 2007 2012 2007 
                Asset Index 0.38 2.33 0.0099 0.15 0.88 0.1894 
 
2.33 2.30 2.09 2.43 2.04 1.90 2.14 2.16 
Durables Index 1.18 7.42 0.0000 1.02 2.04 0.0207 
 
7.45 6.58 8.80 9.14 10.90 9.83 11.08 10.78 
House Quality Index 0.01 1.00 0.1587 0.02 1.05 0.1469 
 
0.42 0.38 0.50 0.47 0.57 0.50 0.61 0.54 
                Rice Productivity (kg/sqm) 0.03 2.00 0.0228 0.002 0.07 0.4721 
 
0.37 0.35 0.42 0.41 0.41 0.38 0.42 0.41 
Rice Productivity (000 VND/sqm) 0.04 0.41 0.3409 -0.11 -0.48 0.3156 
 
2.38 1.03 2.65 1.26 2.47 1.13 2.69 1.29 
                Corn Productivity (kg/sqm) 0.01 1.10 0.1357 0.03 1.44 0.0749 
 
0.18 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.13 
Corn Productivity (000 VND/sqm) -0.18 -2.12 0.0170 0.003 0.02 0.4920 
 
1.59 0.77 1.94 0.94 1.99 0.87 2.16 0.94 
                Cassava Productivity (kg/sqm) -0.13 -1.01 0.1562 0.54 2.35 0.0094 
 
1.14 1.26 1.26 1.35 1.64 1.22 1.27 1.21 
Cassava Productivity (000 VND/sqm) -0.16 -0.86 0.1949 0.45 1.69 0.0455 
 
1.43 0.74 1.64 0.83 1.94 0.75 1.69 0.82 
                Industrial Crop Productivity (kg/sqm) -0.01 0.10 0.4602 0.43 1.02 0.1539 
 
0.54 0.51 0.53 0.60 1.58 4.42 1.01 1.43 
Industrial Crop Prod (000 VND/sqm) 0.03 0.02 0.4920 12.54 2.41 0.0080 
 
5.47 2.73 4.06 2.95 17.71 11.20 5.85 4.04 
                Share of Land in Industrial Crops -0.04 -1.32 0.0934 -0.11 -1.91 0.0281 
 
0.18 0.18 0.29 0.21 0.28 0.30 0.23 0.22 
                Income from Wages & Salaries 634 0.19 0.4247 2,985 1.10 0.1357 
 
14,541 11,535 19,578 15,770 25,512 18,596 23,573 18,542 
Income from Agriculture 3,230 3.27 0.0005 -3,285 -1.54 0.0618 
 
19,224 17,446 18,632 18,584 17,039 17,954 16,724 14,774 
Income from Businesses 2,104 0.52 0.3015 -22,536 -2.90 0.0019 
 
14,012 7,597 22,268 12,676 28,703 22,988 48,759 21,912 
                Household Total Income 3,479 2.14 0.0162 -1,644 -0.41 0.3409 
 
31,309 26,634 36,687 33,648 45,123 39,740 45,460 39,460 
Household Per-Capita Income 1,118 2.51 0.0060 121 0.11 0.4562 
 
7,047 5,739 8,174 7,722 12,193 9,829 12,083 9,832 
                Poverty -0.10 -2.72 0.0033 -0.01 -0.17 0.4325 
 
0.49 0.59 0.40 0.42 0.29 0.32 0.33 0.34 
                Enrollment: Primary 0.04 0.97 0.1660 0.04 0.50 0.3085 
 
0.83 0.83 0.93 0.92 0.98 0.92 0.95 0.92 
Enrollment: Lower Secondary 0.02 0.50 0.3085 0.10 0.96 0.1685 
 
0.60 0.58 0.77 0.72 0.78 0.74 0.90 0.89 
Enrollment: Upper Secondary 0.03 0.63 0.2643 -0.03 -0.32 0.3745 
 
0.28 0.24 0.43 0.38 0.53 0.55 0.66 0.68 
                Travel Time to Health Facilities -5.82 -1.69 0.0455 9.67 1.41 0.0793 
 
46.13 43.48 39.09 28.48 48.64 37.11 37.25 62.36 
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5.4 Conclusion 
Program 135-II has harvested significant success in implementing participatory 
approach from central to grassroots level. First, remarkable progress has been made 
by commune office in the implementation process. Notably, the Program experiences 
24 percentage point increase in the number of commune-owned projects, 23 
percentage point increase in that of commune PMUs, and 10 percentage point 
increase in that of projects having treasury account. Second, huge improvement in 
household participation level in every stage including selection, planning and 
implementation has been witnessed towards the end of the Program: 24.8 percentage 
point increase in selection meeting attendance, 23 percentage point increase in the 
number of households sharing their viewpoints during the meeting, 24 percentage 
point increase in households’ contribution to construction projects and 9-time 
increase in household contribution towards O&M funds. Third, enhancement in 
financial transparency has been achieved to a certain extent. More than 24 percent of 
projects have its financial information publicized and the rate of households receiving 
financial information also doubles over the period 2007 - 2010. The Program has 
expanded its coverage to a greater beneficiary group. By 2010, 94.6 percent of 
households benefit from each infrastructure project.   
Even though huge progress has been made, the target of 100 percent of communes 
becoming investment owners has not been achieved and this is still considered a 
highly challenging task given weak capacity building at local level. Significant 
improvement in every implementation activity has been made but the level of 
achievement in capacity building at local authorities and community remains low. 
This situation is first displayed through weak implementation at commune level: 46 
percent of commune-owned infrastructure projects, 54.2 percent of projects with 
public bidding, 39.1 percent of projects with treasury accounts, 54.4 projects with 
O&M plan. On the other hand, community participation is still limited in certain stage 
such as: only 36.1 households voice their opinion during selection meeting, 8 percent 
join People Supervision Board. Participation level also varies greatly by different 
beneficiaries groups, with the most disadvantaged groups including ethnic minorities 
and female should be given more attention. With a “low” starting point of local 
authorities, the implementation process has encountered multiple difficulties. Impact 
of commune investment ownership is not highly significant and clear. Commune-
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owned projects still face with problems during implementation period such as slow 
disbursement and weak capacity of commune officials. Participation in project 
supervision and O&M activities receive the least attention. Our finding also specifies 
the importance of an effective information dissemination mechanism to ensure high 
level of informed public participation. Communication mechanism needs to receive 
additional attention from the Program because access to information is highly 
correlated to the effectiveness of community-driven implementation.  
The success of participatory approach requires tremendous efforts from central to 
local authorities in engaging local community into every project activity. To ensure an 
effective participation, local community needs to be equipped with sufficient 
information, knowledge, and understanding in the operation of each activity as well 
as understanding the importance of their participation prior to their active 
involvement. Also, institutional capacity building needs to precede that at local 
community. Apart from providing a systematic participatory framework, the Program 
should focus on improving each and every activity of the project implementation. Our 
analysis has identified key strength as well as weakness in project management and 
capacity strengthening process. Participatory approach is the way to sustainable 
community development but reliant upon adequate management capacity and 
effective capacity building at both institutional and community levels.   
The estimated impacts on key response variables for minority households are on 
balance very positive. The most important results are large and statistically 
significant impacts on  total income, per-capita household income, and poverty status.  
Results for non-minority households appear mixed, but impacts on the most 
important measures (total income, per-capita income, and poverty status), are 
neither large nor statistically significant. 
School enrollment is critically important to households and their communities.  
Enrollment rates of minority children are lower than those of non-minorities, 
especially for upper-secondary school.  However, enrollments improved among 
households in treatment and in comparison communes. In all cases but one, 
enrollments in treatment communes increased more than in comparison communes, 
but the impacts were not statistically significant. 
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The analysis shows two important facts.  First, treatment communes were generally 
worse off than comparison communes in 2007, indicating that the authorities’ 
targeting of most needy communes was accurate.  Second, even though they comprise 
only 31% of the population represented by our sample, non-minority households are 
substantially better-off than minority households in key respects.  The right-hand 
panels of Table 5.7 indicate that substantial disparities persist between minorities 
and non-minorities in total income, income per-capita, and school enrollments. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
This report aims to evaluate the effectiveness of P135-II and to identify its limitations. 
The goal is to provide information that can be used to enhance the design of future 
government programs. We report the impacts of P135-II on the expected outcomes of 
household welfare indicators. In particular, we report the impacts on poverty, 
income, agricultural production, housing conditions, and access to basic public 
services. Our analysis is based on BLS 2007 and ELS 2012, the most comprehensive 
and reliable panel data set focusing on ethnic minorities who often live under difficult 
conditions and often that face the deepest poverty in Vietnam. This data set enabled 
us to implement the appropriate methods for measuring the program impactsand to 
measurethe progress in poverty reduction and gains in socio-economic status of 
ethnic minority communities. In addition, thislarge well-designed panel data set 
provides reliable baseline data for designing future government poverty reduction 
programs. Based on our analysis using this panel data set, we came up with the 
following major findings and policy implications. 
P135-II is the first large government program that has adopted a systematic and 
professional evaluation procedure. It meets the highest professional standards, not 
only for the sake of the P135-II, but also as an illustration of the value added that 
good evaluations can provide.  It demonstrates the methodology that could be used to 
draw lessons for upcoming government programs including the New Rural 
Development Program and Program 30A. BLS 2007 and ELS 2012 provide rich and 
high-quality information that enables us to answer many important questions that we 
cannot address for other government programs. 
During the implementation of P135-II, some communes in the treatment group 
graduated from the program and some communes from the control group were 
brought into the treatment group. These reassignments were not part of the original 
program design and they complicated the impact evaluation task.  We were 
compelled to omit communes that had been reassigned; this reduced the sample size, 
reduced the precision of the estimated impacts, and reduced the power of the 
necessary statistical tests. In addition, we found that the budget allocations of P135-II 
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communes and comparison communes were not statistically different.  While the 
treatment communes did receive substantially more P135 funds than the control 
communes received, they also received substantially less non-P135 support.  This 
pattern is consistent with the hypothesis of compensatory reallocation of non-P135 
funds by the local authorities (district and province), which has been confirmed by 
our recent study.14 The potential impact of P135-II depends on the degree to which it 
enhances resource availability to target communes. The reallocation non-P135 funds 
from P135 communes to non-P135 communes to compensate the latter because they 
were not included in P135 created a major difficulty for identifying P135 impacts and 
very likely resulted in underestimating the program impacts.  The fact that the P135-
II communes actually did not receive more funding than other communes 
undermined the goals of P135: to reduce the widening gap between P135-II 
communes and other communes, the gap between poor and non-poor households, 
and the gap between ethnic minorities and Kinh households. These issues should be 
addressed and monitored in future programs to ensure that the funds will be 
allocated to target groups and that it does not affect the decisions of local authorities 
on the other resource allocations. 
P135-II achieved significant success in implementing a participatory approach to 
implementation, with remarkable corresponding progress in decentralization. The 
number of commune-owned projects increased substantially from 21.5% in 2006 to 
46% in 2011. The number of projects having treasury accountsis increased by about 
10 percentage points. These changes represent large improvements compared to the 
first phase of P135 and other programs.Beneficiary households participated in every 
stage of the project including selection, implementation, supervision and 
contributionsto the operation and maintenance funds. Financial transparency also 
improved to a certain extent. More than 24 percent of the local projects undertaken 
through P135-II have had their financial statements publicized and distributed to 
beneficiary households.  
Even though progress has been made, the target of 100 percent of communes 
becoming investment owners has not been achieved and this is still considered a 
highly challenging task given weak management capacity at local levels. In contract to 
the target, more than 50% of infrastructure projects are district-owned projects, 
                                                        
14
Effectiveness of Targeted Budget Support in Program 135 Phase II- An Aid Effectiveness Evaluation Report. 
Indochina Research and Consulting, 2011. 
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nearly 50% of projects were undertaken without public bidding, and only 40% of 
projects have treasury accounts. Community participation is low and varies greatly by 
beneficiary group; ethnic minorities and women’s groups are under-represented. In 
addition, commune-owned projects still face problems such as slow funds 
disbursement and weak capacity among commune officials. Participation in project 
supervision and operations and maintenance activities receive the least attention. 
The success of the participatory approach requires tremendous efforts from central 
and local authorities in engaging local communities in every project activity. 
Therefore, local communities need to be equipped with sufficient information, 
knowledge, and understanding to execute each activity. These issues should be 
considered and addressed in designing future programs, especially programs which 
address decentralization and participation of the community.  
The living standards of households in P135-II improved in every measured respect 
for all ethnic groups. The average household income increased about 20%, andthe 
poverty rate decreased from 57.5% to 49.2%. The housing and sanitation conditions 
also improved for most ethnic groups. However, poverty remains high and the living 
standard of the households in these communes is still very low compared to the 
national average. The poorer households experienced lower income growth rates 
than the better-off households. Therefore, inequality increased, with a large 
proportion of the inequality due to inequality within each ethnic group (more than 
90%). The poverty gap and severity indexes of households in the Program 135-II 
areas did not decrease, so the living standards of the households that remained poor 
are less improved than others and the gap is widening between poor and non-poor 
households in these communes.  
Our results also show that poverty reduction at the commune level is positively 
correlated with income growth and that inequality is slightly correlated with poverty. 
Moreover, the elasticity of poverty with respect to income growth tends to decrease 
overtime, which suggests that income redistribution plays a very important role in 
decreasing the poverty gap and alleviating the severity of poverty. In addition, part of 
the measured poverty is transitory: 22.1% of poor households escaped from poverty 
during our period of analysis, but 14.3 percent of households that initially were not 
poor fell into poverty. Kinh households are more likely to be transiently poor, while 
ethnic minority households are more likely to be persistently poor. This implies that 
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the poverty reduction in these communes is more difficult to sustain, partly due to the 
high level of dependency on agricultural income and a low rate of transition from 
farm to non-farm economic activities.  
The program significantly improved the living standards of certain beneficiary 
households in the targeted communes. While the program impact on income and 
poverty of the Kinh &Hoa ethnic groups is neither large nor statistically significant, it 
has large and statistically significant impacts on the income and poverty rates of 
ethnic minority groups. Thus, theprogram successfully targeted the most 
disadvantaged groups in the treatment communes. According to the baseline data, the 
treatment communes were generally worse off than control communes in 2007, 
indicating that targeting the program on the most needy communes was accurate. In 
addition, the Kinh & Hoa households were substantially better-off than the ethnic 
minority households in most key dimensions of living conditions, including income, 
housing, sanitation, and education. Education is critically important to households 
and their communities.  Enrollment rates of minority children are lower than those of 
non-minorities, especially for upper-secondary school. However, enrollments 
improved among households in treatment and in comparison communes and in all 
cases but one, enrollments in treatment communes increased more than in 
comparison communes, but the impacts were not statistically significant. 
As pointed out in the Baseline Report, there was a big gap between the “baseline” 
outcomes and the P135-II targets, which implies a big challenge for the program to 
achieve its ambitious targets.15 Our results show that the program only partly 
achieved of its targets. It reduced the poverty rate from 57.5% to 49.2%,though the 
target rate was 30%. Only 41% of households have annual income per capita of over 
3.5 million VND, while the target is 70%. Net primary enrollment and lower 
secondary enrollment in the targeted communes did improve but are still far behind 
the goals (85.4% compared to 95% and 70.9% compared to 75%, respectively). 
About 28% of the households reported that they lacked of food sometime in 2012. In 
addition, progress toward achievement of the targets varies among different ethnic 
                                                        
15Chapter 8- Analysis of the P135-II Baseline Survey 
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groups. While sustained improvements in income and poverty were found in Tay, 
Nung, Dao, and H’mong groups, less improvement was seen among other ethnic 
groups, especially the Thai. The fact that program benefits were not equally 
distributed among different ethnic groups suggests that future support to these 
communes should be better designed to account for the specific conditions, needs, 
and culture of each ethnic group. 
This report aims to measure the impact of the program on expected outcomes of key 
variables and the overall progress toward specific targets.Disaggregating the impacts, 
to explain why the program had different impacts on different ethnic groups and 
regions requires further study. In addition, analysis of the reasons some poor 
households remain poor in spite of the program and why some of the major targets 
were not achieved requires an additional study. Such studies have the potential to 
add valuable information for better design of future programs to supports the target 
households and their communities. 
 107 
REFERENCES 
Alderman, H. and Haque, T. (2006) ‘Countercyclical Safety Nets for the Poor and 
Vulnerable’, Food Policy 31(4): 372-383. 
Coleman, B. E. (2002), "Microfinance in Northeast Thailand: Who benefits and How 
much?" Asian Development Bank - Economics and Research Department Working Paper 
9. 
Datt, G. and  Ravallion, M. (1991), “Growth and Redistribution Components of 
Changes in Poverty Measures: A Decomposition with Applications to Brazil and India 
in the 1980s”, Living Standard Measurement Study, Working Paper No. 83. 
Deaton Angus (1997), “The Analysis of Household Surveys”, the Johns Hopkins 
University Press, Baltimore, Maryland, U.S.A. 
Farrington, J. and Slater, R. (2006) ‘Introduction: Cash Transfers: Panacea for Poverty 
Reduction or Money Down the Drain?’, Development Policy Review 24(5): 499–511 
Farrington, J. and Slater, R. (2006) ‘Introduction: Cash Transfers: Panacea for Poverty 
Reduction or Money Down the Drain?’, Development Policy Review 24(5): 499–511 
Finan, F., Sadoulet E., De Janvry A., 2005. Measuring the poverty reduction potential of 
land in rural Mexico. Journal of Development Economics 77: 27– 51.  
Foster, J., J. Greer, E. Thorbecke (1984), “A Class of Decomposable Poverty Measures”, 
Econometrica, 52, 761-765. 
Haughton Jonathan, Shahidur R. Khandker (2009), Handbook on Poverty and 
Inequality, The World Bank, 1818 H Street, NW, Washington, DC, the USA. 
Hulme, D., and Shepherd, A. (2003), “Conceptualizing Chronic Poverty”, World 
Development, Vol. 31, No 3. 
Jalan, J., and Ravallion, M. (2000), “Is Transient Poverty Different? Evidence for Rural 
China”, Journal of Development Studies (Special Issue) (August). 
 108 
Lagarde M, Haines A, Palmer N (2009), “The impact of conditional cash transfers on 
health outcomes and use of health services in low and middle income countries 
(Review)”, The Cochrane Collaboration. Published by JohnWiley & Sons, Ltd. 
Lanjouw, J. O. and P. Lanjouw. 1995. Rural nonfarm employment: A survey. Policy 
Research Working Paper, 1463. The World Bank. 
Lanjouw, P. 1998. Ecuador’s rural nonfarm sector as a route out of poverty. Policy 
Research Working Paper, 1094. The World Bank. 
Lipton, M. 1985. Land assets and rural poverty. World Bank Staff Working Papers, No. 
744.  
Lloyd-Sherlock, P. (2006) ‘Simple Transfers, Complex Outcomes: The Impacts of 
Pensions on Poor Households in Brazil’, Development and Change 37(5): 969-995. 
M. H. Quach and a. W. Mullineux (2007), “The Impact of Access to Credit on 
Household Welfare oin Rural Vietnam”, Research In Accounting In Emerging 
Economies Vol. 7, pp: 279–307. 
Morduch, J. (1995), "Income Smoothing and Consumption Smoothing", Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 9(3): 103-14. 
Nguyen, V.C. (2008), “Is a Governmental Microcredit Program for the Poor really Pro-
poor? Evidence from Vietnam”, The Developing Economies 46 (2), pp: 151 – 187. 
Pham, T., and Lensink, R. (2008), “Is Microfinance an Important Instrument for 
Poverty Alleviation? The Impact of Microcredit Programs on Self-employment Profits 
in Vietnam”, The Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Groningen, The 
Netherlands. 
Pham. H., Le. T, Nguyen C. (2011), “Poverty of the Ethnic Minorities in Vietnam: 
Situation and Challenges from the P135-II Communes”, Research report for State 
Committee for Ethnic Minority Affairs of Vietnam and United Nations Development 
Program, Hanoi, Vietnam.  
 109 
Pitt, M., and Khandker, S. (1998), "The Impact of Group-Based Credit Programs on 
Poor Households in Bangladesh: Does the Gender of Participants Matter?", Journal of 
Political Economy 106(5): 958-995. 
Ruben R and M. van den Berg. 2001. Nonfarm employment and poverty alleviation of 
rural farm households in Honduras. World Development 29(3): 549-560. 
UND (2006), Human Development Report 2006. 
WHO (2004), Meeting the MDG Drinking Water and Sanitation: A Mid- Term 
Assessment of Progress. Geneva: WHO, ISBN 92 4 156278 1. 
Wooldridge J. M. (2001). Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data. The 
MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts London, England. 
World Bank (2012), “Well Begun, Not Yet Done: Vietnam's Remarkable Progress on 
Poverty Reduction and the Emerging Challenges”, The Work Bank.  
 
  
 110 
APPENDIX 
Three Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) Poverty Index 
The three FGT indexes are computed as follows (Foster, Greer and Thorbecke, 
1984):16 
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Where Yi is a per capita income for person i (there are no data on consumption 
expenditure in the Baseline Survey 2007 as well as the Endline Survey in 2012). z is 
the poverty line, n is the number of people in the sample population, q is the number 
of poor people, and α can be interpreted as a measure of inequality aversion.  
When α = 0, we have the headcount index H, which measures the proportion of 
people below the poverty line. When α = 1 and α = 2, we obtain the poverty gap PG, 
which measures the depth of poverty, and the squared poverty gap P2which measures 
the severity of poverty, respectively. 
Gini index 
The Gini index is computed as follows (Deaton, 1997): 
∑
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where iρ  is the rank of person i in the Y-distribution, counting from the richest so that 
the richest has the rank of 1. Y is the average per capita income. n is the number of 
people in the sample. 
                                                        
16For other poverty measures, see Deaton (1997) and Haughton and Khandker (2009). 
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The value of the Gini coefficient varies from 0 when everyone has the same income to 
1 when one person has everything. The closer a Gini coefficient is to one, the more 
unequal is the income distribution.  
The generalized entropy (GE) inequality measures are measured by the following 
formula: 
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The GE indexes range from zero and infinity, and higher values indicate higher 
inequality. α is the weight given to different parts of the income distribution. GE(α) 
with lower values is more sensitive to changes in the lower tail of the distribution, 
and GE(α) with higher is more sensitive to changes in the upper tail of the 
distribution. GE(0) is called the Theil L index of inequality, while GE(1) is called the 
Theil T index.17 
Model to determine the poverty status of household 
The probability of household i being in poverty status j is modeled as follows: 
,
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Where X is a vector of household characteristics, and β is a vector of coefficients to be 
estimated. Since the coefficients in the multinomial logit model do not have clear 
meaningful interpretation, we compute the marginal effect as follows. 
                                                        
17 For other poverty and inequality measures, see Haughton and Khandker (2009). 
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Definition and calculation method of key response variables 
1.  Household Assets 
- Household Productive Assets Index: 
 () =  * ∑ *&  ,  
  = 1if household has at least one of asset , , and 0 otherwise; 
 assets are listed in Section 5 of the questionnaire. 
- Household Consumer Durables Index: 
 - =  . ∑ /
.
&  ,   
 / = 1if household has at least one of durable , , and 0 otherwise; 
 durables are listed in Section 5 of the questionnaire. 
- Housing Quality Index: 
  01 = (10 − (ℎ345 + 6345 + 3345))/7, where: 
  ℎ345:  1 = permanent house 
    2 = semi-permanent house 
    3 = temporary house 
  6345: 1 = piped water 
    2 = clean water source 
    3 = other 
  3345:  1 = flush toilet 
    2 = other toilet 
    3 = no toilet 
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  HQI ranges from 1/7 to 1; higher scores indicate “better” houses. 
2.  Agricultural Productivity 
 Productivity (rice):  
 kilograms per square meter of land allocated to rice production; 
 value of rice produced per square meter of land allocated to rice 
production. 
 Productivity (corn):  
 kilograms per square meter of land allocated to corn production; 
 value of corn produced per square meter of land allocated to corn 
production. 
 Productivity (cassava):  
 kilograms per square meter of land allocated to cassava production; 
 value of cassava produced per square meter of land allocated to cassava 
production. 
 Productivity (industrial crops):  
 kilograms per square meter of land allocated to industrial crops 
production; 
 value of industrial crops produced per square meter of land allocated to 
industrial crops production. 
 Share of land allocated to industrial crops. 
3.   Household Income18 
 Income from wages & salaries, thousands of VND per year. 
 Income from agricultural activities, thousands of VND per year. 
 Income from household enterprises,thousands of VND per year.19 
                                                        
18
   Real values were computed using province-specific deflators to make 2007 and 2012 values 
comparable. 
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 Household income from all sources, thousands of VND per year. 
 Household income per-capita, thousands of VND per year. 
 Indicator for household poverty status; the indicator = 1 if real per-capita 
household income was below the rural poverty line; 0 otherwise.   
4.   Other Indicators 
 Primary school enrollment rate: the proportion of household’s primary-aged 
children enrolled in school. 
 Lower secondary school enrollment rate: the proportion of household’s lower 
secondary-aged children enrolled in school. 
 Upper secondary school enrollment rate: the proportion of household’s upper 
secondary-aged children enrolled in school. 
 Travel times to schools.20 
 Travel times to health facilities: weighted average of travel times to various 
facilities, with weights proportional to the numbers of visits by household 
members to each type of facility. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                        
19
This variable has too few observations for analysis. 
20
   These variables had insufficient numbers of observations for analysis. 
